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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores community organizing by Community Development Corporations
(CDCs), the different outcomes achieved by organizing campaigns, and the factors that
contribute to their successes and failures. Among organizing outcomes, I focus not only
on policy victories and physical or economic improvements to communities, but also on
the ways that collective action produces changes in local political institutions. Using rich
qualitative and extensive quantitative data from organizing campaigns by ten CDCs, I
show how claims about the role of racial and ethnic difference in community, and about
the need for conflict in creating community change, find acceptance or resistance from
political institutions. While institutional resistance to a campaign's claims about
community makes it more difficult for campaigns to succeed, this resistance also
indicates the possibility that successful organizing will enact changes to local institutions.
I find that CDCs won campaigns (and with success, enacted some type of impact on
political institutions) by coordinating mobilization throughout their activities and
departments, and by including activists in governance and decision-making.
Thesis supervisor: Langley C. Keyes
Ford Professor of Urban Planning
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Ways of Contending:
Community Organizing and Development in Neighborhood Context
Introduction and Question
Community organizing can make a difference in poor people's lives. It can
develop indigenous leaders, shift power toward the disenfranchised and toward persons
of color (Delgado 1986, Osterman 2002, Fainstein and Fainstein 1974), create social
capital and community cohesion (Warren 2001, Gitell and Vidal 1998, Saegert 2001) and
direct additional resources to distressed areas (Rubin 1992, Hartmann 1984, Greenstone
and Peterson 1973). As veterans of collective action understand, organizing does not
always accomplish these important and potentially transformative goals, although this
fact is often neglected both by writers on organizing and by scholars of movement
activity generally (Giugni 1998; for an important exception, see Gamson 1990). While
much writing on organizing focuses on its successes (Herz 2002, Medoff and Sklar
1994), many efforts stumble or are defeated (Castells 1983, Marcuse 1999, Stone 2001).
Some campaigns may build power for the organization without achieving immediate
goals. Others may achieve their immediate objectives but not affect broader social or
political dynamics. In some rare cases, campaigns may both succeed and also alter power
dynamics within a neighborhood or policy field. Organizers and residents also know that
there are different types of failed campaigns. Some campaigns may dissolve with little
impact; others may achieve limited but relatively unimportant successes. Others may be
struck down by effective countermobilization.
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This thesis's central concern is to ask what dynamics lead to these different types
of outcomes. In it, I explore community organizing by Community Development
Corporations (CDCs), the different outcomes achieved by organizing campaigns, and the
factors that contribute to their successes and failures. Among organizing outcomes, I
focus not only on policy victories, and physical or economic improvements to
communities, but also on the ways that collective action produces changes in local
political institutions'. That is, community organizing attempts not only to realize specific,
resident-defined objectives - creating a park, enacting legislation, seizing land or
generating resources for affordable housing - but also seeks to achieve change within
political institutions. By winning a campaign, residents and activists demonstrate to other
groups and to political actors that their organization and its demands should be taken
seriously. I focus especially on two aspects of political institutions. The first aspect
examines ways that community organizations interact with each other. As writers on
community structure have understood since analysis of inter-organizational networks in
the 1970s (Lauman 1977, 1978), power within neighborhood systems is greatly
influenced by the structure of relationships among local groups. Although organizing
creates relationships among individuals, by bringing individuals into an organization, it
also may change the balance of power among existing community groups, or change the
terms of interaction among them - affecting local dynamics of cooperation or contention.
The second aspect of institutions encompasses rules, policies or practices on the part of
state actors that affect the neighborhood. I especially focus on changes in the openness of
agencies to political participation by organized constituents, because these are changes
Because of the place-based nature of the organizing, and the scale of activities, changes to these
institutions were often seen on the local level. However, in chapter four, dynamics particular to the small
cities described set the ambitions of campaigns toward citywide institutions.
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most likely to benefit CDC constituents in a sustainable way. In the case of CDCs
organizing, which often focuses often on housing or economic development, these
practices are mostly likely to be seen among agencies or policies that influence local
development activities and outcomes. In these areas, what can CDC organizing achieve,
and what leads to different types of organizing outcomes? What types of successes can




The basic question of this thesis - asking what CDC organizing can accomplish -
evokes controversy within policy debate around organizing practice; for many organizers,
the statement that CDCs can in fact organize effectively is a non-starter. Randy Stoeker's
(1997) analysis of Community Development Corporations and their ability to organize
(2001) holds that it is almost impossible for them to challenge power and deliver
meaningful benefits to their communities (see also M. Gittell 1999). Because community
development involves the manipulation of existing institutional arrangements, Stoeker
argues, CDCs cannot succeed in changing the terms of debate and in leveraging
substantial gains for poor communities (1997). Stoeker writes that most efforts on the
part of CDCs to organize will fail, even though CDCs not organizing will consign them
to powerlessness and irrelevance (2001).
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While strongly stated, Stoeker and Gittell's perspective on CDCs does in fact
draw on significant aspects of the proliferation of the CDC form. Devolution of urban
policy since the Nixon Administration, and powerful successes in rebuilding many
distressed neighborhoods, have made CDCs a prominent instrument of governmental and
social objectives. Supported by public and private sources, CDCs counsel businesses,
engage in community planning activities, and provide job training, day care and other
social services (Vidal 1996, 1986, 1995). As developers of housing and real estate,
CDCs must form close relations with banks, foundations, funding intermediaries, and city
zoning and planning committees (Keyes 1996). These relations enable them to produce a
significant amount of affordable housing, to manage property, and to develop commercial
real estate. According to Walker and Weinheimer (1998), CDCs produced 90,000 units of
affordable housing between 1991 and 1997, more than that directly subsidized by the
federal government. During the 1990s, CDCs and CDC support systems worked to
systematize gains in proliferation and production made during the 1970s and 1980s, when
the number of CDCs grew from the hundreds to the thousands across the country
(Stoutland 1998). This relationship-building and financial support was in part
accomplished through the National Community Development Initiative (NCDI), a 23-city
program that pooled over $200 million from public and foundation sources to strengthen
ties among CDCs, between CDCs and financial institutions, and with City Hall (Walker
and Weinheimer 1998). Stoeker and others argue that this public support and the
institutionalized connections that come with it make CDCs unable to challenge power.
On the other side of the "can CDCs organize?" question, there are few proponents
of CDC organizing as a practice, although there are many defenders of CDCs (cf Bratt
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1997, Vidal 1997, and Keyes 1996, although their work is much more nuanced and more
critical also of failure within the industry form). These writers often espouse a strategy of
leveraging formal networks in community development. Although I explore this issue
more in my conclusion, at the moment I note that the dichotomously-posed debate about
CDCs and CDC organizing emphasizes a world view where structural forces - in this
case, the presence of networks and the power of resources - dominate analyses of
community action and its impacts. Those who say that CDCs cannot achieve meaningful
changes rely on terms that privilege structural forces over the ability of individuals or
organizations to overcome or alter them. Similarly, those who champion CDCs at broad
levels believe that accessing monetary resources and formal networks is the most critical
strategy in creating community change. Both these views represent a form of structural
determinism, or what Margaret Archer calls "downward conflationism" (1988) for its
belief that individual and group behavior is determined by forces above them. Neither is a
theoretical position consistent with the organizer's professed belief that change from
below is possible2 . In contrast, this thesis seeks to explore, by actually examining CDC
2 Archer's argument is as follows: there are three types of logical errors that theorists who articulate a
relationship between structure and agency make. The first is a "downward conflationism," with which she
associates many Marxist writers. Downward conflationists write that structural forces, or those "above" the
realm of individual and collective agency, help constitute the practices of those actors. The second is an
"upward conflationism," held by microsociologists or rational choice proponents, who see larger cultural
practices to be determined from the actions of individuals and groups from "below." The third error is a
"medium conflationalism;" where writers such as Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1977) argue that structure
and agency by definition constitute each other. Archer's point is that this last stance grants too much power
to both categories of structure and agency at every historical moment; one cannot, therefore, draw insights
about the periods in which either structural or agentic forces hold sway, and so cannot suggest how major
periods of change or stasis develop. Instead, she writes that theories describing change and stability must
conceive of structure and agency to be distinct, so as to draw more clearly the ways that they interact with
each other, and to describe how actors' attempts to transform structure sometimes fail and sometimes
succeed. My thesis draws on this analytical dualism for several reasons. First, an agentic framework toward
community change requires the analysis of campaign planning and action distinct from the cultural and
political settings in which it occurs. In doing so, I do not purport that work occurred independent of their
settings; instead, I explore how campaigns impact community structure in different ways, sometimes
succeeding and sometimes failing to change or to reinforce them. Broadly, while debates about structure
and agency occur on very theoretical levels, I have been able to employ some of these concepts about
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organizing practice, the ways that CDC's institutional relationships, and their reliance on
public and private resources, may in fact bring with them ties that make it difficult for
them to mount successful or meaningful challenges to government or economic actors.
This thesis attempts to move beyond reliance on broad theories that provide dichotomous
answers to difficult questions, and asks instead "how much," and "under what
circumstances" do these forces undermine a CDC's ability to challenge.
Is consensus or conflict organizing more effective?
Closely related to the debate around whether CDCs can organize is question of
whether conflict or consensus organizing is more effective. Stoeker (2001) argues that
CDCs cannot organize because community developers do not see the world in its truest
terms: full of conflict and self-interest. In this way, Stoeker's position about CDC
organizing reflects the stance that consensus organizing, a recently-developed offshoot of
organizing practice, is less effective than other models articulated in the United States
since the 1950s. Although purposive attempts to change urban neighborhoods and
government through collective action at the grass roots are probably as old as cities and
states themselves (Castells 1983; Tilly 1978), discourse about community organizing
within the United States draws extensively on the institutional history of a practice
developed from Saul Alinsky's work in the Chicago's Back of the Yards neighborhood.
Alinsky emphasized contentious tactics and confrontation to provoke positive action
toward communities by powerful actors. In recent years, a different approach to
structure and agency in an empirical study with the goal of illuminating what types of dynamics lead to
change, and which fail to do so.
David Micah Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 11
organizing emerged in reaction to organizing's tendency to emphasize conflict. For
Michael Eichler, founder of the Consensus Organizing Institute, the confrontation model
often results in failure because it refuses to create issues of mutual self-interest that can
bring together broad constituencies:
The organizer who sees the world in terms of absolutes is doomed. Most people,
regardless of income, realize how complicated the world has become. Just ask any
parent. We can no longer afford to oversimplify. Instead, we have to admit how
complicated and contradictory the world has become....We need to teach people
how to analyze the self-interest of potential partners and have the ideological
flexibility to mix and match partners. (1998)
Of special relevance to CDCs, Eichler directed a demonstration project for the
Local Initiatives Support Corporation to test principles of consensus organizing. This
program used a consensus-organizing model to bring together stakeholders (including
neighborhood associations, service groups, banks, and elected officials) in the
Monongahela Valley region, Phoenix, and other areas, so they could come together to
form new CDCs. For proponents of consensus organizing - prominently, Ross Gittell and
Avis Vidal (1998), whose book describes the LISC demonstration project - this
organizing for CDC formation proves that more confrontational organizing is
counterproductive. Certainly, the cases Gittell and Vidal study demonstrate that
consensus organizing may effectively advance the goal of building nonprofit housing
delivery capacity, especially in areas without a strong tradition of CDCs. However,
because organizing in the LISC demonstration project did not involve more typical,
challenge-oriented models, thereby making comparison difficult, the claims Gittell and
Vidal make about the superiority of consensus to challenge-oriented models do not
entirely fit their data.
David Micah Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 12
In avoiding the dichotomously-posed question, "Can CDCs organize," I argued
briefly that skeptics of CDCs and CDC organizing hold theoretical positions that
privilege structural forces over agentic ones. In contrast, both proponents and detractors
of conflict and consensus organizing privilege agency - namely, people's cognitive
ability to frame action and interpret reality - over structural forces. Those who hold that
mobilization on either model is more effective believe that people's collective capacity to
analyze community structure is one of the most important factors that determines whether
or not they will be able to create change. That is, they argue that seeing the world in
terms of powerful conflicts, on the one hand, or seeing the world in potential allies on the
other (and adopting the tactics that stem from either analysis) will result in more effective
work.
In the conclusion to this thesis, I argue that this position is analogous to what
Archer (1988) calls "upward conflationism" - the theoretical stance that practices on the
part of individuals and groups from below create larger structural patterns. The following
chapters explore ways that political structures are complex and difficult to influence, no
matter how they are understood. The CDCs I study take very different approaches to
collective action - some avoid conflict, and some embrace it. CDCs also analyze issues
of racial and ethnic difference in varied ways, also with substantial implications for the
development of campaigns and their reception by political institutions. Instead of
exploring the universal efficacy of conflict or consensus organizing, this thesis explores
the possibility that in different contexts, conflict organizing or consensus organizing
might create different types of responses from local and state actors. It also explores the
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possibility that success is dependent on factors other than the orientation of a CDC
toward challenge or toward consensus.
My overall objective, then, is to move toward a more nuanced theoretical account
of CDC organizing outcomes, and, secondarily, of community action by community and
service organizations. In my view, this account would both avoid the dichotomously-
posed debates around CDCs and organizing, and also depict the phenomenon of
organizing in a way that describes the role of both human agency and social structure.
My analysis tries to illustrate the interaction between the two broad categories of agency
and structure - at least as collective action and movement activity at the neighborhood
level illuminates them 3. As is suggested by the title of my thesis, I explore ways of
contending - understanding that there is not just one form that struggle can take. I also
explore the specific context in which these struggles occur - understanding that practices
effective in one neighborhood might provoke a different response in others.
Going beyond theoretical dichotomies to ask what happens
Although proponents and opponents of CDCs, conflict organizing, and consensus
organizing make broad claims, there have been few studies of the actual experiences of
3 Throughout this thesis, I attempt to enter into conversations about social movement dynamics, both to
draw on their insights about collective action on a neighborhood level, and to convey the implications of
this research for wider audiences. This study, with the work of many involved in describing social
movements, highlights purposive efforts to involve ordinary people in collective activities that attempt
change. This does not mean that the fit between these literatures and the phenomenon of CDC organizing is
exact. Movement studies encompass varied issues, from animal rights efforts, to the work of gay men and
lesbians for equality, to environmental activism, to urban riots. Furthermore, as those within and outside the
Community Development field will often stress, as an organizational form, CDCs do not constitute a
movement in themselves, although their growth has often been supported by movement activity. The
uneasy fit between CDCs and movements is in itself a provocative question for the policy field, and is one
that organizers within CDCs also address as they attempt to make campaigns work.
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CDCs who engage in organizing and challenge. Stoeker's analysis of CDC organizing
has largely focused upon the different institutional logics represented by organizing and
development activities, and the certainty that these logics will result in failure. Gittell-
Vidal's accounts of organizing for CDC formation, while detailed, do not describe the
experiences of CDCs after they are formed, and so do not address Stoeker's critiques of
pressures caused by the CDC form. As might be expected when such a strongly-stated
positions as Stoeker's or Gittell-Vidal's are held to scrutiny and broader testing, the
experiences of CDCs who organize are much more complex, in the same way that CDCs
as a whole are not so easily characterized. On the one hand, practitioners within the cases
I study readily acknowledge that CDCs are a difficult vehicle through which communities
may organize. As groups possessed of heavy resource dependencies, consensual
obligations to government and economic actors, and professional processes that often
militate against community involvement, many find it difficult to develop leadership and
mount campaigns aimed at community change. At the same time, many CDCs took root
in communities that joined to fight urban renewal or otherwise improve their
neighborhoods, and retain their identities as activist, resident-driven organizations. For
others, especially those formed primarily around housing or economic development
missions, organizing is an activity that must be incorporated into other modes of
community practice - they must learn how to do it, and sometimes do learn how, often
through difficult experience.
Instead of asking whether or not CDCs can organize, I describe what happens
when they try to do so. By focusing on the range of outcomes associated with CDC
organizing, the factors that contribute to their attempts to create change, this thesis avoids
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essentialist claims about what CDCs are, what they do, and what they represent within
cities. I do not attempt to champion CDCs as an organizational form, or claim that their
organizing represents a vanguard within attempts at urban political change. However,
CDCs are a significant presence in many of the US's largest cities, and the CDC field
needs to be seen understood productively in relationship to organizing and urban
movement re-building. The sheer number of CDCs (estimated near 3,600 by their trade
association, the National Congress on Community Economic Development) and their
role in affordable housing production, community reinvestment advocacy, and service
delivery, makes CDCs' ability to learn organizing important.
Methodology
Data sources
My thesis draws its data from the Ricanne Hadrian Initiative for Community
Organizing (RHICO), a funding and leaming program that supports organizing by CDCs.
These data represent an extraordinary window into the process of collective action by
community organizations, and a way to explore the impacts of CDC organizing. While
sharing a broader political and economic context, RHICO CDCs take part in different
local dynamics, and have different internal organizational characteristics. I worked with
the ten CDCs funded through the RHICO program as multi-year grantees, each of whom
developed their own organizing campaigns to attempt local change. These CDCs
operated in very different neighborhoods of Boston: 1) Chinatown, 2) the working-class
and Latino (but rapidly gentrifying) community of Jamaica Plain, 3) the African-
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American and African-Caribbean neighborhood of Codman Square in Dorchester, 4) the
progressive, largely-white neighborhood of the Fenway, and 5) the multi-ethnic
neighborhoods of Allston and Brighton. Within Greater Boston, sites included 6) a city-
wide CDC in the diverse working-class suburb of Somerville, and 7) a CDC in a largely
Dominican Salem neighborhood called the Point. Outside of Boston, there was 8) a CDC
in a predominantly Puerto Rican part of Holyoke in Western Massachusetts, 9) one in the
historic mill town of Lawrence on the Merrimack River, and 10) one serving the former
mill towns of Fitchburg and Leominster in Central Massachusetts.
Campaign goals for each CDC varied, but were focused generally on issues of
affordable housing creation, community control of development and land use, or resource
generation for specific projects of importance to the neighborhood. This focus on
development by CDC campaigns was in part a natural extension of CDC's regular
programmatic interests, and in part a feature of the RHICO program design. RHICO
mandated that participants propose a campaign that in some way engaged the overall
work of the CDC, so as to spark conversation within the organization as to the role of
community organizing in carrying out development objectives, and to promote more
inclusive development practices among them. For example, the Jamaica Plain NDC was
engaged in a multi-faceted "Campaign of Conscience," whose goal was to gain control of
publicly-owned vacant lots for affordable housing uses, and to build electoral power for
anti-gentrification policy measures. The Twin Cities CDC had a local legislative
campaign against family displacement and for multi-family housing development. The
Asian CDC worked to coordinate resident efforts to gain control of a parcel of land
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opened up by Boston's Central Artery and Tunnel Project (or "Big Dig"), the nation's
largest public infrastructure program, for affordable housing construction.
Campaigns that had multiple goals tended also to be concerned with affordable
housing. This was the case with the Allston Brighton CDC, where housing inflation
sparked by Harvard University's move into the neighborhood forced activist engagement
with the planning process designed to shape this expansion. Other campaigns were
concerned more broadly with projecting a progressive vision for local development. For
example, community planning and organizing in the Norfolk Triangle area of Codman
Square in Dorchester, carried out by the Codman Square Neighborhood Development
Corporation, hoped to address the problem of vacant lots by finding ways to replace them
with development of the community's design and choosing. In Holyoke, Nuestras Raices
hoped to force institutionalization of a city policy to let neighborhood residents decide
the best use of city-owned vacant lots. In Boston, the Fenway CDC worked to implement
the community's "Urban Village Plan," which would transform a strip Boylston Street
from a 'sea of gas stations' into a green, pedestrian-friendly, multi-use and mixed-income
neighborhood.
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Figure 1: Organizing Campaigns
CDC Location Campaign
Asian CDC Boston's Organize community to take control of scarce
Chinatown land opened up by Central Artery/Tunnel (Big
Dig) project
Allston-Brighton Northwestern, Form organization of Latinos, attempt to
CDC residential Boston influence planning process around Harvard
neighborhoods University's expansion into the neighborhood
Codman Square Low-income, Organize vision for land use and development
NDC African-American within a concentrated subarea of the




Fenway CDC Progressive, Develop and implement "urban village plan" -
student/gentrified pedestrian-friendly vision for affordable
Boston housing, educational opportunities, senior
neighborhood services, "green" building, community
economic development
Jamaica Plain Progressive, "Campaign of Conscience" to build 5,000
NDC diverse working affordable homes, preserve existing affordable
class housing; open up city-owned land for affordable
neighborhood in housing development; coalition to educate
Boston mobilize and vote, legislative action
Lawrence Former mill town Develop network of leaders, flexible structures
CommunityWorks on the Merrimac for interaction and power-building; outcomes in
River physical change, economic development, and
policy change
Nuestras Raices Former mill town Organize CDC's base of urban gardeners, and
of Holyoke in other community residents, around new plan for
Western Mass community-controlled vacant lot disposition
Salem Harbor Former mill and Win community center from the city and
CDC port town, largely develop it according to neighborhood vision
Dominican
neighborhood
Somerville Diverse working Organize diverse neighborhood association in
Community Corp. class suburb of the Union Square Neighborhood, concentrating
Boston on civic and quality-of-life issues
Twin Cities CDC Former mill "Taking Action Committee" running anti-
towns of displacement campaign aimed at local and
Fitchburg, statewide policy; "Plymouth Street Initiative"
Leominster in aimed at community revitalization in Cleghorn
north central MA neighborhood of Fitchburg.
David Micah Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 19
Although not itself the focus of my research, the RHICO program deserves
presentation both as an important endeavor and as the setting for this research. A joint
initiative of the Massachusetts Association of CDCs (MACDC) and Boston's Local
Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), RHICO funds organizing by CDCs and provides
technical assistance, peer learning opportunities, topical electives, and opportunities for
reflection and documentation about the experience of CDC organizing (MACDC 2004).
Named after a CDC organizer and project director who worked both for progressive
CDCs and for MACDC, RHICO emanated from an analysis that the community
development industry in Massachusetts, while achieving many powerful goals, had left
behind its roots in activism. RHICO's supporters among CDCs - in steering committee
and leaders - drew from staff and executive directors at the most progressive, activist
CDCs in the trade association, who believed that principles of community organizing
must integrated more broadly into the work of Massachusetts CDCs. This message from
activists in the CDC field about the importance of community organizing found
resonance - although not uncomplicated reception - with funders and intermediaries the
community development as a whole. Funders and intermediaries embraced RHICO as a
reformist vision of what CDCs should be, as a tool believed to result in more effective
statewide advocacy efforts during an era of budgetary shortfalls and recession, and as a
statement of ideological purpose in itself One condensed evocation of these multiple
goals can be seen in the speech of Joe Kriesberg, CEO of MACDC, to activists
assembled at a RHICO "leadership summit" in the Spring of 2003. In his words to those
gathered, Kriesberg cites a normative commitment to organizing, a vision of what 'a
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return to the grass roots' should constitute, and an analysis of what will be effective in
enforcing MACDC's legislative advocacy efforts:
About ten years ago, we [within leadership positions at CDCs] realized that we
weren't doing what we needed to do to really make the change that we wanted to
make in our communities, and that you wanted to make in your communities. And
that we were focused on the buildings, and the money, and on the deals, that we
had begun to lose sight of what really drove our whole movement, which was
people, like those who are in this room. The leaders and the community people
who make the changes that make things better... .If [people in power] think about
me, if they think about two executive directors, they're not gong to respond. They
don't care about one or two people. But if there's thousands of people out there
asking them the same thing.. .we think we can make a lot more change than we
have in the past. And that's a tall order, because we've done quite a bit in the past.
(RHICO peer leadership summit 5/03)
Participatory, longitudinal data collection: showing paths campaigns take over
time
The primary methodology for data collection was participatory. My engagement
with CDC staff and activists aimed to facilitate and observe site-driven problem
definition, analysis, action, and evaluation - both drawing from and furthering insights
that naturally develop over the course of community organizing. As RHICO "learning
historian," I developed processes for reflection and communication among the ten sites
funded for multi-year organizing grants, was primarily responsible for implementing
them, and wrote reports for the initiative on the work of its participants. By prior
agreement with the program, and through prior and ongoing arrangement with the sites,
data I collected for this report-writing could also be used for thesis writing and
publication. My work with CDCs meant supporting staff and leaders' efforts to identify
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significant challenges within their organizing, and to elaborate the strategies they
employed to overcome these challenges. Working with groups in the context of early
campaign planning, and through a site-visit process that emphasized critical thinking
around campaign strategy, 'challenges' were defined as issues that were both difficult,
and also necessary to achieve success - within their organizations, their communities,
and their campaigns. These 'challenges' became the focus of interviews with staff at
different positions, which occurred from April of 2002 until January of 2004. During this
period, I interviewed staff at each CDC about every other month.
In addition to these interviews, I also attended and sometimes facilitated
workplanning and/or technical assistance sessions for each CDC, where CDC staff came
together to strategize about their work. In lieu of traditional site visits, I supported and
recorded two reflective sessions for each CDC, where staff, board, and leaders came
together to discuss challenges and successes in their campaigns, and observed program-
sponsored peer learning sessions. I also observed multiple public meetings and actions at
each CDC, so as to collect other confirming or contradictory data on participants' own
accounts of their actions, and to witness other dynamics sparked by them.
Complementing the detailed insights produced about each campaign, the longitudinal
nature of my encounters with CDCs and activists over an eighteen-month period
illuminates important temporal aspects to organizing - the place of the unexpected, the
ways that potential successes and setbacks emerge to participants of collective action
over time, and the factors that played into campaign successes at critical junctures for
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each CDC.4
4 From a more traditional research perspective, extensive data collection from multiple perspectives within
each agency allows for hypothesis development, and also hypothesis testing, using both qualitative and
quantitative methods. These processes occurred through coding and analysis of the interviews, group
discussions, and written materials provided by sites; through collection and analysis of supplemental
written accounts in local and regional newspapers; and through interviews with knowledgeable informants
outside the campaigns. I assessed the validity of my qualitative analyses through extensive feedback loops
with participants, and through presentation of initial findings to the RHICO committee, where my initial
coding - presented as 'themes' from the field - was discussed.
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Figure 2: Qualitative Data Collection
CDC Individual Collective strategy Meetings Additional
interviews/reflective sessions observed or materials
sessions and/or facilitated actions reviewed
observed
Asian CDC 9 3 3 1,2, 3, 4,
5,6,7, 8,
9
Allston-Brighton 9 5 5 1, 2, 3, 4,
CDC 5, 6, 7
Codman Square 11 3 1 1,2,3,4,7
NDC
Fenway CDC 5 2 3 1,2,3,4,5,6
Jamaica Plain 5 4 4 1,2,3,4,5,6
NDC ,7,8
Lawrence 10 3 1 1,2,3,4,5,6
CommunityWorks ,7,8
Nuestras Raices 4 3 0 1,2,3,4,5,6
Salem Harbor 6 4 3 1,2,3,4,5,6
CDC ,7,8
Somerville 4 3 2 1,2,3,4,5,6
Community Corp.
Twin Cities CDC 10 2 4 1,2,3,4,5,6
,7,8





4) End of year report
5) Newsletter
6) End of year written documentation and survey
7) Newspaper Accounts
8) Video/other documentation
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This approach to data collection has surfaced a primary finding of my thesis:
namely, that organizers could not always predict what would happen if they won their
campaign - how winning might build community or organizational power, change
internal community dynamics, or result in sustainable changes for their neighborhood. As
I write in the next three chapters, the ambitions of campaigns became clear only over the
course of interaction with other community organizations, and with branches of state and
city government. Drawing from grounded theory techniques, each of these chapters
illustrates a path taken by CDC organizing, where it appeared to actors involved in the
campaign that its success would also produce a similar effect on local political cultures
and institutions. In each of the chapters I describe two cases of CDC organizing where
the potential outcomes of the campaign emerged as similar, according to actors involved
in the campaign and reliable observers of them - that is, where organizing activated
similar dynamics among other community organizations and with local government.
Although the relatively small number of cases, and significant differences in CDC
strategy, organization, and neighborhood context hinder claims at broad generalizability,
the richness of data in these chapters lets me draw out causal arguments about the
relationship among these factors as they contribute to different types of organizing
outcomes. This theory-building endeavor is consistent with approaches to qualitative
research, where attempts to give complete accounts of the phenomenon at hand also may
hold implications for similar processes (Strauss 1998).
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Figure 3: Paths that campaigns take
5 These shared contexts and characteristics are fortuitous because they allow comparison between
campaigns with different ultimate outcomes. But they also raise the possibility that CDCs with similar
organizational characteristics and operating in similar neighborhood and political structures will see similar
impacts if their work is successful. My analysis strategy does not allow me to say authoritatively what
impact these shared factors have on the course of all CDC campaigns.
Type of impact that BriefDefinition CDCs where the Shared
successful chance to achieve it organizational or
organizing may emerged structural factors5
have on local
institutions
Continuity Winning the Codman Square Large CDCs, located
campaign may NDC, in Boston (a large
preserve or sustain Jamaica Plain NDC and
the direction of organizationally-
community dense city with
mobilization and advanced CDC




Growth Winning the Somerville Small CDCs new to
campaign may Community organizing; mixed-
adjust - but not Corporation, income
fundamentally alter Asian CDC neighborhoods with





Change Winning may Nuestras Raices, Economically-
substantially change Lawrence depressed mill towns
political institutions CommunityWorks with remnants of
and with it, power political machine;
relations between poor neighborhoods
the community and with Latinos as
the state. primary constituents.
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Comparative qualitative analysis strategies
While the thesis follows the paths that CDC campaigns take - understanding how
participants understand the stakes of their campaigns as they proceed - I also care about
illuminating the factors that contribute to the ultimate success and failure of campaigns.
To answer the question of what helps some campaigns succeed, and what makes others
fail, the following three chapters also employ a comparative methodology (Ragin and
Becker 1992). Therefore, chapters two through four not only describe two cases of CDC
organizing whose paths were similar (ie, which evoked similar community dynamics, and
where organizing, if successful, would produce a similar impact on local institutions);
they also describe two campaigns where one failed and one succeeded to realize the
ambitions they surfaced over time. In each chapter, CDCs are similar in organizational
characteristics (size, financial resources, age of the organization, experience in
organizing, and overall programmatic activities), and are also in analytically comparable
settings (in neighborhood economic, demographic, and political structure. These
similarities let me better understand strategies and organizational dynamics that are most
conducive to success throughout the CDC context. Setting aside those structural factors
not in the control of organizers within CDCs (such as where the CDC is located and its
resource flow), this type of comparison lets me examine what other organizational
characteristics and organizing strategies are associated with successful work.
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Quantitative analysis - linking governance and development practices to
outcomes
The second data set I rely upon to explore CDC organizing outcomes is
quantitative. To further comparability among sites, and to explore the possibility of
correlational analysis, I helped develop questions that were administered online to
practitioners in RHICO about organizing efforts and impacts. This instrument developed
from an extensive, year-long process I helped facilitate from the summer of 2001 until
the summer of 2002, where practitioners attempted to quantify organizing impacts and
indicators they believed to be associated with the development of organizational power
by CDCs. These were administered to organizing directors about their work during the
summer of 2002 and 2003. This instrument is particularly important, as it lets me
operationalize this study's dependent variable of "organizing success" across varied sites
and neighborhoods. In my concluding chapter, I use analysis of the survey to raise broad
thematic issues about the importance of networks in organizing. In my second analysis
chapter and in my conclusion, I employ quantitative analysis to supplement analysis of
qualitative data. Using different operationalizations of the "dependent variable" of
organizing success - 1) leaders engaged in campaigns, 2) active membership associated
with campaigns, and 3) resident-driven policy wins - with independent variables
associated with internal characteristics of governance and development-related
mobilization, I fit these to linear and non-parametric regression models. Although the
small-n of the cases raises issues about the replicability of statistical findings6 , the
strength of the associations provide additional evidence as to the importance of certain
6 For statistical techniques using small sample sizes, see Sheskin 2004.
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internal organizational characteristics in winning campaigns and changing political
institutions.
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Chapter 2: The Hope for Continuity
In the following three chapters, I move beyond generalizations about the impacts
of CDC organizing, and describe in rich detail the choices that six CDCs made as they
planned what their campaigns would address, the strategies they employed to try to enact
change, the responses of local political institutions to CDC campaigns, and the successes
or failures they experienced. Because I am concerned not just with tangible community
improvements gained through organizing, but also the effect of CDC organizing on local
political institutions, in each chapter I analyze two campaigns in two communities which
evoked similar dynamics with other community organizations and state actors. Each
chapter describes a specific path that CDC organizing takes over time, where two CDCs
experiencing resistance (or acceptance) to the campaign, and developed a similar sense of
how winning might influence local institutions, either by reinforcing existing dynamics
or by changing them in some way.
However, I care not only about paths that campaigns take, and the potential
impact of organizing on local institutions, but also about whether or not this impact was
actually achieved. Therefore, these chapters not only describe a shared path experienced
by CDCs as they organize, but also contrast cases of successful and failed organizing.
Using a traditional comparative case methodology (Ragin and Becker, 1980) I chose to
bring together in each chapter CDCs that share important structural characteristics - of
organization and of neighborhood setting. This analytic strategy therefore will emphasize
the importance of differences other than these structural ones, and will explore and
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assess factors associated with successful organizing that are more within the realm of
individual and collective agency.7
Overview of CDC organizing path: "The hope for continuity"
In this chapter, I describe two cases where actors realize that winning the
campaign will also help preserve the current direction of community mobilization and
neighborhood civic life. I call this campaign path, which becomes apparent to organizers
and activists over time, "the hope for continuity." In both instances, actors come to
believe that success may not only achieve important resident-defined objectives, but also
support desirable existing patterns of inter-organizational cooperation or conflict, and the
political institutions that shape these dynamics. I explore the emergence of this path for
organizing through the work of the Codman Square Neighborhood Development
Corporation and the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation. In both
cases, each CDC's orientation toward organizing found resonance with those held by
other local actors. JPNDC's organizing, like those of most other community
organizations, emphasized both conflict and racial and ethnic difference in its campaign
framing and its organizing tactics. CSNDC's orientation toward community, and its
vision for community change, also found confluence with local homeowners associations,
in emphasizing inter-group conflict, but in downplaying the role of racial difference in
this conflict. In both cases, these resonances of vision held out the chance to strengthen
existing community systems, and to reinforce local political institutions according to
7 i.e., those strategies or organizational characteristics which community organizers and leaders CDCs have
a real chance of influencing , and not other issues, such as a CDC's overall monetary resources or its
location.
David Micah Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 31
values held by the CDC and its members. As organizing emerged around land use and
development of vacant lots in an extremely poor part of Boston's Codman Square,
organizers and activists at the Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation
(CSNDC) realized that successful creation and implementation of a community plan for
development also could strengthen existing ties among local homeowner groups.
Similarly, JPNDC's organizing also surfaced the opportunity to strengthen ties among
community organizations, by giving them the chance to enact their shared vision for
progressive and culturally-conscious community control over development.
As noted above, the second ambition of the chapter is to contrast successful and
failed organizing, among CDCs that are similar to each other in certain, largely structural,
organizational and neighborhood characteristics - in overall size and resources, in the
number of organizing staff, and in the amount and type of non-organizing (ie,
development or service) activities. JPNDC and CSNDC are located in the city of Boston,
and so participate in a climate generally favorable to neighborhood and CDC interests
(Dreier 1996). Both work in low-income neighborhoods inhabited by people of color,
although Codman Square has many more African-Americans than does Jamaica Plain,
which has more Latinos. Both focus their organizing on yet-ungentrified sections of the
neighborhood. In organizational characteristics, both are large CDCs who produce a
significant amount of affordable housing, and have relatively large organizing
departments - a director and at least two organizers working with him. Both had been
conducting community organizing for several years before the campaigns I studied
began.
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Finding the Hope for Continuity in Codman Square
Context
Codman Square, Dorchester is one of the poorest neighborhoods in Boston. Its
predominantly African-American, and newer, African-Carribean populations have
experienced many aspects of institutionalized racism over time. Like many black
communities that formed during the 1960s in northern US cities, the area between
Washington Street and Blue Hill Avenue was 85% Jewish in 1950, but by the end of the
1960s whites almost entirely left the neighborhood (Gamm 1999). In recent years,
although gentrification has affected the development of Codman Square east of
Washington Street, the still-ungentrified area west of Washington Street still possesses
has many abandoned buildings and vacant lots, with attendant concerns about crime and
safety (Millenium Plan 2000).
Although there are many volunteer, community and civic organizations west of
Washington - including several black fraternal organizations from a more prosperous era
for Boston's African-American middle class9 - local organizational life is significantly
shaped by the largest and most powerful of these professionally-staffed groups: the
Codman Square Health Center, and the Codman Square Neighborhood Development
Corporation (CSNDC) (site visit 2002). During the late 1990s, these two organizations
8 For a history of the neighborhood, changes that occurred in it, and the role of banks and other institutions
in fostering these changes, see Gerald Gamm (1999), hy the Jews left Boston and the Catholics Stayed.
9 In the local Syria Temple, Masonic murals depict the order's medieval traditions, and also evoke a
different era of black middle-class life in Boston - by a curved scimitar appears the legend "oasis of
Boston, desert of Massachusetts."
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partnered to create a "millennium plan," bringing together community members and staff
at local organizations to identify areas of local concern. This plan identified the area west
of Washington Street and bordered by Norfolk and Talbot streets as an area where vacant
lots were rife, and where affordable housing development might make a positive
contribution to neighborhood revitalization. Emerging from this development goal and
from the Millenium planning process (Lattimore, site visit 2003), CSNDC's RHICO
initiative proposed a program for community organizing around land use in what they
called the "Norfolk Triangle" area.
Planning a partisan-advocate campaign
Although community planning is sometimes characterized by consensus-building
and broad participation (Healey 1997), CSNDC initially conducted community planning
in a way that emphasized conflict - illuminating tensions between resident interests and
other groups, identifying targets for challenge, and considering the use of contentious
tactics. This orientation emerged from staff's analysis of conditions in the Norfolk
Triangle, from the biographies of organizing participants, and was re-enforced by internal
organizational dynamics. For Carlos Rosales, the NDC's lead organizer in the Norfolk
Triangle'0 , experiences as a tenant organizer suggested a mode of organizing that
identified viable targets for challenge. Defeating these targets would help build power
and credibility for the NDC and for residents of local groups who worked with it
(interview 6.02). In other ways, NDC staff analysis of community dynamics also
informed the campaign's emphasis on conflict and its de-emphasis of racial difference.
1 Respect for Rosales within the RHICO program was reflected by his inclusion in the program's steering
committee.
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Although practitioners believed that racism shaped disparities between Codman Square
and the rest of Boston, within the community, CSNDC staff often viewed struggles to be
self-promoting, parochial, and economically-self serving. For example, a frustration of
the NDC's then-development director, Lisa Davis, was that the CDC was challenged to
"stay out" of a portion of the neighborhood, in part because the president of a resident
association claiming moral turf in that section was a for-profit developer whom she
believed might benefit personally from their absence (RHICO peer session 4.02). As a
result, development staff sought to counterbalance what they perceived to be the self-
interest of homeowners groups who often spoke out against new affordable housing
development, by working with residents who could support the NDC's vision and about
the need for affordable rental housing (site visit 2002)".
For the NDC's director of organizing, Marcos Beleche, the campaign and the
community's de-emphasis of race was the product of organization-building by white
professionals and activists. Although interested in having organizing address issues of
race, he observed with frustration that it was difficult to voice these claims given the
nature of local political and service system dynamics. Speaking of one community
organization in particular, he said:
It's very interesting. It's one white male who really controls it. The president is
West Indian, but that's not where the power lies. It's kind of like in the Valley in
Texas, where you have all these Latino Mayors, and it's a white City Manager
[who really was in charge]. Some of us our more attuned to it, in part because of
our own experiences: you decide when you can fight it, and when you can't and
what have you. [In Codman Square] there's a dynamic of white people doing for
black people and black people benefiting. (interview 1.04)
"As suggested by the homeowner/renter divide, while class issues among blacks in the Norfolk Triangle
and elsewhere within Codman Square may have been an important creator of factionalism, the NDC's
organizing did not try to make class an important category of analysis, either.
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Strategy: Mobilizing Organizing against Development
Although the impetus for CSNDC's campaign - community organizing around
issues of neighborhood development that the CDC could assist and carry out - predicated
collaboration between organizing and development staff, this collaboration did not occur
during the early months of the campaign. Over the first few months of his work, Rosales
often felt pitted against development department objectives, in a way that assumed little
possibility for shared ground between them. In discussing early campaign challenges,
Rosales first suggested that the major one was 'internal,' in that he needed to overcome
as an organizer what he perceived to be the history of skepticism around the NDC's
development within the neighborhood: "Even though we say we work with the
neighborhood, the challenge is that it doesn't really happen. It's not enough just to say
that.. .we want a way to show that what we're saying is true." (interview 7.02)
Early in the campaign, some organizers voiced the view that it was impossible to
be an affordable housing developer and also "for the community" at the same time, a
feeling that its new director of organizing, Marcos Beleche, attributed in part to the
organizing department's sense of relative esteem within the organization (Beleche
interview 12.02). In part because of this perception of internal power imbalances, Rosales
and other staff assumed in the first months of the campaign that there was little chance
for them to directly influence the NDC's development agenda. For example, during
campaign planning, organizing staff identified as the most crucial issue to them, "How
will we manage tensions when development seizes opportunities that may conflict with
organizing work?," a question whose very framing assumed (at the time) that this pre-
emptive action by development would in fact occur. By the end of six months of
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organizing, Beleche reflected on ongoing challenges of bringing together the work of the
two departments:
The most challenging aspects to resident involvement in development activities
include the external timelines within which development opportunities arise that
require our CDC to respond. Added to this is the lack of access and influence on
the part of organizing and development to the processes that determine these time
frames. Related to this is the lack of an internal "process" that can be
superimposed on any external time frame to effectively and efficiently identify
resident roles within any development activity. Residents too lack the type of
relationship with the external powers that be to effectively influence time frames
and policies that create such development opportunities. (End of year reflections
2002)
Ambitions for the Campaign Emerge
A major early concern for CSNDC was that previously-organized residents would
oppose the goals of any new group, undermining its claims at legitimacy. Staff at
different positions within the NDC were particularly concerned that residents affiliated
with ACORN's local chapter (whose organizers had previously charged that the NDC
was an unresponsive property owner of vacant lots) would mobilize against any efforts to
move into ACORN's territory. During the early months of the campaign, Rosales said
that he feared ACORN's earlier targeting of the NDC would make it more difficult for
him to help residents target inspectional services around vacant lots.
These concerns turned out to be less important than initially imagined. Over time,
staff spoke significantly less about inter-organizational conflict. Instead, Rosales found
himself supporting the agendas of local resident associations, with whom organizing
found strong connections. After sporadic attendance by Norfolk Triangle residents at
monthly meetings, Rosales spoke in an interview of having developed a "new model for
organizing within the Norfolk Triangle," (8.1.02), sparked by the recent attendance of
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members of the adjoining Torey Street and Thetford Street Resident Association. Seeing
that these groups were oriented toward contesting local development (for example, the
expansion of an auto body repair shop in the neighborhood), an objective that he also
supported, Rosales did outreach on behalf of these groups around street repair issues,
around the proposed expansion of an autobody repair shop, and around other issues such
as mailbox drop locations in and around the Norfolk Triangle.
Over time, Rosales and others felt that working with these organizations would
re-invigorate existing structures of community civic engagement. Early in the campaign,
Rosales noted that the most powerful one of these, the West of Washington association,
had strong and acknowledged leadership, but was sometimes unable to turn residents out
to attend meetings with public officials. Although the scaffolding for interorganizational
collaboration was already present - Codman Square had a Council of Neighborhood
Organizations - Rosales felt that making the Council's member associations more
engaged, more open, and more active would help fuel positive coalition work by the
council. Other staff and board members shared this view of the potential benefits of
organizing. During a site visit, a board member spoke of the Council as a group that
"would like to do organizing, but they've never felt like they have any human capital to
bring to bear." (10.03). In the same forum, Davis referred to the "gatekeeping" function
of many neighborhood groups, and with it ways that organizing could overcome this
among local groups through inspiration and example, while still retaining local structures
for participation such as the Council.
What happened - the early campaign regroups
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Seeing the need to "win" not only externally but within the organization, Rosales
hoped to make housing development strategies more directly influenced by resident
participation. To build the power and influence of organized residents within the CDC, in
a strategy that partly mirrored the conflict-oriented stance of its organizing in the
neighborhood, Rosales attempted to create moments where the NDC's development
activities itselfbecame a target and point of engagement for neighborhood outreach. In
this strategy, Rosales would flyer the neighborhood announcing that the NDC was
planning to develop projects in the neighborhood, and invited comment from neighbors.
Rosales's hope was that local residents would come out for or against these proposals,
and would continue to be engaged afterward. For Rosales, the substance of the proposal
was less important than the fact of participation. At the same time, Rosales hoped to have
the executive director make public commitments as to the role residents would play in
Norfolk Triangle development, to expand the focus of organizing work to areas outside
the Triangle, and to include the need for green space and parks in the NDC's traditional
development.
But an a priori commitment to resident control of NDC development was difficult
for the its executive or development director to make, given the fact that neither the NDC
nor other local groups had successfully done so in the past, and the fact that there was not
a substantial number of residents working with the NDC to lend enough legitimacy to
their voice. In efforts to influence the NDC's internal processes, Rosales was not helped
by the fact that neither the NDC, nor other community organizations around the Norfolk
Triangle, had yet a strong enough membership base to overcome opposition within
contentious and sometimes-personalized neighborhood forums. As a result of this history,
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internal changes occurred slowly within the NDC, which in turn frustrated organizers,
who felt unable to promise residents influence in the organization.
During the early months of the campaign, the NDC struggled to define the scope
and meaning of its work with members of the resident associations around Norfolk
Triangle Development, even though resident leaders remained interested in collaboration.
For example, at one meeting I attended, a leader from the West of Washington group
(which was not directly engaged with Norfolk Triangle organizing) asked directly what
the new organization the NDC was trying to form "was," a question Rosales was unable
to answer. This hesitation appeared to stem from feeling unable to promise residents that
their voice would hold sway over neighborhood development as practiced by the NDC.
During the early months of the campaign, only a few residents attended, leading Beleche
to cancel the November meeting. Also during this time, development staff voiced
frustration over the lack of development opportunities or other concrete neighborhood
improvements that sprung from organizing (Davis was interested also in any other type of
housing-related work, such as a code-enforcement campaign).
During this time, Beleche attempted to change the tone of organizing, to de-
emphasize the development of short-term targets for winnable action (as he put it, always
asking "who is the bad guy, who is the evil guy" (site visit 2003), for several reasons.
First, he believed that CDCs who organized needed to do both development-oriented and
also more "reflective" campaigns. Arguing that "organizing within the CDC context
means seeing more than one side to the coin" (interview 12.02), he felt that the NDC
should be open about its interest in affordable housing development, and interact with
2 In my second analysis chapter (six), I note that the NDC made internal improvements in the area of
interdepartmental coordination, with very positive effects for the course of the campaign.
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residents with the knowledge that "it could be us [what residents control or advocate
through the CDC's activities] or it could be something else" that occurs in their
neighborhood. Second, Beleche thought that Rosales's orientation toward conflict, which
also worked to make the NDC's development a target, was not an effective organizational
change strategy. Beleche reported that Rosales often focused on a lack of commitment
from development toward organizing and resident control, but that Beleche also assessed
that the organizing department as a whole may not have pushed back enough during
ordinary interactions with the development department - a strategy which might have
achieved greater success.
Instead, the mode of asking development to propose projects "simply for the
purpose of organizing against it, to stir things up" (interview 12.02) by forming an
independent power base in the neighborhood was no substitute for encountering
differences within the agency on a staff level. In part, Beleche traced this strategy of
building an external base to a sense of powerlessness within the organizing department,
saying, "If you don't believe [change] can happen, it's going to be hard" (interview
12.02). Beleche was also concerned that the willingness of the small cadre of local
leaders associated with the other neighborhood groups to work with the NDC may have
made it more attractive to continue that inter-organizational work than pursuing extensive
basebuilding and leadership development outside of this group. This lack of new
leadership and participation led the NDC to retool and reassess its basebuilding and
outreach strategy during the summer of 2003, and to rethink the relationship between
organizing and development in ways that could prove to be more successful for the
campaign it undertook.
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Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation: Achieving Continuity
Context
Located on the other side of Boston's Franklin Park from Codman Square,
Jamaica Plain is, like many parts of Dorchester, a dense, traditionally working class
neighborhood. Spanning from Olmstead's Jamaica Pond on the west to Franklin Park on
the east, the census reports that one quarter of JP households are Latino, whose poverty
nearly doubles that of local whites, at nearly 28% (BRA 2000). Latinos have been
especially pressured rising rents, and by the conversion of triple-deckers to luxury
cooperatives and condos. Like Codman Square, JP is home to many neighborhood and
civic organizations, but these groups tend to be more mobilized generally, and contribute
to JP's deserved reputation as a bastion of progressive life in Boston.
Formed in 1977 by residents combating the creation of a Southwest expressway
through Jamaica Plain and Roxbury, JPNDC has retained this activist orientation toward
issues of economic disenfranchisement, racism, and residential displacement, even as its
program areas have expanded over time to include economic development through job
training and placement, support to small business owners, and assistance to child care
providers. In 1998, JPNDC partnered with the membership organization City Life/Vida
Urbana to initiate the "Campaign of Conscience," a multi-pronged attempt to address
gentrification in Jamaica Plain. Seeing home and rental prices rise dramatically after the
end of Boston's rent control in 1995, followed by the economic boom of the late 1990s,
JPNDC's membership and board believed that they needed to reach beyond traditional
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affordable housing development activities and use additional tools and resources to fight
gentrification through organizing. Said Joe Allen, a JPNDC board member about the
origins of the campaign:
While we're able to develop some units, still we see people leaving every day
who live in this community, particularly in the Latino community who have been
supportive of these efforts and are victims of our successes in previous years - in
developing the orange line [the MBTA rail that replaced the Southwest
Expressway takings], and in other activities. And so out of frustration, almost, we
needed to create some place to gather to discuss these issues.. .to invite people
into this (site visit 2002).
The Campaign of Conscience involved tenant organizing, the formation of
resident-owned cooperatives, mobilization to designate city and state-owned vacant land
for affordable housing, and organizing to preserve expiring-use properties. During the
period during which I observed JPNDC's organizing, its coalition work shifted to de-
emphasize formal structures of the Campaign of Conscience, and to emphasize legislative
and electoral work through the Coalition to Educate, Mobilize and Vote (CEMV). This
coalition involved not only City Life/Vida Urbana, but also several other local
organizations, including the Hyde Square Taskforce and the Bromley-Heath tenants
association. The CEMV campaign developed candidate forums, built relationships with
potential voters over time and conducted targeted outreach on the day of elections,
practiced political education about issues impacted by local voting, and otherwise
mobilized in support of progressive educational and affordable housing policies on the
city and state level.
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Planning an "agonistic, pluralistic" campaign1
JPNDC's initial planning for the Campaign of Conscience emphasized protest and
challenge-oriented strategies, as well as its broader framing around racial and economic
justice. Consistent both with the NDC's founding in mobilized action against freeway
construction, and with current patterns of neighborhood organizational engagement, the
NDC continued to employ contentious tactics that also emphasized disparities
experienced by Latinos in Jamaica Plain during the period I observed. These underlying
values inform strategies of JPNDC's organizing, and also become an especially important
part of the NDC's identity as it interacts with other local groups. Although its coalition
partners and their constituents differ in some aspects of orientation toward neighborhood
intervention 14, they work within broad terms of agreement about the sources and
solutions to the urban crisis - believing it to be rooted in structural inequalities and
addressed through political action for working class people of color, through the creation
and preservation of affordable housing, and by fostering community-owned and
culturally diverse economic ventures.
The early months of the Campaign of Conscience established this pattern of
visible protest and disruptive action, when NDC staff and leaders moved against real
estate offices they identified as accomplices to housing speculation, interrupting office
activity until some members were arrested for trespassing. They also organized protests
outside the homes and businesses of landlords identified as unscrupulous, to highlight the
need for affordable housing and to create a sense urgency around JP's affordable housing
13 See chapter 6 for more on this term.
4 For example, the Hyde Square Taskforce has criticized affordable housing development without
associated resident services (Smith interview 6.03).
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crisis. Both staff and activists valued these early actions for what they accomplished.
Reflected Harry Smith, JPNDC's organizing director, about the early successes of the
campaign, "partly through targeting realtors and other speculators, we feel we've created
the expectation that outright speculation will be met with protest. We may show up at
your house (Smith 8.02)." At a site visit in late 2002 (six months into the organizing I
observed), a board member reflected positively on the ways that these protests were
joyous and affirming to the organization and the nascent campaign, speaking of creative
chants and the impression they made on his young son 5 (site visit 2002). As a result of
its own assessment of successful practice, and strengthened by its continued coalition
work with agencies of similar ideological cast, JPNDC continued to plan and execute
confrontational events.
I observed these strategies emerge most often in the area of electoral and
legislative organizing, where JPNDC staff and residents sought to define culturally-
resonant targets over the course of its policy work and voter outreach. For example, in
2002, the elimination of bilingual education was on the state ballot, an issue around
which they mobilized hundreds of members in a visible demonstration before the vote
(which passed resoundingly statewide, disheartening local activists). Similarly, in the
early months of the campaign, re-establishing legislation around rent protections was a
goal for coalition members. During a planning session for a candidate's forum, I
observed a resident leader argue successfully for the most forceful delivery of questions
to candidates that they could deliver: "When we ask questions, we should be explicit
about what we want and what we should expect to hear." As he continued, he said "we
should give them real challenges, so that if they don't answer it right, we won't be
15 "Austin O'Connor, Where's Your Honor" and "Austin O'Connor, Don't be a Piranha."
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interested in voting for them," and suggested that instead of asking whether they
generally supported rent control, that they ask the pointed question, "what features should
rent control have." (8.21.02) During this candidates session and other events with elected
officials, JPNDC and coalition partners pressed local legislators to be more forceful in
advocating for policies within City Council and State House leadership, and in doing so
often interrupted hesitating or obtuse answers from their elected officials. At one event in
April 2003, residents booed their council member for his opposition to rent control
legislation, as Richard Thal, the NDC's executive director, chastised local elected
officials in front of more than two hundred people, saying to them that "we're here to say
not how tough the times are, but to see what we as a community can do," and that CEMV
aims to "challenge each person [ie, legislator] in this room, not to be spectators, but to see
what we in this room can do" (April 2003).
Strategy: Extensive collaboration between CDC departments, openness and activism of
CDC governance
Much of JPNDC's organizing aimed to control vacant lots for affordable housing
development, or to form limited-equity cooperative housing for tenants of distressed
properties. These areas might naturally involve real estate staff in campaign work.
However, as was witnessed by CSNDC's organizing, these collaborations do not always
occur successfully. In contrast, JPNDC coordinated extensively between organizing and
development departments. After eight months of organizing, Smith reflected:
Organizing has continued to play a leading role in all of JPNDC's development
projects. Organizers and real estate staff coordinate on every existing and
proposed project, developing joint strategies and carrying out community
outreach together. Our strong community presence gives us a competitive
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advantage over other developers when we compete for public land. (end of year
report 2002).
The NDC attributes the success of all its housing development and preservation
activities to organizing that demands disposition of vacant lots, pushes zoning and
permitting bodies to accommodate new affordable housing projects, and strategizes with
tenants around co-operative housing formation. Within the NDC, collaborative work is
made easier by biographical and ideological affinities between real estate and organizing
departments - all of JPNDC's real estate development staff were community organizers
earlier in their careers. However, while shared convictions and experiences in successful
collaboration formed the basis for interdepartmental coordination, staff and leaders also
attempted to achieve new levels of accountability in both development processes and the
governance activities that controlled them. Claiming some value for sparking conflict
within the agency, Smith said that "Our strategy is to force the issue," for example,
making the argument to board and development that "Domingo [a mono-lingual Spanish
speaker and new board member] is coming along next. How will you deal with language
and vocabulary issues with him?" (interview 8.21.02) For example, during the time
period I studied, the NDC's development and organizing departments worked to include
non-board leaders in development committees, and pushed development meetings not
just to adopt bilingual meetings but also by establishing non-technical development
jargon for those new to its specific vocabulary. During the time I observed the NDC,
organizers also worked with economic development staff to increase community
ownership and control over job training programs, worked with childcare providers to
develop a campaign for housing in which they could also practice their business, engaged
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graduates of homebuyer classes in local advocacy around land disposition, and involved
small business owners in policy and campaign work.
For many reasons, including a perception that organizing does in fact "deliver"
affordable housing to the neighborhood, strategies to coordination mobilization and
development have found substantial support within JPNDC's board of directors, and re-
enforces their own disposition to adopt more inclusive development practices.
Furthermore, many board members became active in the NDC through involvement in
the Campaign of Conscience. During an early site visit, German Tejada, a board member,
commented on the tangible gains that can be attributed to organizing, and the ways that
this fostered an identity of participation within the agency as a whole:
Rockvale Terrace (a 15-unit development) is happening in large measure because
people organize. So, for us, as an agency, recognizing that yes we're about
development, about job creation, but really, the bedrock of what we do is about
reaching out to the community.....developing new leadership. That's what CDCs
are about from our standpoint. (site visit 2002).
This board and organization-wide commitment to mobilization also helped JPNDC's
executive director, Richard Thal, take visible stands on difficult and contested issues.
During the time period I observed, Thal spoke at several public meetings, including
several in which local public officials were sharply challenged and criticized. Harry
Smith, JPNDC's organizing director, found this to be a very important component of
organizational credibility. Captured in my field notes, Smith said:
Richard is involved in the campaign - he speaks and is involved. Says that a
director's presence is needed to make it central - and he also lets them develop
enemies; they've protested realtors, city hall, investors, which can be "dangerous
work" - the whole organization needs to be engaged - they can't do it half way.
(8.21.02)
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Ambitions for the Campaign Emerge
Over the period I observed of NDC organizing, many of the formal coordinating
structures of the Campaign of Conscience dissolved. While the NDC continued
organizing activities formerly done under the umbrella of the Campaign of Conscience,16
it took additional interest in legislative policy and electoral work. Smith articulated the
need for policy work with the analysis, "the problem of gentrification didn't start here
and it won't end here," (8.21.02) seeing the need for city and statewide policies that could
help move the fight beyond building-by-building organizing and development strategies
to affect neighborhood patterns of neighborhood development as a whole. Significantly,
the way JPNDC proceeded with this goal made the NDC even more deeply embedded in
coalition work, even as it de-emphasized formal coalition work during the Campaign of
Conscience. During the summer and fall of 2002, it expanded coalition activity to interact
more extensively with the Hyde Square Task Force and the Bromley-Heath Tenants
Council in the formation of the Coalition to Educate, Mobilize, and Vote. Wrote Smith at
the end of 2002:
Our campaigns around 1,000 Affordable Homes and Voter Mobilization have
strengthened existing relationship with organizations in the neighborhood. Our
voter mobilization work has built on the already strong relationship between Hyde
Square Task Force, City Life and JPNDC and taken it to a new level. Staff and
leaders of the three organizations meet on a regular basis to discuss the campaign.
We held a planning retreat of staff from the three organizations in December to
plan 2003 activities around voter mobilization and education. In addition we
were able to develop closer relationships with other JP groups, most notably
Bromley-Heath TMC, which coordinated their voter outreach activities with ours.
(End of year report 2002).
16 This included tenant organizing, work around public land and vacant lot disposition, and tenant
organizing around coop formation.
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Building coalition capacity to mobilize around racial and economic justice
became an especially important goal for JPNDC, given the ways that gentrification
threatened to change both the constituency of local organizations, and form new ones to
challenge affordable housing development, tenant organizing, and other policies or
actions the NDC valued. Over the course of time I observed its work, JPNDC organizers
found growing resistance to affordable development, even in areas where its base was the
strongest:
This year saw an increase in the participation of organized groups of neighbors in
community planning meetings opposing the creation of affordable housing. As JP
continues to become gentrified we anticipate more battles with neighbors around
the siting of affordable housing. Although we were victorious in most of the
neighborhood battles, our experience this year only reinforces the need for a
deeper pool of homebuyers and tenants who are prepared to participate in
community planning processes (end of year 2002).
On several occasions, organizers remarked to me that streets were becoming very
different as new residents moved in, and that the neighborhood they knew was changing.
What happened - Successes build JP's local political and inter-organizational
institutions
In the area of affordable housing development, the NDC's organizing through its
organizing and development subcommittees were able to help the NDC overcome abutter
resistance in local projects, become the designee for affordable housing development in
Jackson Square, a large area of public land. Residents held a community meeting for
affordable housing around city-sponsored planning, and celebrated the formation of
cooperative housing. The same organizing committees that had worked on these
campaigns also did significant work with CEMV. For example, for the 2002 primary
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election, they placed more than 4,000 informational flyers in the hands of individuals,
phoned 1,500 registered voters in the Hyde-Jackson Square area, and contributed to an
increased voter turnout of 54% over 1998 elections in the seven precincts targeted.
During the same period, the coalition held several highly-successful candidates' forums
that pressed commitments around education and affordable housing from every
individual running for state representative. For the general election, according to Smith,
the NDC:
distributed 8,000 informational flyers and phoned 2,500 registered voters in
thirteen precincts in Hyde/Jackson/Egleston Squares. We covered eight polling
stations on election day. In all more than 75 volunteers participated in the effort.
Voter turnout increased 34% over 1998 elections in targeted precincts, with 59%
turnout (end of year report 2002).
In 2002 on the policy front, the only state legislators who filed rent control
legislation (backing the abortive attempt to enact a home rule petition stemning from
Boston) were from Jamaica Plain, although these legislators were unable to push the
legislation forward. Smith reflected that JP was helping produce "a little machine" for
affordable housing, one that was able to challenge once comfortable elected officials
around policy needs:
The dramatic increases in voter turnout in our targeted areas have caused tensions
with elected officials who now face a higher level of unpredictability when
seeking reelection. Many elected officials have been openly supportive of our
efforts but we have also detected nervousness and defensiveness on the part of
some political leaders. One example of this tension is the vote that City
Councilor John Tobin cast against the Mayor's proposed rent stabilization bill,
which was strongly supported by JPNDC and City Life. In the days leading up to
the vote we mobilized more than 200 residents to call his office in support of the
legislation. When he voted against, many residents called to complain. We also
printed a letter to the editor signed by 10 groups criticizing his vote. This
aggressive campaign has caused some tension, but it has also sent a strong signal
to Councilor Tobin that the affordable housing issue has broad community
support. (end of year report 2002).
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In the summer 2003, also around CEMV, JPNDC did outreach and mobilization for the
Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Council race, doubling voter turnout and resulting in
significant turnover, the election of many people of color, and the election of several
youth leaders to that body (which is charged with advising the city on development
decisions). Over 30 individuals ran for 20 slots, and of the thirteen new candidates who
ran, all were elected. Although the NDC did not support specific candidates, it did
encourage many to run, and as a result of mobilization, Smith felt "A lot of the old guard
woke up this morning and aren't on the neighborhood council" (interview 6.03). Later
that year, in Boston's city elections, targeted outreach increased voter turnout by 56%
compared to a city-wide increase of only 13% (end of year report 2003). These efforts
were particularly significant, as they contributed to the first year in which turnout from
Boston's more progressive neighborhoods outstripped voting in conservative South
Boston, a fact that contributed to at-large the re-election of Felix Arroyo (Boston's first
Latino councilman) and Maura Hennigan, another progressive councilmember-at-large
During this time, CEMV activity reinforced the ability of local progressive
organizations to coordinate complex campaign work. Smith reflected that this dynamic
was helped in part by the ways that each group respected the strengths and constituencies
of its coalition partners. Said Smith:
I think that we are fortunate to operate in the environment we're operating in, and
we've had a role in creating the environment we're operating in. JP has the
reputation, well-deserved, for having progressive views in a lot of
issues.. .Certainly that makes it easier for us, because one of the reasons the NDC
has been success is that we don't bully our way into things that we're not the
primary group doing it. We don't go and hire youth workers, just because we need
a youth worker.. .In JP, you can't do that - it's hard to collaborate with groups
you're competing with. We don't directly step on each other's toes. There's that
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understanding and relationships have been built over the years. You look at
successful collaborations, and it's not like, let's re-invent the wheel. (1.04)
In these ways, CEMV not only helped deepen each organization's constituencies as they
worked with residents to build relationships around voting and political empowerment,
but also helped reinforce the structure of neighborhood organizational life, as it extended
these relationships along the lines of each group's traditional programmatic activities.
Review and preliminary analysis
How "the hope for continuity" emerged
Chapters two through four of the thesis have two aims. First, they illustrate a path
that CDC organizing may take, by looking at two campaigns which sparked parallel
community dynamics. These dynamics helped actors involved in both campaigns to
develop a similar sense of the impact campaigns might have on local political institutions.
As both JPNDC and CSNDC's campaigns progressed, actors saw an opportunity to win
community improvements, while also strengthening local political institutions - to
achieve desirable "continuity" in civic life. As it started its campaign, the Codman
Square Neighborhood Development Corporation was concerned that other community
organizations and homeowners groups would move to disrupt their attempts at leadership
development and mobilization. In practice, they found the opposite to be true: that
residents in other neighborhood organizations shared fundamental values with CSNDC,
especially in their contentious orientation toward development projects, and in the ways
David Micah Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 53
that they tended to down-play issues of racial and ethnic difference in issues of
community politics. The NDC's organizer, Carlos Rosales, sought to help homeowner
groups contest unwanted development around an autobody repair shop. At the same time
that he supported the agenda of these groups, he also hoped that activists would support
his own contentious agenda: to challenge the NDC's own development department to
become more responsive to community concerns.
Because of these shared interests, as the NDC explored in practice what local
organizing meant, it discovered that successful work could help build local political
institutions that allowed for coalition work around the control of development projects.
That is, by strengthening the capacity of local organizations, it hoped to strengthen the
Codman Square Council of Neighborhood organizations to operate on the same model. In
these ways, similarly-held views by the CDC and other community organizations meant
that "winning" the campaign - successfully implementation of a vision for planning and
development in the Norfolk Triangle - would create desirable continuity in political
institutions and in inter-group patterns of interaction (as I describe below, they were
unable to attain this goal at first).
Like CSNDC, the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation's
organizing vision found wide resonance among other community organizations. JPNDC's
orientation toward organizing emphasized the ways that gentrification affects low-income
Latinos, by challenging in direct and contentious ways the embodiment of these market
forces. For example, projecting and enacting this vision for community meant that NDC
staff and leaders targeted realtors for direct action, when they believed their practices
encouraged housing speculation in the neighborhood, and involved other actions. City
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Life/Vida Urbana, the Hyde Square Taskforce, and Bromley-Heath collaborate with
JPNDC in part because they share this radical vision for community, even if the bulk of
the work they do in involves more traditional service delivery activities.
Even when the rationale for its initial coalition with City Life/Vida Urbana
dissolved, these ties helped JPNDC expand its collaborative work with other community
organizations. Through the coalition work that emerged from these shared values, they
formed the Campaign to Educate, Mobilize, and Vote, which in turn enhanced the ability
of community organizations in JP to collaborate and to "divide labor" among ongoing
projects. In these ways, organizing in JP also surfaced "the hope for continuity" - a
chance to strengthen ties among local groups, while also using those ties to make Jamaica
Plain's local elected officials and its political institutions (such as the neighborhood
development council) even more responsive to residents in this vision of racial justice.
What made the difference between success and failure
The second ambition of the chapter is to begin to describe organizational
characteristics and strategies that helped make the difference between success and failure
in CDC organizing. As I argue throughout these chapters, success in campaigns has a
secondary impact upon political institutions, by strengthening existing patterns of conflict
or co-operation, or by changing in some way the terms by which groups interact with
each other. Although both CSNDC and JPNDC saw over time that winning might
strengthen existing local institutions, only JPNDC's campaign was successful. That is,
although both JPNDC's and CSNDC's organizing was set on a similarpath, only
David Micah Greenberg -Ways of Contending page 55
JPNDC's campaign realized its ambition to strengthen local institutions, thereby
achieving "the hope for continuity."
Both CDCs were possessed of similar organizational characteristics - in terms of
overall CDC size, resources, and the shared political context of Boston". Significant
differences, however, emerged in the ways that CDCs were able to coordinate between
departments, use community development activities to mobilize constituents, coordinate
between organizing and development departments, and bring activists into the very
workings of the CDC. For example, although the organizing department entered the
Norfolk Triangle in part because development opportunities existed there, Rosales felt
cautious about engaging residents in development processes that they might not in fact
control. He also felt demoralized by what he believed to be internal power imbalances
between CSNDC's organizing and development. As a result of this sense of division
within the agency, he adopted a strategy of using potential development plans as "targets"
for community protest and engagement, which was somewhat confusing to residents and
also did not foster internal organizational change. CSNDC's lack of coordination
between organizing and development departments was counterproductive, as the CDC
attempted to implement a campaign around planning and development goals.
For JPNDC, in contrast, collaboration between organizing and development
departments promoted resident control and shaped the direction of development
opportunities. In direct ways - bringing the resources and technical capacities of the
development department to organizing-defined projects, and also bringing articulate and
committed residents to local fights around control and preservation of properties - it
" For more detailed consideration of alternative explanations about the difference between success and
failure, see chapter six.
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helped it create co-operative housing, control vacant lots for new development, and
preserve affordability in expiring use buildings. In part because all of the NDC's staff
had been organizers at former points in their careers, they were especially concerned in
creating opportunities for residents to become involved and development-related
components of their campaigns. Development staff spoke Spanish, were able to
conceptualize campaigns with organizers, and provided tactical advice to committees
around development-related campaigns. Organizers and developers worked also together
to create within board and decision-making processes greater opportunities for
community control of development, and to inspire activist participation and leadership
development through regular committee processes.
In addition to providing a large and committed base of members and leaders for
JPNDC's political and electoral organizing, this activism within JPNDC's governance
helped the CDC work in coalition with other activist membership organizations in
Jamaica Plain, and to bring many dedicated and competent community leaders to the
coalitions in which they participated. Although CEMV in itself represented a risk for the
community organizations involved, because it put to the test the efficacy of their shared
commitments to racial and economic justice, the successful electoral organizing it
conducted strengthened the ties these groups had with each other, and advanced their
ability to do strategic work within the JP community.
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Chapter 3: The Chance for Growth
Overview of "the chance for growth"
This chapter illustrates the campaign path I call growth, where winning the
campaign may adjust - but not fundamentally alter - the ways that local organizations
interact with each other and their constituents. As staff and residents encounter other
community groups and state actors, they experience fierce resistance to the claims
associated with the CDC's organizing. Although this resistance poses challenges to
organizing, actors realize that this resistance also signals an opportunity. As CDC staff
and activists interact with other community organizations and with government agencies,
they realize that political institutions are threatened by the campaign, its demands, and
the ways that these demands are framed. As this occurs, CDCs also understand that
winning the campaign creates the opportunity to adjust the terms of local discourse.
Either sparked by an appreciation of the CDC's power and efficacy, or forced directly by
the CDC, other political and community actors may change their practices and the ways
they relate to each other.
At the same time, in this chapter - and in contrast with the next - CDCs realize
that even if they were to win the campaign, they would not be able to fundamentally
adjust the practices of other groups and the terms of local interaction. In my first analysis
chapter (five), I trace the origin of the path that the campaign takes, and with it its
opportunity to change local political institutions, to the CDC's shifting orientation toward
community. In "the chance for growth," a CDC's broad vision about community, the
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campaign that flowed from this vision, and that tactics that resulted from its orientation
toward community are initially very dissonant with those held and embodied in practice
by other community organizations, elected officials, and administrative agencies. As a
result of this dissonance, CDCs encountered significant opposition during the campaign.
However, because both CDCs also adjusted their own tactics as a result of opposition,
they did not persist in demanding that these institutions be completely restructured - that
groups completely change existing practices and patterns of inter-group interaction, or
that state actors fundamentally change patterns of participation. Instead, they saw the
chance to force important shifts in these areas, even if they could not be completely
changed.
Because I am not merely interested in the potential that a campaign has to enact
change, but also the factors that lead to successful attainment of these ambitions, in this
chapter I again compare a successful and a failed case of organizing. In this goal, the
Asian CDC and the Somerville Community Corporation are fruitfully paired for several
reasons. Both CDCs were new to community organizing, although staff sometimes held
significant experience in it. In geographic and programmatic focus, both CDCs had
citywide mandates, although they concentrated on a single neighborhood. In governance,
both boards of directors drew largely from well-regarded social service and policy
professionals. And while Chinatown is different in demography and culture than Union
Square, in terms of local political institutions, both Boston and Somerville had
progressive mayors at the head of a 'strong-mayor' system of government. In ways that
related directly to dynamics in the campaigns, however, the scope both mayor's
progressivism was limited by structural weaknesses in city finance and by ties to business
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interests. Finally, both organizations were possessed of highly-reflective and
strategically-minded staff - a virtue that allowed both to adjust their campaigns when
they encountered significant resistance from elected officials and from other community
organizations.
Somerville Community Corporation: Seeing the Chance for Growth
Context
Somerville is a city of approximately 77,000 (Census 2000). It is bordered by the
wealthier city of Cambridge to the south, by Boston's Charlestown to the east, and by the
working-class suburbs of Arlington and Medford to the west and north. Largely
developed in the 1920s, Somerville is the most densely-populated city in New England -
a distinction achieved not by prevalence of high-rise development but instead by its lack
of parks and open space (EPA 2000). In most Somerville neighborhoods, triple-deckers,
single-family homes, and small multi-family rental units stand side by side on small lots.
The end of rent control in Cambridge and housing inflation in the Boston metropolitan
area increased rents and housing values dramatically in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
For example, Somerville experienced a 20% increase for single family homes from 2001-
2002 alone (CHAPA 2004).
Although recent gentrification has fueled demographic shifts in some
neighborhoods, the city remains home to many recent immigrants employed in low-wage
service industries. Successive immigrant waves - Irish and Portuguese families, and later,
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Brazilian, Haitian, Latino, and South Asians - have made Somerville an especially
diverse city. According to the 2000 census, approximately 52,000 residents were born in
the United States or its territories, while 23,000 were born elsewhere. In many ways,
immigrant groups experienced the brunt of impacts brought on by contrasts of rent
inflation over service wages. In 2000, the census-calculated poverty rate for immigrants
in Somerville was 14%, compared to 11% for non-immigrants and 6% for the entire
Boston metropolitan area. Most poor immigrants were non-naturalized and ineligible for
public benefits (Census 2000).
Somerville has often attempted to incorporate immigrant groups by supporting
community and ethnic organizations, a process made easier by its strong-mayor system of
government and the vestiges of a machine political culture'8 . At the time that SCC started
organizing, Dorothy Kelly Gay, a progressive Democrat, leader within the Massachusetts
Democratic Party and former candidate for Lieutenant Governor, had been serving her
second full 2-year term as Mayor. Kelly Gay presided over a regime with deep ties to
progressive community and ethnic organizations, but which had also been unsettled by
strong conflicts with them. One directory search lists over 250 nonprofits in Somerville,
many of which share and coordinate work with a city hall "captured" by their issues. For
example, in environmental issues, City and membership organizations advocated jointly
for the expansion of its bike path; its Human Rights Initiative advances in collaboration
and in broad support from many local groups. At the same time, economic development
priorities fueled by the Somerville's lack of commercial tax base set the ground for
18 In the neighborhood in which SCC organized, one symbol of this public support as extended to new
groups over time is in a large display for Somerville's Community Access Television, a smaller one for the
Massachusetts Alliance of Portuguese Speakers, and an even smaller, newer sign for a South Asian
Community Center.
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conflict with progressive local organizations, most fiercely around proposed
redevelopment at Assembly Square, a strip mall scenically located by the Mystic River
and close to public transportation.
The Somerville Community Corporation took part in this fabric of cooperation
and contention, even as its staff and board believed that community organizing could
eventual reshape the terms of these interactions. In 2001, as the board hired Danny
LeBlanc as executive director. a 25-year veteran of community organizing and affordable
housing advocacy. LeBlanc argued that Somerville had no group that practiced
systematic organizing, and that its absence was a crucial gap in city life that needed to be
filled. Although a relative newcomer to CDCs, LeBlanc's rapid rise within the
Massachusetts Association of CDCs to Board Chair reflected widespread respect for his
competence and vision. As SCC felt it had established a generally successful presence in
the Union Square neighborhood, under RHICO the CDC decided to concentrate on
expanding its base within Union Square. For reasons I explore in greater detail below,
SCC proposed to RHICO that it would form a neighborhood association representing all
of Union Square (and not just the blocks surrounding their housing developments) around
quality-of-life issues, as an organizing strategy they felt could be replicated in other
Somerville neighborhoods.
Planning a diverse and inclusive campaign
Civic and neighborhood associations are often perceived by other community
organizations to be inherently conservative, and focused primarily on increasing property
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values, controlling development, and advocating for local businesses (Rabrenovic 1996).
However, as I argue throughout these case studies, the meaning of SCC's campaign to
form a neighborhood association in Union Square was embedded in a particular
community context, and emanated from an analysis of the types of changes it felt were
both possible and meaningful to enact in it. Over the course of the campaign, local groups
and local residents responded not just to the fact that SCC was attempting to create a
neighborhood association, but also to the ways that it constructed and advanced the
project as representing a particular vision for neighborhood change. From the beginning
of its campaign, the CDC brought issues of racial and ethnic difference to the foreground
of campaign planning and practice. Also from the beginning of the campaign, SCC chose
not to engage in immediate contention with local groups and with city hall. It de-
emphasized conflictual tactics for strategic reasons, even though it believed that its
organizing could over time develop the ability to challenge power in a way that led to
sustainable change for the city of Somerville.
The orientation of the campaign toward diversity had both strategic and
ideological motivations. LeBlanc, as an organizer and also a decades-long resident of
East Somerville, believed that Somerville's community organizations were generally
dominated by white, older neighborhood activists, a fact that sometimes gave them
substantially less power and legitimacy. This issue of selective representation among
leadership was especially salient when groups were supported by city staff or resources,
were affiliated with formal planning processes or neighborhood organizations, or
otherwise held leadership appointed by the city. SCC's analysis of the 'natural tendency'
of community organizations to be driven by white activists was borne out by the group
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SCC helped form around the Linden Street development, which had a potentially diverse
base but leadership that was mostly white.
Said LeBlanc at a campaign planning session, the "default" mode of any new
groups that formed was be without leadership by people of color, and argued that "the
lesson I draw is that we have to work harder and in a more targeted way, so that
immigrant groups and non-English speakers have more of a comfort zone" (session 6.02).
Both SCC's organizing director, Malika Bey, and its organizer shared this vision of
building an inclusive neighborhood organization in Union Square, and spoke extensively
about the challenge of culturally-competent organizing as the most important issue for
their campaign.
In Union Square, the strategy that emerged from this vision for change was to
hold several separate meetings targeting each racial and ethnic group, and then to bring
participants from these meetings together into the larger organization after they had built
enough confidence and cohesion. Working primarily through existing community and
ethnic organizations, organizers made presentations at the local Sikh temple, talked to the
Brazilian outreach worker at the Massachusetts Alliance of Portuguese Speakers, and
spoke to representatives at the incipient South Asian Center. In some cases, these
presentations occurred in what they called "double billing" (8.02) with outreach
associated with the group's affirmative marketing for its Linden Street development.
Although outreach around both organizing and rental applications occurred at the same
time, SCC's quality-of-life organizing and its affordable housing development activities
remained separate topics for the neighborhood both conceptually and practically. During
these presentations, the opportunities for engagement offered to residents for the two
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remained of very different types - on the one hand, asking them to apply to the housing
project, and on the other, asking them to take leadership in a neighborhood-wide and
action-oriented group.
Staff believed that a membership organization comprised of people from different
ethnic groups could represent a significant step forward for Somerville's political and
organizational life. However, for pragmatic reasons, staff also decided that they were
unable to make this group an overtly challenging one, at least at first. Primarily, SCC
reached this decision because they felt they would be unable to prevail in meaningful
conflicts without first building a substantial base. SCC organizers concentrated first on
relationship-building around less contentious issues, in part because they believed that
elected officials in Somerville were extraordinarily sensitive to challenge. Previous to
Union Square organizing, Bey was involved in a campaign through SCC to try to
preserve the affordability of a large expiring-use development in East Somerville, and
encouraged residents to write what she considered to be fairly respectful letters urging
their Congressperson to "do what he could" to save the project. This action, which she
believed to be fairly innocuous, provoked what she considered to be significant backlash
from the Congressperson, who considered it to question his efforts on behalf of the
project (interview 8.02).
The complex rationale that used less contentious, quality-of-life organizing as a
stepping-stone to greater political change with people of color was illustrated in an
exchange between SCC's Technical Assistance provider, Steve Meachum' 9, and LeBlanc
during an internal SCC strategy session. After hearing about the importance of diversity
19 Meachum was a staff member at City Life/Vida Urbana, a membership organization in Boston that
emphasized both issues of race and also contentious actions to build power for Latinos.
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to Somerville and the lack of an effective voice for people of color within political
institutions, Meachum asked staff how a neighborhood association spoke to the CDCs'
larger mission of building power and mounting challenge. Meachum probed about why
organizers shouldn't talk about issues of concern to immigrants and to bring them into the
campaign, if this was in fact the mission of SCC, ending with the challenge, "Why not
just say what you want to do?" In response, LeBlanc answered, "I've been part of
[racially and culturally] conscious groups. As a CDC who's new at this, I would be afraid
of getting caught up in grandiosity. Internally, I'm not shy about saying it, but externally
I am." That is, while workplace discrimination, status issues, and exclusion from
Somerville's political life might be the first concerns of new immigrants in Somerville
(site visit 10.03), staff believed that they could not address these issues without first
building strong membership within an organization. During this session, staff articulated
that Somerville's Latino Coalition was frustrated by this similar gap between ambition
and the feasibility of change they wanted to enact, given their lack of active membership
and organizational power. In sum, these factors contributed to SCC's emphasis on issues
of racial and ethnic difference, but their avoidance of conflict and contentious tactics.
Separating Organizing and Development
Another important early decision by SCC was that the group that formed through
organizing should not be tied to SCC's development or service activities. Instead of
engaging residents around a development project they would determine and help enact, as
did some other CDCs in RHICO, SCC decided to embark on an organizing process of
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identifying issues with residents without preconditions, outside of the quality-of-life
focus. Writing about this decision in their RFP to RHICO, LeBlanc argued that "If we
are successful, our next development project will be identified and grow out of the
concerns of the neighborhood association, rather than the other way around, as happened
with the Linden Street Development." (RFP). In essence, SCC hoped that the local group
would continue to act independently of SCC after organizing was completed, so that the
CDC might move to another area and start the process again. Also in its program
application, SCC wrote of the risks and benefits to building this "independent" group, as
opposed to membership and leadership that could become part of the CDC's own
governance processes:
SCC very much understands that there is a degree of risk involved in having SCC
invest in the organizing and development of a neighborhood group that by
definition will have substantial autonomy. Issues or projects may arise that are not
easily connected to the rest of what SCC is doing. Expectations of neighborhood
residents may outstrip SCC's capacity to deliver. Conflicts may arise with City
government or other entities that put SCC in an awkward position. But we believe
that our role in organizing a neighborhood group will put us in the best position
for a strong and positive relationship. We believe that the positives derived by the
development of new community- leaders - for SCC, the neighborhood, and
Somerville - are worth the risks. (RFP)
Ambitions for the Campaign Emerge
Over the course of the campaign, the character of SCC's claims about diversity
and inclusion elicited challenge from other community organizations and from local
elected officials. This resistance was important for the campaign, both because it made
the work of activists and organizers more difficult, and also because it illuminated to the
CDC the ways that its organizing posed threats to community institutions. SCC's
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organizers embraced these conflicts to a certain extent because they saw the opportunity
to alter existing community dynamics, especially as these dynamics related to patterns of
incorporation among community and ethnic organizations. Organizers realized that the
framing the organizing around issues of inclusiveness and diversity questioned who truly
"spoke for" people of color in Somerville, and whether or not other organizations and
elected officials held substantial ties to members and constituents. SCC also realized that
the CDC had the chance to build its own power, as defined by its ability to mobilize
residents around a vision for development and local change.
A particularly important moment for the campaign occurred at a summer meeting
targeting Latino residents of Union Square. As six residents listened to organizers and
spoke about their neighborhood, three staff members from another community
organization arrived and challenged SCC's organizers about the project, asking why they
were attempting to build an independent body for Somerville Latinos when one already
existed, and claiming the assembled group was "duplicative at best." (interview 9.02) In
reflecting on their disrupted meeting, SCC felt that the unanticipated conflict had some
potentially positive implications. Bey observed during planning sessions and interviews
that organizations who were not practicing leadership development or outreach to
members and constituents were likely to feel that organizing by the CDC encroached on
their "turf," saying, "If we're doing our job well, some people are going to feel upset."
(interview 9.02)
To Bey, Somerville's ethnic service or advocacy groups were sensitive to the
emergence of a new group for several reasons. First, these groups were often formed by
activists who demanded recognition by city hall and funding for services targeted to their
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population but sometimes participated in what she called a "quick degeneration of
leadership," where activists who were able to establish a recognized group could say,
"I've made it - and then provide services," without conducting further organizing with
residents in membership expansion and leadership development (field notes from
interview 9.02). Second, SCC's orientation toward diverse participation contrasted
strongly with the more conflict-oriented claims of the Latino Coalition, which in its
emergence had demanded recognition and funding for Latino issues, charging
institutional racism in the city of Somerville (Fishman 2000).20 In this light, the group
might have feared that its claims would be undercut by a group with a more conciliatory
stance toward power, however strategic that stance might be.
SCC quickly moved to resolve tensions that stemmed from the community
meeting, as LeBlanc met with the agency director where the staff served. At the same
time, organizing staff felt that "gate-keepers" (field notes from 9.02) among local
organizations might be challenged to assess their stances toward power and their
practices to foster local participation, as they competed with SCC's efforts, were inspired
by it, or as their own constituents demanded changes of them. Said Bey of this dynamic:
What we need to do with [the organization].. .we're not going to be able to change
it, but if, we do our jobs right, the community will demand [the change].. .people
will feel empowered to become involved, to participate in other things where they
will begin to impact other groups, and demand what they need. (field notes 9.02).
Even in the early months of the campaign, SCC saw this type of influence emerge
indirectly among other community groups with whom it interacted. Partly inspired by
20 The Boston Globe reported on the Coalition's initial meeting, quoting a resident who attacked the City's
police department, saying "On 911 calls, police don't respond when they hear that the caller is Latino... I'm
concerned because the streets where I live are not well lit. Enough racism."
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SCC's organizing, the neighborhood's South Asian Center started to do more extensive
outreach to its own population, and conducted a "barn-raising" event at their new center
in a more membership-driven mode.
The early campaign dissolves
The community tensions evoked by SCC's campaign arose in the first full
meeting, during a rainy night at the end of November, 2002. Twenty people came out to
the meeting, which LeBlanc opened by introducing the concept of creating a "union" of
Union Square. While he noted that many groups were working on Union Square issues,
LeBlanc said that what SCC cared about most was "interface between groups," and spent
time distinguishing the development activities of the CDC and the group it was trying to
form. Noting that SCC had a role as a property owner at both ends of Union Square, he
said that its interests in Union Square were instead driven by a new type of concern - to
create a lasting association of residents who could work together. Saying to the group,
"We're not in this effort so that the group can support our next proposal. We're not
looking to skip town, but build an organization you can be part of," LeBlanc also echoed
SCC's inclusive approach to organizing by saying that the group "is not about forming a
political power base... [but] working with any group to get things done " and to create "a
sense of shared accountability." (field notes 10.02)
Unfortunately, the meeting was dominated and somewhat disrupted by
representatives from other neighborhood groups, especially ones that were currently
inactive. LeBlanc's introduction was interrupted by a question about the sources of
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SCC's funding, and several other times by activists who spoke either about their multiple
efforts in Union Square, or who warned SCC of the many demands on time. One
challenged the organizers directly, saying that this group "shouldn't reinvent the wheel,"
and threatened "if this is going to be a waste of my time, I want to go right now." The
meeting was attended by only one person of color, a man who appeared conscious of the
fact that he was a representative of South Asians in a room of whites. In speaking about
the potential participation of South Asians and the South Asian Center in the emerging
group, "You give us something to do, and we do it. You don't give us something to do,
were very quiet," while pulling his hands back and sitting down (field notes 10.02).
Although a second meeting was scheduled - with some difficulty, given the
number of evening activities to which participants were already committed - organizers
canceled the next meeting. Some weeks after the first meeting, the local alderperson and
Mayor Kelly Gay asked SCC to withdraw from organizing in Union Square, and to
concentrate instead on East Somerville, where gang activity and resistance to a hastily-
passed city gang ordinance had brought out demands for attention and services.
Organizers had from early planning stages of the campaign believed that it would be
easier to focus on East Somerville, as more issues might appear that could galvanize the
whole neighborhood. Since East Somerville was, compared to Union Square, poorer and
in greater need of organizing, SCC was persuaded by the substance of the argument to
shift neighborhoods. Still, the elected officials' move against SCC's power-building
attempts was dispiriting to staff and to LeBlanc. The opposition of these officials was
effective in part because the CDC had no base of support within the neighborhood. As a
result, SCC strategized, over the course of its move to East Somerville, about the types of
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organizational practices that could better mobilize community, and also give the CDC
legitimacy to do work in the neighborhood. I describe the results of this shift in
organizational strategy - one which involved greater coordination between departments -
in chapter six.
Asian CDC: Achieving Growth
Context
Boston's Chinatown borders its downtown and financial district2 1 . Among large
institutions - South Station, Tufts University and New England Medical Center - low-
rise 4-5 story 19 th and early 2 0 th century apartment buildings house approximately 6000
residents (Chinatown Master Plan 2000). While the neighborhood is fairly small, its
economic and cultural importance for Chinese residents throughout New England
remains powerful, as it remains a destination for shopping, eating, and gathering; Asian
CDC's board chair observed that Chinese people from Maine to Hartford consider
themselves Bostonians (site visit 10.02). Downtown real estate investment during the
1980s and 1990s helped transform the borders of Chinatown - what used to be known as
the "Combat Zone," for its violence and pornographic businesses - but with this
economic revitalization, a host of other pressures emerged for its residents. Rents during
the late 1990s increased significantly, as several new luxury high-rise developments rose
above existing low-hanging structures.
21 In its location near valuable downtown office and residential space, Boston's Chinatown is like San
Francisco, New York, and many other major cities, and shares similar market pressures as a result.
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While these external market pressures make Chinatown's working class
particularly vulnerable to displacement, its powerful internal divisions represent another
source of pressure on community life. Far from monolithic, Chinatown is diverse in
language and ethnicity. Residents speak Cantonese, Mandarin, and Toisanese. During the
1950s, Chinatown was also home to Syrian and Lebanese immigrants who retain
affiliations with the neighborhood. While the neighborhood is poorer than most in
Boston, many better-off professionals with an appreciation for the neighborhood's culture
and convenience also reside there. Although its population is over 90% Chinese, and
largely composed of immigrants, neighbors arrived at different moments of world history
and different institutions of US immigration policy (Chinatown Masterplan). These
factors had consequences for the orientation of civic engagement within the
neighborhood.
Of particular importance to Chinatown's neighborhood politics is conflict among
organizations founded during different periods of national and local politics. During the
1950s and 1960s, Chinese family associations formed with a strong pro-business and
anti-Communist orientations. These groups were significantly incorporated into Boston's
urban political institutions; at the beginning of my study, the Chinatown Neighborhood
Council maintained strong authority in local planning and development decisions, even
though many of its members lived elsewhere. Forming more recently in Chinatown,
progressive associations formed to address disparities and discrimination suffered by new
immigrants, and with tactics that involved challenge and confrontation. Disputes among
these progressive and conservative groups were particularly divisive in the area of
downtown real estate and commercial development. During the time of my study, conflict
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around one development - Liberty Place, a high-rise development that violated both the
letter of zoning and the spirit of Chinatown's master plan - pitted the Chinese
Progressive Association (CPA) and the Chinese Residents Association (CRA) against the
CNC. In settling the CRA's law suit against the development, the city and the developer
announced very modest affordable housing set-asides for the community, but conceded
that CRA was to gain a major representative role in the neighborhood development
advisory board.
The Asian CDC (ACDC) was founded in 1987 as an affordable housing
developer, and as a developer of low-income units found itself over time in the middle of
this spectrum; siding, for example, with the radical resident groups in contesting
unwanted development, and yet needing to partner with the city on other development-
related issues. ACDC's campaign was to take control of land that would be opened up by
the construction of an on-ramp to the Central Artery and Tunnel Project (Boston's "Big
Dig." While this area, Parcel 24, was designated for housing by the Turnpike Authority,
there was no guarantee that it would be used for affordable housing. Like SCC's
campaign, one impetus for ACDC's work around the campaign emerged from analysis of
recent housing development activities. Around another public land known as Parcel C,
ACDC worked with a private developer to create both affordable and market-rate
housing. However, both ACDC staff and some other community organizations believed
that the CDC did not fight effectively for a greater proportion of affordable units. ACDC
staff felt that effective organizing would convince the CDC's board that they had the
legitimacy and community support to negotiate more from the city in the next project,
and also would be better able to influence other community organizations to support
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affordable housing development. Said Marilyn Lee-Tom, ACDC's director at the
beginning of the campaign, "in this community, they haven't seen development done
right. We have to prove to them that this is where we have to go. In this community, they
haven't seen it." (strategy session 7.02)
Developing a consensus-pluralist campaign
Through its campaign to build affordable housing on Parcel 24, ACDC's staff and
leaders strove to articulate and enact a credible vision of one community acting in concert
for its betterment. Initially de-emphasizing conflict between community residents, the
mayor, and other local organizations, it convened an extraordinarily transparent
organizing process aimed at bringing together long antagonistic local organizations to
support resident-controlled development.
This orientation toward conflict and toward different was consistently held by
staff of different positions through the early stages of the campaign, although it was often
articulated with different justifications. For ACDC's housing development director, Sam
Yoon, an orientation toward consensus was necessary because a neighborhood with high
market values meant building alliances with for profit developers - a practice which they
had adopted in the development of the Metropolitan on Parcel C, and which they sought
out early in the campaign timeframe around another BRA-owned parcel. Yoon, who
often talked about the pressures of the market during interviews, said during early stages
of organizing, when staff was considering partnering with another developer to build
mixed-income housing on a separate parcel of land:
David Micah Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 75
Strategic alliances with downtown interests are a necessary evil - you'd like it to
be from the grass roots up, but for us, in a dense neighborhood right by a high
market location, you need to come at it from all angles. (interview 8.02)
For Yoon, consensus-oriented coalition work was also a way of rising above what he
considered to be patterns of factionalism and partisanship in Chinatown. Although some
of these struggles had ideological roots and real implications for the citizens of
Chinatown, Yoon believed that many lines of struggle were drawn for purely "personal"
reasons, and used the tongue-in-cheek metaphor that "complementing your cooking"
could go a long way in cementing alliances between developers and community leaders
(interview 8.02).
Jeremy Liu, ACDC's director of community services, articulated the campaign's
early emphasis on consensus as a pragmatic one. Liu believed that bringing together all
groups will "create a better project."
There are clearly some things about Parcel C (the Metropolitan) that could have
been much better had we had a really strong network from the community, if we
had felt that we had the agency and the power to change some things about the
process, and the way that project happened, but we didn't, so we made certain
decisions along the way that ended up making it not quite as good a project as it
could have been. (site visit 2002)
On another occasion, Liu noted that inclusiveness made it difficult for excluded groups to
play a "spoiler role" for any project they felt excluded from, as development institutions.
He assessed, "If you're on the downward slope of power [as may be some groups], you
can stay on the outside and make it not happen." (interview 7.03)
The practical implication of this framing was to approach every organization in
Chinatown, especially around early efforts to win passage in the State Legislature of a
bill that would designate the parcel for affordable housing development. This orientation
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toward community, and the tactics that followed this orientation, are best summarized by
ACDC's executive director, Doug Ling, as he reflected in writing on the achieved goals
of the early months of the campaign (from June to December, 2002):
1. To build a coalition that truly represents all facets of the community,
regardless of history, political inclinations, or existing relationship with
ACDC.
2. To secure buy-in from as many community partners as possible on the three
points of the proposed legislation. (The three points were kept as simple as
possible.)
3. To solidify the coalition by consulting and involving as many organizations as
feasible, in planning meetings, legislative visits, and public appearances
4. To ensure that all parties are well informed of progresses of the Campaign at
all phases of the campaign (end of year reporting 2002).
Strategy: Enact Changes in Governance Structure and Development Practice
Like SCC, ACDC's campaign emerged during a period of staff change. Unlike
SCC, staff and residents used aspects of ACDC's campaign, also to enact changes in the
organization's governance and development practices. While some of these changes,
which involved extensive coordination between organizing and development
departments, were made easier by the fact that housing development was the immediate
goal of the campaign, not every CDC within RHICO whose campaign involved potential
coordination was able to enact it. As such, ACDC's work in this regard was both
difficult and significant in the ways that it helped realize the campaign's objectives and
contributed to changes in community dynamics.
Organizing also helped ACDC's staff and board renegotiate the way that they
interacted with each other. ACDC started organizing during a period of considerable
tension between staff and board. At the earliest point of early campaign planning,
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ACDC's staff saw organizing as a way to build independence from its board of directors,
which with whom generational, ideological differences were somewhat mirrored. At a
campaign strategy session, ACDC's then-executive director, Marilyn Lee-Tom, described
organizing as a way of enacting staff independence:
to 'wean' staff of the board. Because the organization was small in the past, the
board has been very 'hands on.' They need a high level of information to feel
comfortable and in the past were even project managers. We've been trying to
move away from that model. (strategy session 6.02)
Tensions between staff and board peaked with the resignation of Lee-Tom during the
summer of 2002. During the period of board-staff reconciliation, staff found new reasons
to engage with their board through organizing - particularly as current and former
residents with significant moral legitimacy around the organizing campaign campaign.
For example, at a RHICO site visit, Jay Wong, the director of ACDC's board
talked about the ways that organizing acting both as a point of rapprochement and
ongoing challenge to staff:
A lot of the board is associated with the community and has grown up in the
community. And of course if they agree with what the staff is doing, and they
actually need to work together, it makes a common bond more strong. Maybe the
bond isn't there at times, but the fact that the idea that they have to do some of the
legwork in the community, I think that gives a chance for the board and staff to
work closely together. (site visit 2002)
For staff who was sometimes frustrated at what they perceived to be arbitrariness of its
own board's decision-making processes, organizing served as a "process guide." Wrote
Liu:
For ACDC, Community Organizing has served several roles in managing or
inflecting tensions between staff and board. Community Organizing is "Base
Building" for the staff as we "target" the board as a body of the community that
we need to influence. Community Organizing is "Surrogate Community
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Credibility" for the staff to "head off' the board's tendency to second guess staff
decisions. These two roles frame the relationship between board and staff as
oppositional. Community Organizing is also a "Process Guide" for the
organization as a constant reminder of the way we need to operate. This role
frames the relationship between the board and staff as aligned, fundamentally.
(end of year report 2002)
While sometimes set in terms of board-staff struggle, the engagement sparked
from this conflict meant that ACDC coordinated its campaign extensively with the board,
even as they worked to create new structures for community engagement within the
board. For example, early in the campaign, ACDC staff worked with its Community
Planning and Advocacy Committee (CPAC) to make it the community organizing,
planning and advocacy committee, and to create a mission statement that emphasized
leadership development. The new CPAC and which included non-board residents of
Chinatown for the first time. ACDC also worked to coordinate campaign activities
among departments, especially between housing development and other community
programs. For example, staff came together to use ACDC's annual meeting to highlight
parcel 24, and to use this as a forum to bring principles of community organizing to an
ordinary CDC function. Sparking further coordination around organizing, in late 2002,
the CDC had a staff-wide retreat addressing the question of what organizing meant for
the mission and activities of the entire agency. Finally, throughout the campaign,
organizing and development coordinated to make ordinary pre-development activities
especially amendable to community involvement and community control. These events
are described in part below.
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Ambitions for the campaign as it emerged
Like SCC's campaign, ACDC's organizing was met by unexpected resistance
from other local organizations, in part because other groups possessed more conflictual
organizing models. Over time, ACDC realized that its organizing could win its goal of
seizing Parcel 24, while also contributing to a shift in dynamics among community
organizations. While no staff or resident believed that they had the power to significantly
change the practices of other groups - as other groups had too much staked on these
identities - they saw that winning the campaign also laid out a template for a different
type of work in Chinatown, one where fragmented groups could come together for a
common good.
One of ACDC's monthly campaign meetings that I attended, described by staff as
fairly typical in the early stages of the campaign, evoked some of these tensions. Its
written agenda proposed a debrief on the meeting with the transportation chair of the state
legislature, a sign-up for community outreach, discussion of a community-wide design
forum, and, as a last item, a discussion of the "preparatory group's" composition and the
language in which it conducted business. This agenda was quickly disrupted. One
resident and one staff member at a local organization asked that the language issue be put
up front; ACDC staff, who facilitated these meetings, accommodated the request. The
next forty-five minutes was spent in discussion that the preparatory group meeting was
discriminatory because it did not have translators. Staff from another community
organization also insinuated that ACDC had already received money from the City for
Parcel 24.
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These dynamics, while representing their own constant challenge to coalition-
building, also led ACDC staff and board to consider how their efforts might challenge
groups to move beyond their traditional political practices. For example, after the meeting
described above, ACDC realized that organizers at other groups did little work with
residents before or outside coalition meetings, and instead used the coalition project as a
forum for leadership development by encouraging residents to challenge ACDC. During
an early conversation with the RHICO program, Liu realized that ACDC's organizing
might pose a different paradigm for local collective action, asking out loud, "How can we
not do machine-style organizing? Having a small staff, we need to partner with other
people to make an impact. [but] how can we take a legitimate leadership role in a
community campaign, and how can the 'well-oiled machine' not take over?" (site visit
2002). By referring to a "machine," Liu referred both to the classic definition of political
machines (and its adherents in Chinatown), but also to the system of that emerged in
response to it. While these protests were primarily successful in stopping development
projects, they had not yet exerted control over a community-initiated and resident-
supported project.
Ling agreed with Liu's assessment, adding, "In a way, if we do it right, and we
find the best way to get community involved, other groups can use this model that we're
talking about, that would be a great accomplishment; it's not always an adversarial role
that they can take...it would take away from a zero-sum mindset" (site visit 2002). In
writing about the possibility of moving beyond a conflict-oriented "zero-sum mindset" at
the end of six months of organizing, Ling wrote:
ACDC's established image of a neutral organization helped make our leadership
role in the campaign more effective. We actually became convinced that
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regardless of outcome of the Campaign, the solidarity of all the agencies would at
least signal that broad-based collaboration among more than two or three
Chinatown organizations is indeed possible. (end of year report 2002)
What happened - ACDC holds the coalition together
In October 2002, seventy ACDC members attended the Annual Meeting of
ACDC in an auditorium of an elementary school across from the CDC. In contrast with
other meetings, the event emphasized participation and relationship-building among
attendees. Standing at the front of the room, Yoon said, "We'll ask you to tell us who you
are, and your hopes and your vision for Chinatown." Although staff led most of the event,
community residents also spoke. A new board member testified about the pleasures of
living in Chinatown - convenience to downtown, easy access to Chinese food and market
vegetables - and also spoke of what challenges lay ahead in to the community. Residents
raised their hands if they previously lived on Hudson Street, the part of Chinatown that
was destroyed by the Artery, and staff played a well-designed video in which board
members and former residents spoke about the devastating effects of displacement on the
community. After the event, people signed their names on dollars, in English and in
Chinese, and placed them on the type of use they thought best for the parcel of land:
market rate rental, affordable rental, homeownership, parks and open space.
These events and similar ones throughout propelled the group's campaign forward
at different strategic moments. At first, public events helped push legislation forward in
the Massachusetts Statehouse to turn Parcel 24 over to a community organization, with a
bill filed in December of 2002. Because the BRA and MTA claimed that the bill for
community control of Parcel 24 would set a dangerous precedent as planning over the
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Artery progressed, they were forced to respond to the bill filing, first by adopting similar
goals for the disposition of the parcel, and later by incorporating the design vision of the
coalition into the structure of its RFP. According to Liu, the bill "forced the MTA and
the BRA to the table to discuss its goals," put the MTA on "on record stating that the
most likely and appropriate use of Parcel 24 is affordable housing," and, most
significantly, pressed Mayor Menino to announce in August of 2003 that he supported the
principle of a land give-away for $1.
After Menino's support was made public, it became much easier to work with the
BRA and the MTA around a community vision for the site. But arriving at a vision still
required extensive community design processes, and coalition committee work around
affordability and development standards. Even after Menino's public support of
disposition of Parcel 24 for $1, the BRA was still charged with adopting (for the
Turnpike Authority) criteria for its formal disposition, to be incorporated into an RFP.
Starting community conversations about the specifics of what residents wanted for the
site, in August, 2003, approximately fifty Chinatown residents came together to articulate
different design visions for the parcel - using, for example, blocks to shape height and
massing as appropriate to zoning restrictions and community context. On the basis of the
community design forum, coalition partners had a basis of understanding by which they
could set forth specific standards that they wanted to see in the RFP. This was
particularly important for the campaign, as the BRA and the MTA had been pushing
residents and organizations to define exactly what they wanted from the parcel; one
might speculate that they believed this hurdle to be particularly high for Chinatown,
given the historic discord around development. ACDC continued work with several other
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community groups - including those who had engaged in some conflict with each other
in the past.
Nonetheless, tensions continued to emerge with coalition partners that threatened
to disrupt campaign work. For example, at one point, a radical neighborhood association
approached the bill's sponsor independently to change its proposed language, a move that
confused its supporters and delayed filing (Liu 3.03). At another, a more conservative
group asked to be removed from Coalition letterhead. Despite these continued
challenges, ACDC was able to hold the coalition together: a process that was never easy,
but was greatly assisted by staff's work around ACDC's governance and development
practices. ACDC staff built credibility for the CDC among its coalition partners, by
working with ACDC's board to produce a statement that Parcel 24 was important enough
for Chinatown, that it would support development on Parcel 24 even if the CDC were not
to be the developer (site visit 2003). By incorporating board members and new residents
into the CDC, ACDC was able to "push back" on other groups at strategic moments, and
create opportunities for real discourse among coalition members. And by creating visible
and effective events around normal stages in design and development, ACDC moved the
campaign forward and gave ordinary residents a reason to remain part of the effort.
These successes have given the CDC, its board, and its resident leaders increased
visibility and credibility in working with other community groups, and posed
opportunities for local interagency coordination and coalition work, where few existed
before in Chinatown. At the beginning of ACDC's campaign, staff at other agencies
challenged the CDC to desist from resident organizing on the basis that it competed with
their efforts. Toward the end of ACDC's campaign, the group was asking for support in
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their own work with tenants around safety issues, and worked with ACDC staff and
leaders around city-wide campaigns. Toward the culmination of the campaign, in another
indication of altered community dynamics, staff and leaders from both business and
resident-oriented community organizations stood together to demand in very detailed
terms what they wanted to see on the parcel. This final demand (aimed at shaping the
RFP for disposition of the parcel) stipulated that both the more conservative Chinatown
Neighborhood Council and the more radical Chinatown Residents Association would
need to approve the designation of a developer for the parcel. At the community forum
with the BRA later that evening, in the presence of over 100 community residents,
representatives from both conservative and radical groups (previously engaged in heated
public exchanges and litigation) exchanged cordial words about the proposed plan for 24.
The BRA told the group that their proposal would likely be adopted.
Review and preliminary analysis
How "the chance for growth" emerged
ACDC and SCC's campaigns were shaped both by the resistance they
experienced , and by the accommodations that both groups made to political and
community actors. For both SCC and ACDC, organizers and activists realized that the
resistance they faced from community and state actors also represented an opportunity to
adjust, but not fundamentally alter, local dynamics. In my first analysis chapter (five), I
describe how this shared path developed as each CDC articulated a somewhat different
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vision about what it meant to be part of their community, and what it meant to change
their community for the better. I will describe in greater detail the most salient
components of this vision of community and community change in chapter five.
However, as I have now described four CDC campaigns, it will be increasingly familiar
to the reader that 1) issues of racial and ethnic difference, and 2) orientations toward
conflict, are very important terms of inter-organizational cooperation and contention.
In Somerville's Union Square neighborhood, the CDC's emphasis on diversity,
and its strategic avoidance of early conflict with political actors, was met with challenge
on both sides of Union Square's political spectrum. The CDC speculated that for white-
led community groups and white local activists, raising the challenge of diversity
threatened organizational legitimacy. The meeting dynamics I observed supported their
observations. For Latino staff members of a local community organization, and leaders of
a more militant effort to bring the claims of immigrants to the city, SCC believed that the
campaign's emphasis on more cautious relationship-building undermined their claims to
represent Latinos across the city along a more exclusively conflict-oriented model of
protest. These observations also have support in the descriptions of meetings of the
Latino coalition, that were described in local newspapers. Partly as a result of their
divergent values, staff and residents at local associations moved to disrupt organizing by
the CDC at the meetings they held. Although their challenges made organizing more
difficult, SCC staff realized that success in their work - creating a racially-inclusive
community organization that had a productive understanding of what it took to create
change- would encourage both ethnic organizations and white homeowners groups to
become more participatory. In several ways, including the fundamental decision to shift
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organizing to East Somerville after request by local political actors, SCC also moved to
accommodate local actors, and with this accommodation mitigated the challenges that
their organizing represented to these groups.
Similarly, ACDC framed its organizing to seize public land for affordable housing
as an attempt at consensus-building and collaborative community planning. This
orientation evoked unexpected and significant resistance from community groups on both
sides of Chinatown's political spectrum, making the campaign much more challenging as
it proceeded. For example, seemingly simple tasks, like setting a meeting agenda,
became very difficult. Groups threatened to leave the coalition at several points. For both
radical and conservative community organizations (groups which formed in opposition to
each other and which had been locked into strategic conflict for several years),
consensus-oriented work was misguided at best and fundamentally challenged the terms
of discourse, and the strategies, that each had evolved to advance the agenda of its
constituents. During the course of ACDC's interaction with other community
organizations, the CDC adjusted the orientation of its organizing, making issues of both
contention and race more central to its claims and strategies, thus allowing coalition work
to occur more easily with the radical neighborhood association. However, ACDCs
underlying emphasis on consensus and collaboration continued to be at odds with beliefs
and tactics held by other local groups. With this dissonance, organizing developed the
ability introduce a new concept for the neighborhood - that more broad-based, pro-active
coalition work was in fact possible to build and maintain, even if individual groups
continued to hold antagonisms toward each other.
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What made the difference between success and failure
Both ACDC and SCC's campaigns were met with resistance from other actors.
Both campaigns also worked to reduce, to a certain degree, the dissonance that they
evoked within local political institutions. Over the course of organizing, actors realized
that success might not only win their specific campaign goals, but also adjust community
dynamics - to achieve the outcome I call "growth." However, only ACDC was initially
successful in its attempts to do so. In reviewing the cases, I start to trace the difference
between success and failure to two related organizational strategies: 1) the CDC's ability
to coordinate between departments, thereby mobilizing community through and around
development process, and 2) the CDC's ability to engage activists in governance.
In the early months of the campaign, SCC was significantly handicapped by its
principled decision to form a "fire wall" between the CDCs regular development
structures and processes, and the neighborhood association it was trying to form. Starting
a community organization from scratch - as SCC attempted in building a completely
independent organization in Union Square - became exceptionally difficult. Because
SCC believed that organizing and development activities needed to be separated so as to
gain credibility among community stakeholders, it could not use its housing development
or its regular governance activities as a way to build leadership and foster engagement.
Although, over the early months of the campaign, SCC sponsored workshops on
immigration as a way of building trust with immigrant groups, it did not find a way at
these sessions for attendees to become involved with the CDC. As a result, few
22 SCC achieved success later in the campaign, in ways that also highlighted the importance of the
organizational strategies below.
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community leaders were involved enough in the CDC and its organizing efforts to stand
up to the challenge posed by local and political actors.
In contrast to SCC's early work, ACDC's ability to enact the ambitions that
emerged over the course of the campaign was largely due to internal organizational
change, and especially its re-orientation of governance and development processes to
encourage mobilization and community control. By changing the focus and tenor of their
annual meeting to emphasize the campaign and the need for organizing, by working with
a board subcommittee to change its mandate to include organizing and leadership
development, and through the efforts of the board to state support for community control
of Parcel 24 even were the CDC not the developer, ACDC created opportunities for
deliberation and community control that helped them maintain coalition power and win
concessions from the city and the turnpike authority. As a result of these efforts, Boston's
Mayor Thomas Menino announced support for the $1 land give-away to the
neighborhood. With this victory ACDC produced a tentative template by which local
groups could interact with each other on less divisive terms.
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Chapter 4: The Ambition for Change
In this chapter, I illustrate the campaign path I call change by describing the
organizing of Nuestras Raices in Holyoke and Lawrence CommunityWorks in Lawrence,
and also by contrasting the outcome of their efforts. In both cases, fierce resistance to the
demands of CDC organizing from local institutions signals to staff and activists that
successful campaigns, over time, may significantly alter local political institutions,
making them more participatory and more responsive to neighborhood concerns. In both
cases, actors quickly developed the sense that their orientations toward community and
community change were in significant dissonance with those held by political
institutions. In contrast with organizing described in the previous chapter, both Nuestras
Raices and LCW strove to sustain this dissonance, and even worked to make it more
salient within the campaign and among its constituents. Interestingly, both a culturally-
conscious, conflict-oriented approach to organizing (in the case of Nuestras Raices ), and
a community-building, consensus-oriented approach to organizing developed friction
with local political cultures. As a result of this friction, these campaigns also evoked
the most ambitious prospects for institutional change, even though this ambition only
became apparent to actors over time. In both cases, CDCs valued this friction, and
maintained it in the face of pressure, because they realized that developing power meant
not just exacting concessions around policy or resources, but also to change the terms by
which city hall and local groups interacted with each other.
23 I speculate that in cities dominated by cultures of 'machine' politics, which often emphasize partisan
conflict but stress the ability of ethnic groups to become incorporated into political process, both
consensus-oriented work and racially-conscious organizing may meet resistance.
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Lawrence CommunityWorks both succeeded in its basic ambitions of community
improvement, and also has enacted significant changes in the orientation of local
development institutions that control development processes. Nuestras Raices failed to
achieve the ambitious goal that its organizing surfaced. It is legitimate to compare these
CDCs, as they share aspects of political, geographic, and economic contexts. Both
operate in low-income former mill towns with substantial Latino populations, where
machine politics have not incorporated these groups into civic life. In terms of
organization, both are relatively new CDCs that hold extensive relationships with
residents, formed not just through community organizing but also over the course of other
service and economic development activities. But in other important structural
characteristics of the organization - financial resources, staff size, and access to
professional institutions, Lawrence CommunityWorks is much better-advantaged. This
fact makes it much more difficult to isolate specific strategies that make the difference
between success and failure in the two cases. 24 Therefore, in the comparative study and in
my second analysis chapter (six), I emphasize ways that each group's extensive
relationships with community residents were developed and employed differently during
campaign work, a fact that was very significant for the ultimate success of the campaign.
Developing the ambition for change: Nuestras Raices
Context
Holyoke lies along the Connecticut River in western Massachusetts. Like many
other former mill towns in New England, it retains some of its manufacturing base, but at
2 In previous chapters, the analytic strategy was to compare groups similar in overall features, to
emphasize those aspects of strategy (as opposed to structure) that made the difference between success and
failuure. For greater discussion of the role of resources in organizing success, see chapter seven.
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a far reduced capacity; many of these looming and iconic red structures (some
comparable to skyscrapers in square footage) lie empty along the city's downtown and
riverfront. The census-determined poverty rate for individuals in Holyoke was 26.4% in
1999, compared to 9.3% for Massachusetts as a whole and 5.9% in neighboring,
suburban South Hadley. Starting in the 1950s and 1960s, Holyoke became home to one
of the largest Puerto Rican populations of US cities. In its service area in downtown
Holyoke, over 82% of constituents are Latino. In the city as a whole, 410% of residents are
Latino. Over 88% of Latinos are Puerto Rican (US Census 2000). Only two city council
members are Latino; one member of Nuestras Raices reported overt racism during
encounters with City Hall in the previous mayor's administration (site visit 2002).
Nuestras Raices is a small CDC which engages in community gardening and
youth services programming, and recently created an in-house food service business
incubator to complement their greenhouse and nursery. A relatively young organization
with only four permanent staff during the period I observed them, they nonetheless
possessed substantial volunteer and semi-permanent staff, including over 10 Americorps
members working with youth and with gardeners (Colon interview 8.03). In the period
between 1992 and 2004 (during most of this time working with unpaid volunteers)
Nuestras Raices helped residents found ten community gardens in and around downtown
Holyoke, through fairly extensive community processes (RHICO application). During the
period I observed them, its founding executive director, Daniel Ross, was very concerned
with building financial resources for the CDC.
During the 1980s and 1990s, economic change, arson, and the demolition of low-
income housing left Holyoke's downtown area with an extraordinary number of vacant
25", Our roots."
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lots. These lots fill with trash, weeds, and vermin, and sometimes become focal points for
drug activity. Although the City of Holyoke owns many of them, no single, cohesive,
city-level strategy had been employed to address problems associated with them. Instead,
Holyoke's mayor holds a great deal of discretion in the disposition of vacant lots, and
many Holyoke residents feel that lots have historically been transferred to a small circle
of beneficiaries, including factory owners and other powerful economic actors. Although
though some lots have been sold for factory expansion and other uses with enormous
local impacts, until recently, there has been little public input into the future of these
vacant lots. While many vacant lots have been used for industrial development, most lie
unused (site visit 11.02).
As one of the founding members of Holyoke's Food Security Coalition, during
2001, Nuestras Raices advocated for the city to adopt a vacant lots policy that gave
community residents the opportunity to decide how these properties should best be
developed or transformed. As vacant lots are costly to many different Holyoke city
agencies - from the Health Department to the Legal Department - once these
departments were brought together, the city was willing to adopt a pilot process for
vacant lot disposition in the neighborhood of South Holyoke. This 9-step process brought
together local stakeholders to decide on land use priorities for the lots. The CDC's
campaign attempted to institutionalize this policy and expand it to other areas of the city
(workplanning session 6.02).
Planning an 'agon istic pluralist' campaign
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As an environmental justice organization with strong "roots" (as its name
suggested) in Puerto Rican culture, Nuestras Raices sees its economic development,
youth services, and organizing work to be bound up in the struggle of migrants to the city
for self-betterment and political self-determination. This deep concern for culture comes
in part from early efforts of community gardening to preserve Puerto Rican traditions in a
new land:
The majority of the residents of inner-city Holyoke are Puerto Rican (75%), and
many grew up on the farms of rural Puerto Rico. Many of the older residents first
came to this area as migrant farm workers. Most of our members have lifetimes
of experience in agriculture and are proud to use their knowledge to improve the
community and to teach to a younger generation. (RHICO proposal).
During early months of the campaign, working to expand the pilot plan for community-
controlled disposition of vacant lot continued to draw on these frames of racial and
economic justice, and fostered a sense of strong opposition to dominant political
institutions. The ways that Luis Saez, Nuestras Raices ' organizer during the early
months of the campaign, identified early challenges to organizing, reflected these framing
choice about conflict and racial difference:
e How do we change the city's economic development policies to a more flexible,
community-driven paradigm, when powerful (and often white-controlled)
interests in city government and industry are lined up against it?
e How do we engage Puerto Ricans in this effort when there is a history of wariness
and exclusion about planning and development processes?
Similarly, for Ross, political work in Holyoke meant addressing "the underlying issue
that Nuestras Raices deals with each and every day - of our community and the whole
world. Racism, powerful, corporate interests controlling everything, especially to the
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detriment of low-income people and people of color. That's our number one issue"
(interview 8.03).
For Ross, as for other staff, this anti-racist, culturally-conscious orientation
toward the vacant lots campaign was continuous with the way they framed and
approached gardening formation. In response to questions from RHICO steering
committee members about the transition of the group's activities from community
gardening to policy advocacy, he replied that both gardening and policy work stemmed
from a similar analysis of local politics and economics, and that members would see the
similarities: "I don't see them as necessarily different. Our environment is the product of
land use policies made by the city, which is a function of how much power the people
have" (site visit 11.02).
In its daily interactions with residents around gardening and youth services,
Nuestras Raices both helped cultivate, and also drew upon, a persistant sense of
opposition to city leaders and profound frustration with the exclusion and poverty
experienced by he city's Latinos. This sense of opposition was deeply held, to the extent
that some members eschewed what they considered to be efforts of incorporation by
normal political processes. For example, one board member said that she was once
approached to run for office, but that "when you sit in that chair, you have to serve
everybody" (11.03) instead of being an advocate for low-income people of color from the
neighborhood.
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Strategy developed (but not acted upon): engage gardeners and youth members in
campaign work
In practical terms, the strategy that emerged from this vision and framing of
opposition meant that Nuestras Raices would build on the cultural and political
understandings that it had already formed with community gardening and youth members
about the structure of political action in Holyoke, and to amplify these concerns through
political participation. According to their RHICO work plan and also interviews with
Saez, organizers hoped to identify potential leaders from their base of community
gardeners in different neighborhoods, especially in South Holyoke, where it had several
gardens. In other words, for Saez, the strategy was to spend time "hanging out in the
gardens" (interview 6.02) before doing outreach and doorknocking with residents who
were at work there. On encouragement from RHICO technical assistance, they also
attempted to raise the issue of the pilot disposition plan at the CDC's annual meeting.
Ambitions for the campaign emerge
Staff at Nuestras Raices soon realized the stakes of the vacant lot disposition
issue for Holyoke political institutions. As Holyoke had few resources to encourage
economic development, it saw that a central component of rewarding its remaining
industries was through disposition of lots for business use, or for groups with other ties to
the political regime. In part, Nuestras Raices 's sense of the stakes of land disposition
emerged as the city attempted to violate the content of the plan on behalf of politically-
connected actors; a business owner whose representative was a former Mayor of the city
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was granted a lot across the street from Nuestras Raices , in contravention of the plan
(Colon 8.03). The second factor helping them understand the stakes of the campaign was
the ways that political agencies responding to their framing of community participation in
terms of race. When the CDC felt unable to engage leaders around the issue of lot
disposition itself, they attempted to help residents understand the vacant lots issue in
relationship to another pressing health concern - the high rates of neighborhood asthma -
and invited local EPA officials for what they called a "listening session" on the effects of
industrial location policy on neighborhood health. They received response from the
Mayor's office was that they were "playing the race card," a term which suggested to
organizers the sensitivity of their mobilization. From my field notes, Ross talked both
about learning about the city's sensitivities around lot disposition policy, and also how he
embraced the resulting conflict for what it could yield his constituents:
Says Office of Economic and Industrial Development has a lot of power within
the city; feels that private developers are given carte blanche, throw in vacant lots
and "the store." That they're not focused on the cumulative impact of this - "If we
keep adding industry, we keep adding negative impacts on the community in
terms of health, safety, poor quality of life - we want much more of a balance
with green space, parks, recreation, and small, locally-owned businesses."
The lots campaign is defeated
During the early months of the campaign, Saez was frustrated by internal resource
demands which made it difficult for to employing these existing relationships (see above)
he had intended to access for political work. Feeling isolated even within a small agency,
Saez had some time taken up by writing a grant to the EPA, and felt he had no "help" for
the campaign within the board or members of Nuestras Raices . Similarly, he complained
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that youth leaders were the only people with whom he might work on the campaign, but
that these leaders preferred to "play basketball" than do work writing flyers, translating,
or organizing a meeting. Saez left Nuestras Raices during the summer of 2002, and
although a replacement organizer, Hilda Colon, was hired from within, there was a long
period in which Colon continued to run other service activities - such as running the
women's group for gardeners - without attempting organizing. While these activities
placed Colon in a very visible community role, this role meant that she interacted with
residents mostly about gardening and not on the campaign itself. By the time that the
winter came in 2002, when the CDC no longer saw gardeners in the gardens, the
campaign had very little base.
This lack of base forced staff into a reactive role around the vacant lots planning
process. As they tried to push for the expansion of the planning policy to the
neighborhoods of Churchill and The Flats, NRI was not helped by the fact that they were
mobilizing to defend a plan that had already formed without significant resident direction
in the first place. Not only did the Mayor of Holyoke refuse to commit to the
institutionalization of the plan or back its spread into other neighborhoods, but also was
the content of the plan itself was violated on several occasions. Staff at Nuestras Raices
first fought to keep a used car dealership off the property directly across the street from it,
to uphold the principle of the community-driven process that yielded the plan. They were
not able to do so successfully. Compounding problems for the campaign, in December of
2002, the city planner who helped spearhead the pilot process in South Holyoke was
fired, leaving the CDC without an ally within city government. After a second, successful
attempt on the part of the city's economic development office to violate the content of the
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vacant lots plan by placing a gas station and car wash on a parcel designated for another
use - on the lot on the other side of Nuestras Raices - the agency decided that it needed
to concentrate its efforts on an issue that was more widely understood by community
residents26 . In the fall of 2003, the CDC voluntarily dropped out of the RHICO program.
In sum, because the CDC was unable to coordinate existing gardening activities as a way
to mobilize residents, its campaign faltered.
Lawrence CommunityWorks: Achieving Change
Context
The City of Lawrence was founded by mill owners in 1847, who also received
charters to develop lands around mill properties, and planned the surrounding city's
development extensively (Lawrence Historical Society 2004). Home to the famous
"Bread and Roses" textile strike in 1912, mills remained a prominent component of
Lawrence's physical and economic fabric, although, as in Holyoke, mill-based industries
have declined since the second world war and many currently lie vacant. Starting in the
19th century, Lawrence saw the arrival of Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants. In the
1960s, Latinos of different ethnicities came to the city. During the 1980s, large numbers
of immigrants from South East Asia, including many Cambodians, moved to Lawrence.
During this period, many mill-based industries continued their decline. According to the
2000 census, the city's poverty rate was 24%, compared to 9.3% for the rest of
26 At the same time, on learning at 10 or 11 in the morning that a hearing was scheduled for the afternoon
on disposition of the property, Hilda Colon mobilized ten residents she knew from gardening to appear at
the meeting, a presence which convinced a hearing officer to encourage the developer to work with
residents on some design issues.
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Massachusetts. Within Lawrence, more affluent neighborhoods lie south of the Merrimac
river. In the neighborhoods of the North Common where CommunityWorks focuses its
organizing and services, median household income was one quarter of that of the rest of
the city (LCW 2003).
Bill Traynor, a native of Lawrence, former Executive Director of a CDC in
Lowell, and experienced consultant on organizing and community building to several
national foundations, became involved in the late 1990's with what was then the
Lawrence CDC. In working with a local resident group, the North Common
Neighborhood Association (NCNA), he found that residents were frustrated with the
level of community involvement in CDC decision-making, and, together with the NCNA
and the CDC's board of directors, shifted the group's leadership and direction. In 1999,
the CDC became Lawrence CommunityWorks, and Traynor became the new executive
director. At the same time, the group of MIT planning students who worked with him
assumed staff positions in the fledgling agency (MIT case study 2001). Now located in a
former mill building on Island Street in the Merrimack river, Lawrence
CommunityWorks promotes local revitalization through physical projects in affordable
housing development, conducts family asset-building with Individual Development
Accounts, provides youth programming services, and conducts community organizing.
RHICO supported LCW to organize "Neighbor Circles," resident-facilitated
house meetings over dinner that focused primarily on relationship building and, in some
cases, concrete, jointly-defined actions that emerged from these dinner meetings. Because
LCW helped residents who met through these circles become involved with ongoing
campaigns, this work also spilled over into other areas of collective action, among them:
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1) a campaign for zoning change, for the construction of "Our House," 2) a design and
technology center for youth, and 3) the Reviviendo Gateway Initiative, a revitalization
project aimed downtown and inclusive of mill owners, artists, small business owners, and
other residents of the North Common.
Planning a Consensus-Pluralist Campaign
Several months into the Neighbor Circle campaign, Kristen Harol, LCW's deputy
director, noted that the proposal for neighbors to come together for dinner discussions
may have been received at the time as somewhat surprising and unambitious, coming
from an organization with many active organizing campaigns, and with deeply
transformative ambitions for community. But the Neighbor Circles strategy was
consistent with the organization's analysis of Lawrence and its overall orientation toward
work, which emphasized collaboration, networking, and community building, and which
also de-emphasized issues of discrimination and racial difference, at least in framing and
in claims made publicly over the course of campaigns.
Fundamentally, staff and leaders at LCW saw Lawrence's political culture as both
riven by partisan conflict and division, and also unable to resolve in practice or in public
discourse the issues stemming from disparities suffered by Latino residents. It also saw
Lawrence as weak in civic capacity of the type normally associated with governing
regimes in larger cities - where business or community interests worked with political
leaders to get large projects accomplished. Bill Traynor, LCW's executive director,
articulated this view at an early stage in the Neighbor Circles campaign:
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If you look at the kind of forces that would normally be pulling the levers in a
town like this, you might look at the bankers or the business community, some
prominent attorneys, the guy who runs the hospital, the guy who runs all the mills,
the two biggest employers, you would expect that there was a room where all
those guys get together and talk about something, and find a way to get it done,
whether it's direct or indirect - the publisher of the newspaper, all right? That
doesn't happen, ok? Not only does it not happen, but you build an alliance with
[an executive] at the hospital, then eight others are already suspicious of you. (site
visit 2002)
Traynor continued to speak about the perils of choosing sides and developing
allies or opponents in such an environment:
You decide you're going to ride the Mayor's train to power, you've made a big
mistake, because 9 councilors all of which are going to oppose it just because. In
other words, power, if kind of graphically illustrated, would be one of those
ancient dishes with all the cracks going a different way here? There's no path, no
alliances, no regime. Ok. And not even a remnant of one or pieces of one.
Sometimes in a community you can identify three kind of parallel or intersecting
power regimes, right? There isn't anything that comes close to that here. And
believe me, we've been looking for it. Because it could make our lives a whole lot
easier if we there were. (site visit 2002)
For LCW, this power vacuum was also deeply embedded in an orientation toward
race and ethnicity by both whites and Latinos, where groups remained suspicious of
action conducted by the other, and where neither was able to dominate local political life
in real terms. Armand Hyatt, then-board president, described this dynamic as a political
culture of fearfulness and mistrust: "I remember Lawrence being describe as a city of
jugular politics. It doesn't matter what position you hold, it matters whose side you're on,
and whether or not it's yours or somebody else. Some of that jugular feeling. That type of
politics can result in pettiness, sometimes" (site visit 2002). During the same
conversation, Liz Guttierez, then-planner with the Revivendo Gateway Initiative,
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suggested that these perceptions about the other group's political hegemony were illusory
and contributed to a culture where it was difficult to accomplish things:
Because there's this perception, that it's the white man that's developed power,
and others say, no, it's some Latino leaders that have developed power in this
town, and it's race, it's class, it's all kind of things, but so much of this is
perception of who has the power (site visit 2002).
Traynor continued, "It's totally fragmented, and its fragmented for everybody.
That's both a bad thing, and it's an opportunity, from some group, for some network, to
get its stuff together and start a movement to take this place and do something." (site visit
2002)
LCW staff and leaders widely shared this belief, that the proper framing for
organizing should avoid claims about racial and ethnic difference, and also that strategies
for collective action needed to be consensus-driven, transparent, and collaborative in
orientation. As will be noted below, while staff and residents held sometimes strong
beliefs about the ways that structures of inequality were intertwined with race, and staff
and residents often came to the conclusion that challenge and confrontation was
necessary, they persistently avoided these frames and strategies because they held them
27to be counterproductive . For example, in response to my questions about what was
yielded in avoiding race in the framing of local action, Alma Couverthie, LCW's director
of organizing told a story of how, on the level of individual engagement, she found it
effective not to challenge racist beliefs directly, but instead to challenge to become more
engaged and involved in community action broadly:
27 On practical terms, some other staff felt that the heterogeneity of Latinos also made it difficult to invoke
culture over the course of organizing. Nelson Butten, a community organizer and long-term resident of
Lawrence, noted that "The minute you say Casa Dominicana [another community organization],
automatically Puerto Ricans aren't going to be part of that. " (2.10.04)
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For me personally, [race] is an issue that I try always to be very very careful
about. Because everything can be discrimination and everything can be race... I
am not that sure that those claims are true, taking things separately, not in general.
And two, I sometimes question the productivity of actually framing issues that
way. Just to give you an example... Our House in its infancy... .we actually
ventured out into (the neighborhood). I was with Tamar, and she was talking to
this old Italian guy about the project, and he started out lashing against the
Latinos...that neighborhood went to hell because look at these neighbors, and
Tamar was about to jump down his throat and say. don't say that... So I said, it's a
problem when people don't get involved and do things. What do you do?
Sometimes I feel I am not here to resolve the race issue, but to open opportunities
of people to work together, focusing on action and goals, and the hope is that
through that, people are going to reflect on their position and change. And if at
some point we need to confront race face to face, we will do that, but it has to be a
very clear and blunt example, not the notion that.. .the reason that whites don't
want more development is that they want to keep the Latinos out.. .And that may
be true, but do you solve anything by pointing it out like that? (3.24.04)
Kristen Harol, LCW's deputy director, echoed the belief that de-emphasis of race was a
very important part of their efforts to enact change in Lawrence, as it contrasted with
political institutions that emphasized division, and held out the chance to impress and
inspire change within these institution. From my field notes:
This is a core part of our analysis: there are people who think about traditional
urban political analysis: older white ethnics taking power, and of course that's
happening, that there's a tremendous amount of racism. But those guys aren't
functioning, and we're pretty sure about that. That the more we're in it, it's a
question of all of us getting together - because in an environment like that, you
don't need a lot of power to stop things from happening, but to bring people
together to do things is in itself a revolutionary act - the big things look
miraculous; but they're impressed with the small things. (1.26.04)
As an alternative to frames of contention or racial inequality, LCW tends to frame (and
also emphasize within internal governance practices, see below) vocabularies of
organization-building and community building, or what Traynor more accurately
described as "anti-organization-building" (site visit 2002) - an organizational culture that
emphasized "networks", "relationships," "fluidity," and "adaptability." In part, this
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approach stemmed from an early analysis of limitations of work with the North Common
Neighborhood Association, where LCW eventually found some leadership to be more
concerned with organizational maintenance than with expanding their base and their
goals. In these ways, both to challenge dominant frames of action within Lawrence, and
to promote principles of effective organization, it concentrates on a relationship-building
culture in its organizing work.
Strategy: "Integrate organizing into everything that we do"
Since the formation of LCW "anew" in 1999, staff and board involved in the
transition proceeded with a highly-defined sense of what community development
practices should entail. At a site visit, Traynor defined subsequent efforts in the following
way:
Not to "do" organizing but to integrate organizing into everything we do. In fact,
to build an organization that does organizing in the context of community
development.. .We do have an organizing director, an organizing program. We
have events and issues, things you might typically find elsewhere. More
importantly, we try to have an organization that tries to find organizing legs in
everything it does. When we do development, family asset building,
neighborhood planning, the question we're always asking ourselves are how do
we do this in a way that's building power?... [it's a difficult thing to do], and a
more difficult thing to sustain. (Site visit 2004)
In practical terms, these efforts to make organizing part of community development
activities have taken several directions. All of its efforts - planning for gateway
revitalization, programming for economic development and youth service programs - are
driven by membership committees who suggest content, recruit members, and who
participate not just in those initiatives but in other organizational activities. Affordable
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housing development proceeds with direction from neighborhood committees called PICs
(property improvement committees), often guided by community planning. Harol noted
the ways that this integration was sustained not just by coordination, but by developing a
sense of interchangeability of roles among staff:
I sit at staff meetings, and hear from development about community gardeners,
and from neighborhood planner about need for affordable housing...if you didn't
know whose job title was who, you would really say that she is the director of
development, and the director of development was the organizer. So, as a team,
we're really thinking in each other's places. (site visit 2002)
Coordination and flow among departments also assists members come together to support
specific housing projects. For example, early during the period of organizing I observed,
in September 2002, during a City Council hearing about an affordable housing
development opportunity for the CDC, LCW members packed the hall with people
affiliated with different parts of the organization. Said Harol of that moment, "The
turnout was interesting, because it was like jury duty or something [in that people from
all walks of life come and meet at the same place]" She continued, "People who didn't
know they were part of the same organization but who had different interests in seeing
that property happen for us" all came out to the council to support it.
Third, over the course of the time I witnessed their work, LCW adopted a more
formal approach toward "network-building" among residents, emphasizing the flows of
residents between departments and CDC activities and with each other. In doing so, they
faced challenges inherent not only in the work itself, but also ones posed by in the rapid
growth of their own organization. In March of 2003, Couverthie described this dynamic
as stemming from natural pressures of CDC and staff specialization into program areas:
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I think that in order for network to work as we envision it, we have to make a lot
of changes internally; we have taken big steps toward. The problem came from,
[when] LCW started - the new face of it in 1999; we were just around 7 or 8 in
the staff. Things were a lot more integrated; we depended a lot more on each
other. As we started growing more quickly, the need to kind of specialize became
evident. That's when things started to split more into departments and things like
that. Now the call is somewhat to go back to the way that things were, when
things were more integrated.
LCW found that one major component to building integration was emphasizing cultures
of openness and communication among staff. LCW conducted a staff-wide retreat on
communication in April, 2003; Harol described the goals that emerged as developing
"the type of culture where you're responsible to your coworkers to be extremely honest
with them.. .where you have a problem with somebody, you speak to them." (interview
5.03)
In addition to furthering informal practices of communication among staff, LCW
developed a formal "Network Coordinator," hiring Marianna Levy-Spoumis in the
summer of 2003. In addition to conducting new member orientations, building
information systems for tracking, and helping facilitate communications generally among
departments, Levy-Spournis and others were especially interested in creating bridging
relationships with staff and participants at LCW's Family Asset Building, or FAB
program. Although directed by a resident committee that also recruited potential
participants in Individual Development Accounts and related services, as of March, 2003,
Couverthie contrasted FAB's relations with the rest of the agency with those of the
organizing and planning department:
I think it's very safe to say that in terms of organizing and development, that has
not been a challenge. I think that project-wise it's very well-integrated; I think
that's a focus of LCW development work as a whole. The challenge is that.. .it's
more present with FAB - because FAB came later, it came later with the process
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of us being more specific about our work and independence. So now, it goes form
the organizing side and FAB and other areas of the organizing, we needed to
bring those 2 together and do work together. (6.24.03)
Levy-Spimous described her efforts with FAB as particularly important, given the large
people with whom they come into contact. From my field notes:
The first thing we're trying to do is talk to the instructors because they're the first
point of contact for a lot of these FAB class members - to talk to them about their
role as network weavers... and then how do they facilitate these connections: and
that this is about relationship building - (interview 2.10.04)
Staff saw benefits to internal coordination in both membership development and
in political mobilization. During an interview, Nelson Butten, LCW's organizer, told a
story about "flow" through different parts of the agency, and how it contributed to
membership-building for LCW. He described his recent encounter with a woman they
met through a Neighbor Circle, originally from Panama, who had recently brought her
daughters to Lawrence from New York. Although both were professionals in Panama,
they were unable to get jobs in their craft in Lawrence because of certification and
language barriers. The daughter expressed interest in Lawrence's PODER Leadership
Institute (see below), but, as she hadn't yet done committee work within LCW or
otherwise possessed relationships with community members, staff deemed that
connection inappropriate. Instead, they connected the daughter to the FAB program,
where she became an active participant in that program. Another daughter was involved
in marketing and commercial design, and was connected to LCW' s youth program, where
she volunteered to teach classes to participants (2.10.04).
In addition to membership and relationship-building produced by this "flow"
through the agency, these networks were often employed for rapid mobilization around
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critical community events. For example, early during the period I followed LCW' work,
the city's Community Development Block Grant plan eliminated the CDC's allocation,
even though the city referenced LCW extensively in their planning materials. Over the
course of only two hours, even though no organized committee existed around CDBG
allocation, almost sixty members came to the evening hearing, including women with
their children who had taken off time from work to voice support for the organization; as
a result funding was restored.
Ambitions for campaigns emerge
As organizing proceeded in the Neighbor Circles Campaign, in the campaign for
zoning change, in work around the Revivendo Initiative and in other organizing projects,
the CDC encountered real resistance from state actors who opposed not only the goals of
the project, but also the terms on which they sought to achieve them. In more subtle
ways, LCW also faced resistance in work with their own constituents, as the CDC sought
to promote alternative cultures of community and relationship-building among leaders,
and to avoid nascent groups' being incorporated into what they viewed as dysfunctional
community dynamics. While part of the resistance on both fronts stemmed from natural
opposition to complex and difficult campaigns, in other ways, it came from suspicion
about LCW's collaborative orientation toward organizing. Over time, these encounters
re-enforced staff and leaders' conviction that continued success would also help alter
patterns of relationships between city hall and neighborhood groups (including but not
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limited to LCW) - making political and civic institutions more inclusive, more
participatory, and more effective.
These moments of resistance emerged in dramatic and in small ways. For
example, at the first meeting of residents involved with the campaign to create a zoning
overlay district for the downtown area, mill owners, artists, and other local residents
stood before the planning board and made an extensive presentation about their vision for
downtown development. Andre LeRoux, LCW's community planner, reported that the
format of the proposal was met with profound skepticism from the zoning board. As
captured in my field notes, LeRoux reported:
At the first planning board meeting, I was in attendance, it was interesting
because we had this whole RGI group, 5 artists, 4 residents, 4 mill owners, and
they all spoke about why this was such a good thing for the district - a pretty
powerful display - and the response was, "Who's making money out of this?
CommunityWorks, mill owners, who's making money out of this?" (3.24.04)
After "backtracking" with the planning board to make sure they felt included in the
process (and in doing so, in LeRoux's assessment, "empowering them"), the proposal
moved to the City Council's ordinance committee. There, it was met with similar
skepticism. LeRoux described the committee as involved "the toughest, most eclectic
counselors," who resisted LCW's attempts to share information beforehand about the
proposal, charging that they were "trying to do backchannels." After residents made their
formal presentation to the ordinance committee, one counselor who was particularly
antagonistic to city officials and agencies seized upon the CDC's claims that it had the
support of the Administration and charged LCW with what seemed at the time like an
impossible demand, paraphrased by LeRoux: "next time, I want to see back here the
mayor, the planning director and all of the administration department heads answering
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our questions, doing a build-out analysis of what this zoning would look like, and the
effect it would have on services and development. All of the department heads. It was a
fairly dark day."
While this major external challenge reinforced LCW's sense of the tensions
produced by its campaigns, in other ways, they felt that they faced another, related
challenge: in a community where leadership has traditionally meant enacting contentious
action, building an alternative culture of leadership meant confronting basic expectations
about what it means to be political. In the very first Neighbor Circle, residents started to
talk about escalating rents in the city, and then wanted to plan initiate a campaign for rent
control legislation. Although, on other occasions, LCW staff had considered such
campaigns to be perhaps winnable on the local level, they worked hard to encourage
leaders to consider both the issue itself and also what types of things they needed to see
in place before embarking on one. Couverthie described how the conversation finally
ended:
They realized that it is a very complex issue; and that there were things that they
didn't have in place to succeed in the campaign. One of them was simple as
getting to know your neighbor - we don't have relationship with the people across
the street. So what they started to do is activities around building sense of
community around the area; local street-by-street issues; building momentum so
that at some point in the future, if it is the right time and the stars are lined up -
they're going ot call the right people - and then they're going to work it. (6.24.03)
As a result of these types of transitional conversations, Couverthie both saw a way that
LCW might work to change leadership cultures within the CDC, and also (as will be
described below) saw the terms around which they hoped to engage leaders when they
did in fact decide on a campaign.
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In smaller ways, LCW staff and members' orientation toward fostering mutual
self-help also encountered resistance from city agencies who worked to discourage it.
Some LCW members who met through a Neighbor Circle members self-organized a day
of clean up around a vacant lot, bagged the trash, and expected the city to pick them up
over the course of normal trash collection. Instead, an inspector arrived from the city to
LCW offices, seeking to fine the CDC and also looking for residents to fine for their
work. Couverthie reflected that encounters like these were particularly important for
residents to see. When community leaders saw "how something that seems good to do is
turning into this whole political issue" (AC 3.24.04), they also developed the analysis that
broader change was necessary.
I would say that almost every single time that an issue....that seems not
threatening or simple [like cleaning up a vacant lot], arises, and gets people in the
community talking and saying this is going to be threatening to the city - unless
the way the city is run changes. What I envision happening is that some of the
leaders that are going to come out of these efforts are going to be the ones to up
the ante, and say we're going to run the show, and they're going to start looking at
the city as a source of power to effect change - that's a long term goal, 5 or 10
years from now. It's started to happen now, little by little... [people are asking,]
What about the historic commissions? What about the city councils? Oh it's the
mayor who appoints them - how's that? And many leaders are seriously thinking
about running for office. We are trying to tell them not to be alone when they do
that - there's actually a strategy and a back-up, that they're not the only voice of
reason among incompetencies (sic). (3.24.04)
What happened - success starts to spark changes in political institutions
In this section, I describe the evolution of the Neighbor Circles and other areas of
LCW collective action, and how successful campaigns not only drew major resources to
Lawrence, but also set examples for a more participatory, conciliatory, and engaged
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political culture, what staff and leaders sometimes described as "a new way of doing
business in Lawrence."
LCW conducted over thirty Neighbor Circle sessions during the period I followed
their work. Over time the Circles became self-generating, as resident facilitators trained
other participants to conduct meetings on their own. These sessions significantly
increased LCW's membership, and in turn helped generate constituency and direction for
other areas of collective action. The Circles themselves were often seen, however, as a
creating small victories in both achievements and in process. For example, some leaders
of the North Common Neighborhood Association (the group that was deeply involved in
LCW's transformation in 1999, but which LCW now perceived as somewhat anti-
participatory) became interested in joining Neighbor Circles. As a result of their
engagement with other Circle members, they started to work to maintain a local park and
find ways to keep gang members out of it. Couverthie described the process in this way:
Some from NCNA [North Common Neighborhood Association] were eager to
know other people from the circles and get to join them. So that was an incentive
to get to join them. Out of that meeting, people joined the committee [to maintain
the park], they have a great plan, they were able to get the police engaged with the
plan. But it was done in a way that people were attracted to come together by an
issue, not by a form... .The focus is the park, the focus is the neighborhood. That's
one reason that keeping it fluid was an asset, because it let them really focus on
what they were going to do, instead of is this something they should be doing, and
who should be - that was beside the point. (6.24.03)
Over the course of the Neighbor Circles, staff worked to ensure both that
promising potential leaders got to know each other, and also different aspects of the
organization. Even when Circles did not yield a concrete project (such as an alley clean
up or organizing playground maintenance). Organizer Nelson Butten described the
trajectory of one circle conducted on Orchard Street, where residents decided not to
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pursue an action around code enforcement for personal reasons, including some fears of
immigration action. While the energy around that circle dissipated, Butten described how
one leader became very active in the Our House Committee (see the footnote below),
spoke often during member orientations, and eventually took part in the PODER
leadership training institute. As conveyed in my field notes, Butten said, "every time we
need somebody to cook [an essential component of house and evening meetings] or be
part of a meeting, she is really involved." (2.10.04)
Also during this time, the Circles started to build a constituency, not just for
potential leaders within the organization, but for leadership training of a certain type. As
described above in the case of the happily-avoided rent control campaign of the first
Circle meeting, sessions sometimes surfaced difficult problems that required complicated
and far-reaching responses. While LCW encouraged leaders to stay away from these
ambitious campaigns until sufficient local relationships had been built, facilitators were
in fact interested in developing the skills that could that eventually enact important
changes. In part as a result of the evolution of their leaders' sense of what constituted
political action, PODER, a leadership training institute, started to take shape. Said
Couverthie:
The idea of having kind of a cadre of well-prepared leaders is not new for us,
we've been tossing this idea around for quite awhile. It wasn't just cooking - and
how are we going to do this, and how are we going to do this - it wasn't until we
start to do Neighbor Circles that facilitators started to flag that they needed that.
That they were being thrown very complex issues, and that sometimes they felt
they weren't ready to tackle these issues and have productive conversations,
because they were too complex, too large, or they didn't have enough information
to deal with them. And staff was at a place where they couldn't take over the
meetings; they were saying they needed to think more about economic analysis
and power analysis, they know that they didn't need to know everything, but they
should know something. (6.24.03)
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PODER emphasized collaborative leadership skills, political and economic analysis, self-
knowledge, trust-building, and tools of political action (including, Couverthie described,
the often over-looked skill of "asking a question" (3.24.04). The first class of the Institute
invited public officials to answer questions about Lawrence, and in doing so used the
space created by the "classes" to develop and formulate a campaign.
At the same time, leaders involved in PODER and in Circles became part of
LCW's other organizing projects, helping fuel those campaigns. While there are many
that might be described here, 28 I focus especially on the campaign for zoning change, as
it both evoked institutional resistance, inspired some changes in political culture, and will
allow for significant redevelopment of the area around the Merrimack according to
community visioning. After the "dark day" in which a councilmember seized on LCW's
claims at collaboration with the city, to insist that the mayor and every city department
head testify about its budgetary impacts, the campaign regrouped, according to LeRoux.
Although leaders made the decision that they could have "railed against it, or brought 200
residents out," they decided instead to address what they analyzed was the "underlying
issue," which came not from opposition to the substance of the overlay, but instead
sought to "send a message to the city" about responsiveness to the Council and to policy
changes generally. Instead, committee members worked to get the Mayor's support to
have city departments prepare statements to the Council, and LCW staff helped these
departments conduct analyses in cases that they had not done so before.
28 For example, around the Our House Center for Design and Technology, one of LCW's first projects, and
an extensive one with diverse community support, the city had promised money to demolish part of the
building, but said that they were unable to provide these funds after LCW acquired the building. 50
residents confronted the Mayor and the city Planning Director as they sat in the center of a circle and were
forced to answer questions about their support of the project. When they suggested that they meet privately
with a select group after the meeting, residents asked that they all attend, and the subsequent meeting had
even more people. Funding was restored. The example is also significant in that LCW residents showed
themselves ready to embrace conflictual tactics when necessary.
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While coordinating with the city, members had five public meetings and seventy
five speakers in favor of the zoning overlay, even as they responded to requests for
information and analysis in what they considered to be a transparent way. In the end,
several city department heads came to the council meeting, and while they were not able
to answer every question the council had for them, their attendance convinced the
committee that they took the overlay proposal seriously. At a late stage in the Council
hearings, the campaign also dealt effectively with opposition from a South Lawrence
councilmember, to the proposal's inclusionary zoning requirements. This issue was
particularly important to the structure, although it was also one that challenged the
coalition's own constituency. While they did not oppose the inclusionary zoning
requirements, and took part in the coalition processes that proposed them, many mill
owners did not fervently support them on their own. By emphasizing to the council that
this was a diverse coalition that supported a plan that would preserve the neighborhood's
own economic diversity, they were able to overcome opposition and move to full council.
LeRoux described the subsequent victory, and its impact in the often-divided
council:
Once we had [the support of the ordinance committee], we had more supporters
on the full council, and it was pretty routine there. We got a unanimous vote. All
their concerns had been resolved, all the amendments had been incorporated... at
the end of it, they all supported it and they all - of them - made beautiful
comments about the process and the result, and they were all really
complementary to everybody, said they had never seen such a committed open
process for an issue like that. By the end of it they were really invested in it, they
were really invested in it (and said) Why didn't you guys expand this to other
parts of the city? That's part of what we try to do in the city, we try to model how
good development could happen. We learned a lot about how to conduct a pulbic
campaign and eleveate the level of discouse in the city, and we did a lot of good
in terms of educating public officials... I think we changed their thinking quite a
bit. (3.24.04)
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The success of the campaign built not only optimism within the council for an "elevated
level of discourse," but also, said Leroux, further built constituencies of LCW within the
city's economic actors, who now approach both LCW and community in a different way:
Over the last few months I've noticed a sea change over the people I work
with..mostly in the private sector....Whereas before these mill owners were all
afraid to be the first ones to redevelop their buildings.. .now it seems that they're
racing, and they're afraid to be the last ones. They're all very anxious about who's
doing what, and they're putting together serious proposals, and have a time frame
of 18 months. They're also looking at residential, and this is all because of the
zoning overlay district. It changed it for the public officials and the mill owners
too.... I think that the private sector has caught on to the value added that's being
generated by RGI. It contrasts significantly with the response they get from the
office of planning and development, which is not responsive, not positive, and not
forthcoming about information.. .not tied into the community. (3.24.04)
Setbacks and continuing challenges
While LCW experienced success these many areas, campaigns were not always
successful. In what Couverthie called "one of our most, I would say harder defeats,"
attempts to renovate a Holy Rosary for afterschool programs. Unfortunately, Couverthie
described the level of animosity between the school department and the city council as
such that the council said, in effect, "you haven't proven to me that you really want it,"
and denied funding for the project. From my notes:
I think that the miscalculation was that we thought it was going to be an easy
thing to do - that we didn't need a lot of organizing around it - we were just
going to renovate the building that the city owned, that we had the support of the
school department to do.. .why would you say no? Well, politics can screw
everything, and in this case, it was a delusion that things were going to go
smoothly - a lot of the project wasn't under our control, it was under the school
department's control.. .they didn't do the quality of work to convince the city
council that it was a good thing to do (3.24.04).
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Harol noted that this fight was one opportunity in which it was particularly difficult not to
analyze resistance in terms of racial discrimination, and to emphasize this in the course of
the struggle. LCW refused to do so, believing that this strategy would be ultimately
counterproductive. From my field notes:
The city is riven by racial issues and a lot of discourse get framed this way here,
and it can be very ugly - and it's hard to resist it because it's there. We had a huge
fight [with Holy Rosary] because we kept the focus on feasibility, finding the
money, it's free - and the only good explanation for why you wouldn't want to do
this has a lot to do with race. But calling it that gets you nowhere, it wouldn't get
what you want. (interview 1.24.04)
Review and Preliminary Analysis
How the "ambition for change" emerged
Like the campaigns described in "the chance for growth," LCW and Nuestras
29Raices's campaigns were met with fierce opposition from state actors . This opposition
stemmed not simply from the specific demands of the campaigns, but also from the ways
that these campaigns were identifiably associated with a particular orientation toward
community and community change. As I describe more extensively in the next chapter,
the most salient components of this orientation toward community and community action
involved stances 1) toward racial and ethnic difference, and 2) toward conflict and the
adoption of contentious tactics. In contrast with the cases of ACDC and SCC, however,
CDCs did not try to adjust their own orientation toward difference and toward conflict to
2 In contrast with the cities of Somerville and Boston, Holyoke and Lawrence are more relatively sparsely-
populated in terms of organization. Partly because of this, the friction that both campaigns evoked with
political institutions was more directly experienced with state actors.
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accommodate political institutions; rather, they actively sought out opportunities to
distinguish their practices and demands from those of other groups.
In fact, LCW decided that the absence of an effective oppositional structure
within city government meant that they needed to build an alternative base of power,
whose members would hold values that contrasted with those the CDC found applied in
dysfunctional ways within city government. That meant that even though staff and
activists were possessed of deeply-held beliefs about the role of race in community, and
even though the CDC was on occasion willing to adopt contentious tactics, that it
generally espoused beliefs about community that emphasized consensus-building and
which de-emphasized racial difference. This contrast between the CDC's own style of
organization and leadership, and what LCW considers to be the traditionally partisan and
divided conditions of organizational life in Lawrence, has sparked conflict with political
institutions. resulted in powerful inter-group conflict. For example, LCW's claims to
work co-operatively with the city (and with all potential partners) to enact zoning change
sparked both suspicion and procedural obstacles within the city council, as council
members who were suspicious of the Mayor's office mobilized against the campaign. As
a result of this type of opposition, LCW realized that success would both involve and
contribute to a change in the orientation of fundamental values of discourse; with this
change in the terms of interaction they hoped
Similarly, resistance to Nuestras Raices's vacant lots campaign turned out to be
unexpectedly fierce, involving constant challenges from City Hall, including charges that
the CDC was 'playing the race card' by emphasizing the cultural aspects of their
campaign in a city that was heavily Puerto Rican, but had only two Latino
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representatives. Nuestras Raices's readiness to see its work in terms of conflict and
difference - its belief in the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from political and economic
strata, its "roots" in gardening and environmental justice as an alternative order to the
industrial and its adoption of conflictual stances toward power -- led it to embrace the
implications of these escalating conflicts, one which would represent a dramatic change
in policy and in the way that government interacted with Latino neighborhoods.
What made the difference between success and failure
As I noted in my introduction, my analysis strategy throughout these chapters has
paired CDCs that were comparable in structural aspects of organization and
neighborhood setting, but which differed in aspects of organizing strategy,
interdepartmental coordination, and governance that CDC organizers and activists might
reasonably be able to change or implement. LCW and Nuestras Raices work in similar
political, economic, and demographic environments; however, LCW has significantly
greater financial resources and a much larger staff (although if one were to include
Nuestras Raices's Americorps volunteers, this disparity would be substantially less). In
chapter six, I explore this analytic problem in greater detail. For now, I note that my
comparative strategies in this chapter do not eliminate the possibility that resources make
no difference at all in mounting successful challenges. However, this comparative chapter
also reveals the ways that the extensive relationships that each CDC had with local
residents were employed very differently over the course of organizing. While Nuestras
Raices segmented its organizing from the activities of the rest of the organization, LCW
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worked hard to make sure that relationships developed through one aspect of the CDC's
development activities could be drawn upon for collective action, a process that required
extensive interdepartmental coordination and "network-building" within the organization.
For Nuestras Raices, during the months between June 2002 and November 2003,
residents were largely not asked to become involved in the public policy debate, or to
take part in campaign planning. Instead, staff's reluctance to meet gardeners outside of
the terms of engagement they had helped establish meant that the campaign had little
base, put the campaign into a reactive role, and meant that no momentum was generated
to compensate for the CDC's advocate's departure from the city planning office. Even as
Colon took over the position, staff continued to interact with gardeners in the fields or in
the CDC's greenhouse almost exclusively around gardening activities, as opposed to in
their homes around political participation, and they still mostly worked with youth
members around recreation and service activities. In other words, while Nuestras Raices
had developed extensive relationships with community residents, organizational
processes were not set into motion so that these relationships could be employed for
organizing purposes.
In contrast, while relationship-building at Lawrence CommunityWorks also
stemmed from other, broadly community-oriented activities (such as family asset
building, educational training for youth, or neighborhood circles), the agency was much
more strategic about the ways that it helped members interact with each other around
different aspects of the organization's activities. As a result, political mobilization was
facilitated by relationships formed over the course of program development. These
programs had not only community involvement but also active committee control, and
David Micah Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 121
helped residents learn that membership in the organization could mean participation in
various different campaigns and committees. The CDC's hiring of a "network
coordinator" helped formalize the organizational processes by which relationships were
facilitated and engaged in mobilized work.
These networks, while facilitated by staff activity to re-orient service projects,
would also not have been possible had residents not themselves controlled the content of
the programs through active committee work. LCW has active and compettive elections
for board positions, and vigorous committees who engage leaders outside of the board's
formal structure. All in all, as members moved in and out of opportunities for collective
action in the Reviviendo Gateway Initiative, in the zoning change campaign, and around
the Our House project, the CDC's campaign was able to weather conflict and skepticism
provoked by the CDC's orientation toward work, and in winning these campaigns, to lay
out the template for a "new way of doing business" in Lawrence.
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Chapter 5: Analysis - How Campaign Ambitions Emerge
The previous three chapters described in detail the organizing campaigns of six
CDCs. Starting with their early planning stages, I examined the strategies CDC staff and
activists employed both within their own organization and in interaction with
neighborhood residents and local targets. I assessed the response of local organizations
and other state actors to the campaign, the successes and failures of campaigns as they
attempted to affect the local physical and policy landscape, and the ability or inability of
campaigns to alter local political institutions. Each chapter described a shared path that
two campaigns took. As campaigns developed, it became apparent to actors in both
CDCs that successful organizing might impact local political institutions in a particular
way. Each of the three chapters also started to analyze the ways that the campaign either
succeeded - thereby enacting the ambition that surfaced through collective action - or
failed - and in failing neither altering nor reinforcing existing political institutions. This
analysis chapter, however, focuses exclusively on the emergence of campaign paths, and
the formation of ambitions either to alter or reinforce local political institutions.
Secondarily, this chapter also starts to locate my findings within discussions about social
movement framing processes, and about the role of race in community action.
Ways of contending
What determined whether mobilization could be incorporated into existing
political systems, or if it instead threatened local institutions? In each of the campaigns I
studied, campaigns evoked a specific, contextual claim about their community, and about
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proper way to change it. That is, in addition to winning concrete goals - building schools,
enacting legislation, or exacting resources from corporations or city hall - organizing
articulates a vision about community itself. In public statements to government, in
conversation between organizers and activists, and in informal interaction among
residents, organizing makes claims about the ways that its resources are (and should) be
allocated within communities, and about the ways that groups and individuals do and
should interact with each other. I described the formation of these claims in the "planning
a campaign" section of each of the six cases. From the perspective of actors involved in
the organizing, the specificity of this claim about community was important for several
reasons. As I described in each section, ideological, biographical, strategic, and
contextual factors all motivated a CDC's claims toward community action. Organizers
decided to frame based on what they thought would best "work" - what would appeal to
the identity and self-interest of individuals they wished to engage and mobilize. In other
cases, they made claims about community based on the actions that could stem from this
vision - assessing whether these actions would be winnable and important. In other cases,
claims about community were adopted because they were rooted in deeply-held beliefs
about justice. As I describe below, these claims also helped determine the response of
local political institutions to the organizing.
The richness of my data allows me to be more specific about the components of a
campaign's claims about community, at least as they surfaced in explicit terms for
organizers and other groups over the course of campaigns3 0 . These specific components
' For studies of the importance of claims not raised, see, for example Peter Bachrach and Morton S.
Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 (1962). For example, in only one
two of the campaigns I studied did class become an explicit issue; in none did gender become an explicit
component of campaign framing. Castells (1983) understands the refusal to adopt claims related to class
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are important to explore because they illustrate some widely-held underpinnings to
community action and political challenge. Within my cases, there were two important
components to a CDC's vision of community and community change, as articulated by
the campaign and its interaction with local residents. These were claims about 1) the
importance of racial and ethnic difference in community, and 2) about the necessity of
conflict in organizing tactics. As campaigns were planned and developed, CDC leaders
made decisions about whether to emphasize or de-emphasize these issues of difference
and conflict: whether to make racial and ethnic identity an important part of a campaign's
attempts to inspire and challenge, and whether to employ contentious tactics in carrying
out its objectives. As I describe throughout the cases, these decisions were often
conscious and deliberate, and made for strategic reasons. Of course, many campaigns
stemmed in fact from these existing orientations toward race and community, even as
strategization made conscious the reasons behind these framing choices.
Below, I build a typology of CDC claims about community and change, as
evoked by organizing campaigns by describing two dimensions, and four types, of claims
and tactics. The first dimension of claims about community and community change I
describe involve claims about difference. The majority of CDCs I studied work in
communities of color, or have diverse constituencies. Either explicitly, through inclusion,
or implicitly, through de-emphasis, CDC campaigns made representations about race-
based patterns of political and economic exclusion impacting their neighborhoods.
Campaigns that made racial or ethnic difference an important issue for their campaigns
often formed cultural associations, framed their campaigns as making inroads into white
institutions, or understood opposition to be based in institutional racism. Although these
structure as an endemic issue to urban mobilization in the US.
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claims about difference were themselves articulated within a particular set of community
demands - a campaign goal - and so may be substantially distinguished from nationalist,
separatist, or identity politics, I draw on language employed by democratic theorists
(Benhabib 2001, Marion Young 2001) to describe a campaign's reliance on difference as
the extent to which campaigns involve the articulation offundamental distinctions among
community constituencies, which are not easily accommodated or erased within the
existing social systems, and therefore require change. These distinctions most often
involved race and ethnicity, but in other situations involved differences found in other
social categories, such as class3 1 . In contrast, CDCs who de-emphasized difference
framed action as community power-building in more general terms, without explicit
reference to the racial, ethnic, or class composition of their constituencies, even when
constituencies were primarily poor people of color.
The second important dimension for organizing frames addressed an
understanding of the necessity and desirability of conflict in community change. Within
my cases, a campaign's evocation of conflict was the extent to which a CDC held that
successful achievement of goals requires it to challenge existing relationships, subject
them to extensive tensions, and employ coercive means to do so. These sometimes
involved the use of contentious mobilization or disruptive tactics. " In contrast, if a
3
'Although many participants understood gender to be an important social dynamic, it did not emerge as a
category of interest over the course of early campaign development. Class was also a more implicit
understanding within CDC campaigns.
32 This definition is consistent with normative, theoretical literature on democratic deliberative theory (see
Mouff 2001), and also on social movement studies of the institutionalization of protest (Tarrow 1998, Piven
and Cloward 1972, 1977),
33 Again, these dimensions of conflict may be seen as relative to the politics as practiced among community
organizations. Compared to some other spheres of organizing practice, there were probably fewer
genuinely disruptive "actions" within RHICO. However, within the spectrum of political mobilization
generally, I believe RHICO's level of non-institutionalized and disruptive repertoire to be fairly typical; see
Goodwin 1998 on the institutionalization of protest in New York City. Within Boston, to compare
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campaign's course de-emphasized conflict, it did not make issues of contention salient in
framing or tactics.3 4 Varied factors were important for a sites' decision to make conflict
an important part of their activity. These included an explicit or tacit assessment of a
CDC's power to accomplish what it needed through disruptive means without suffering
disabling retribution; an orientation toward a CDC's past dependencies to government,
banks, or community groups; a projection of what would mobilize and energize its
constituencies; and a sense by leaders and staff as to the level of tensions they were able
to endure personally. 35
These two dimensions of framing were separable from each other, as illustrated
by the diagram and elaborated in the descriptive paragraphs below.
contentious tactics, the Boston Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO), the local IAF group, used
primarily the "accountability session" as its large scale action, and did not attempt public or visible acts of
civil disobedience.
34 Although I use a typology of high and low levels of conflict within a campaigns' claims about change, I
do not suggest that sites with low levels of conflict practiced what is known as "consensus organizing"
Within considerations of organizing practice, consensus organizing has formed in somewhat polemical
relationship to traditional models of "conflict," "challenge," or "power-building" organizing. All
participants in RHICO worked in some version of conflict organizing - establishing targets, defining a
campaign with them, engaging in actions and meetings that aimed to win them.
3 For example, in a case not described above, the Allston-Brighton CDCs' campaign was to influence a
planning process co-sponsored by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) around Harvard
University's expansion into the neighborhood. In the early months of their campaign, the CDC experienced
powerful tensions about "insider" vs. "outsider" strategies in organizing, due in part to the dependencies
created by Harvard's support of a CDC affordable housing development project, and due to the BRA's role
in permitting the same development. In asking, "How do we challenge Harvard University and other
powerful institutions to be more responsive to residents, especially when previous wins have forced us
somewhat into an "insider's" game with them," they were explicitly weighing their own power with
Harvard, understanding the possibility that they might lose the affordable housing development promised to
them, and seeing whether their board had an appetite to take on such a powerful university.
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First, campaigns I characterize being "diverse-inclusive" in orientation toward
community structure and change may emphasize difference, but believe that groups may
be incorporated into neighborhood and civic life without excessive conflict. For example,
organizing by the Somerville Community Corporation strove to engage immigrants in its
neighborhood association, but sought to build relationships before attempting more
contentious action.
Second, "consensus-pluralist" claims about community and community change
emphasize a stakeholder-convening approach. These may involve attempts to build broad
and inclusive coalitions emphasizing shared values, build openness in communication
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among partners and with those the campaign seeks to influence, or articulate a vision of
"one community" acting in concert for self-betterment. The Asian Community
Development Corporation first adopted this approach, in organizing around affordable
housing development within Chinatown. Similarly, Lawrence Community Works
adopted this strategic approach toward community building within the city, even though
it remained highly conscious of local power dynamics and exerted pressure when needed.
Third, "Partisan-advocate" claims understand the basis for inter-group interaction
within neighborhoods or cities as based on particularist agendas, where ideology, race,
class, or other social groupings suggest little about the need for systemic change, but
where personal history and organizational affiliation dominate agendas. For example,
The Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation read that community
politics was dominated by small homeowners' and business associations that are thinly
representative of their constituencies, and saw little cohesion in activity or coordination
among them. It also saw the politics of development as dominated by private agendas and
abutter-driven contentiousness, and so acted to capitalize on these dynamics in their
36campaign
Fourth, claims that emphasize both difference and conflict I call "agonistic-
pluralist," borrowing the term from writers about democratic deliberation (Mouffe 2000,
Benhabib 2001). Bonnie Honig's articulation of "agonism" characterizes this stance well:
"to take difference - and not just identity - seriously in democratic theory is to affirm the
36 I also note that certain orientations of ethnic mobilization may be characterized as "partisan-advocate,"
even if the basis of their claims about change are in the exclusion of an ethnic group. That is, where
representatives of an ethnic group believe that exclusions can be accommodated within existing patterns of
group incorporation - for example, the way the Dominican constituency of Salem Harbor's Point
neighborhood demands similar resources from a city as did French-Canadian and Central European
immigrants a generation or two ago - one may also see "partisan-advocate" orientation toward change.
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inescapability of conflict and the ineradicability of resistance to the political and moral
projects of ordering subjects, institutions, and values....it is to give up on the dream of a
place called home.. .free of power, conflict, and struggle." (Honig 2001: 186). In my
cases, The Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation adopts this stance, as
does Nuestras Raices, in that both utilize contentious tactics or seek out areas of conflict
while promoting solidarity and cultural consciousness among Latino residents.
The importance of context - how ambitions emerge in interaction
Why do these claims matter for political change? As I noted above, biographical
and strategic factors are important components of understanding the choices that actors
make as their claims make. But the specificity of these claims are also important for
understanding the impact that a campaign could have on local political institutions. This
is because the claims evoked by organizing not only appeal to group and indvidual
identities in organizing campaigns, but also because local institutions form
complementary (or competing) claims to those advanced by the organizing. Throughout
the "campaign ambitions emerge" section for each case, I noted how local political
institutions were very much bound up in their own particular articulation about race and
conflict within community. What I call the potential impact of campaigns (the hope for
continuity, the chance for growth, and the ambition for change) emerges as organizing
finds resonance or dissonance with those associated with local political institutions. In
other words, the stakes that successful organizing might have on local political
institutions became clearer to organizers and activists as they interacted with
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neighborhood groups, elected officials, and governmental agencies about broad and
potentially issues within community life37.
As CDC leaders interacted with staff and members of other groups, other
organizations quickly recognized the character of a CDC's claims toward race and toward
conflict, how it related to their own efforts, and whether it was complementary or
dissonant with their own. That is, while the specific demands of CDC campaigns were
themselves seen to be significant by other groups, equally important were the ways that
these demands were viewed as an extension of broad claims about race and about conflict
within community. As participants in organizing themselves develop a collective
understanding of community, and as contests over this representation emerge, actors
come to understand what change becomes possible through organizing. Where agreement
formed, or where tensions stemming from divergent views about race and about conflict
were quickly accommodated, collective action tended to build on previous successes, or
continue general setbacks within that neighborhood 38. Where dissonance formed between
groups about the orientation of organizing work, campaigns sparked more friction within
the community, and between residents and government. While this friction presented
challenges for organizing, making it more difficult to "win", it also held out the potential
37 This finding, enabled by longitudinal methodologies, surfaced a particularly important aspect of
organizing. Although community organizing aspires to enact broad changes in political institutions, when
actors who attempt it are probed about their work over time, it becomes clear that they cannot always
predict the impact that their work may have on local political institutions. Even when experienced
community organizers, committed resident leaders, sophisticated development professionals, and
competent executive directors take part in organizing efforts, a campaign's ambitions in this area became
clear to participants and targets only as staff and leaders actually carry out its work. That is, by holding
meetings with residents, pushing agendas with members of other community organizations, carrying out
actions and demonstrations, and interacting with governmental agencies and elected officials, CDCs
learned whether their efforts might be incorporated into existing community dynamics, or if they posed a
more radical threat to political institutions.
38 Although I use the word "agreement," because I find that organizing creates spaces to contest and to
deliberate values, I recognize that challenge to institutional arrangements (or their acceptance) often
involves coercion and non-deliberative processes.
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to reshape relationships among community groups and to change power dynamics
between neighborhoods and city hall. A brief review of resonance and dissonance in my
cases illustrates this general point.
The hope for continuity - claims find resonance with local institutions
In chapter two, I described how the Codman Square Neighborhood Development
Corporation's organizer discovered, contrary to his initial expectations, that residents in
other neighborhood organizations shared its contentious orientation toward development
projects. As they explored what successful implementation of a vision for planning in the
Norfolk Triangle would mean, they found that successful organizing would help build
local political institutions that allowed for coalition work around the control of
development projects. Similarly, the Jamaica Plain NDC's orientation toward organizing
emphasizes the ways that gentrification affects low-income Latinos, by challenging in
direct and contentious ways the embodiment of these market forces. For example,
projecting and enacting this vision for community has meant that NDC staff and leaders
targeted realtors for direct action, when they believed their practices encouraged housing
speculation in the neighborhood, and involved other actions. The NDC's organizing
vision holds wide resonance among the neighborhood's other progressive and
membership-rich community organizations, allowing them to do substantial coalition
work which held the potential to reinforce strong agreement among groups. In both cases,
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frame resonance among community organizations could yield desirable continuity in
39political institutions and in inter-group patterns of interaction
39 The fact that local institutions played a role in shaping the ambitions of their work is born out by the
dissonance - and substantially greater challenges - that JPNDC experienced as they moved to other, more
conservative areas of Boston. At the same time that electoral and legislative work was an area of
excitement and success for JPNDC, its organizing through CEMV also made staff and residents realize that
the broader political institutions its organizing addressed were very resistant to fundamental change. To be
sure, part of this resistance stemmed from the high ambitions of several policy and legislative goals, and
from the power disparities between community organizations and broader economic and political
structures. But as the NDC engaged with state and city political structures, staff felt that the impact of their
work was often circumscribed within Jamaica Plain, and that, in some more subtle ways, they participated
(albeit successfully) within systems for community action that circumscribed political involvement within
Boston to discrete neighborhoods. Although Boston's governing regime is largely progressive, its
centralized political structure allows for other forces -- conservative council members from other
neighborhoods, and downtown economic interests - to hold considerable sway and to make broader
institutions more resistant to the radical claims that they advance. At public events I witnessed, the
neighborhood's generally sympathetic elected officials would complain that they were isolated voices in
the Council or the Legislature; while the NDC's constituents refused to accept these responses at face
value, they too acknowledged that suburban and conservative legislators held more power in those
institutions. Smith reflected on this dynamic in January, 2004:
In Boston, our most common response [from legislators] is, 'We're with you, we're with you, but
the suburbs are killing us.' They'll vote for us, but it's an uphill battle. And along with that comes
[the argument that], 'The governor is who the governor is, and the president is who the president
is. And you can't expect us to do that much.' Our biggest challenge is getting legislators to take
real leadership, and risk relationships with colleagues to push their agenda. And that's a hard thing
to do given the structure of our legislature, with a literally all-powerful speaker of the house who
has a history of acting out against ..big and small.
During and around the time of organizing I witnessed, JPNDC found itself on the losing side of policy or
advocacy initiatives it supported through coalition work. Two citywide campaigns in which the NDC
participated, aimed at generating tools to combat gentrification (one attempting to reinstate tenant
protections, and another creating a property tax surcharge for affordable housing creation) were defeated in
2001 and 2002. Additionally, at the end of the 2002 budget session, in which both social services and
affordable housing saw major cutbacks, JPNDC found itself frustrated by the limitations of organizing
around JP's budgetary and legislative priorities. In response to the disheartening fate of progressive policy
advocacy during this period, the NDC understandably shifted focus to building neighborhood institutions
such as the Neighborhood Council, and to strengthen and expand existing inter-organizational relationships
in ways that increased civic and voter participation. Kalila Barnett, who coordinated much of JPNDC's
policy and electoral mobilization work, also spoke of the ways that broader institutional change and policy
victories were difficult to achieve, but that tying electoral work to local leadership development was very
important:
I mean [the limits of policy work are] incredibly frustrating, and we haven't completely figured it
out. But in doing an evaluation of our voter mobilization work, one of the things that we've found
out is that you can do it in a couple of different ways. You can just mobilize voters and use the
sort of database we have, that has 20 thousand or 40 thousand people in JP, or you can try to make
it a little more meaningful. And we've tried to do that, and we've focused the work on our
membership base, and developing leaders within our membership base - so the way it becomes
less frustrating is that it's building a local campaign around a citywide policy issue.. .you're
developing leaders among groups of people you're very familiar with. Even if you don't win that
campaign, it's a worthwhile experience, because it still furthers along the local community.
(interview 4.04).
Still, upholding Jamaica Plain's political traditions may be very significant for Boston over time. For the
first time in Boston's history, turnout in the progressive neighborhoods of Jamaican Plain and Roslindale
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"Growth:" dissonance that is not maintained over time
In contrast to JPNDC and CSNDC, in Somerville's Union Square neighborhood,
the CDC's emphasis on civic engagement, trust-building, and a gradual power-building
with Latinos was dissonant with the ways that staff at another local organization
emphasized conflict and challenge for immigrant rights, and with the ways that largely-
white community associations downplayed issues of race altogether. Partly as a result of
this conflict, staff and residents at local associations moved to disrupt organizing by the
CDC, either because the CDC's organizing 'competed' with their attempts to represent
ethnic constituencies (and did so on different terms than they hoped), or because claims
about race undermined the legitimacy of the white groups. Although this conflict made
organizing more difficult, SCC staff realized that building a racially-inclusive community
organization would encourage both ethnic organizations and white homeowners groups to
become more participatory and more engaged with their own constituents.
Similarly, ACDC first framed its organizing to seize public land for affordable
housing as an attempt at consensus-building and collaborative community planning. This
framing evoked unexpected and significant resistance from community groups on both
sides of Chinatown's political spectrum, and made the organizing much more challenging
as it proceeded. During the course of ACDC's interaction with other community
organizations, the CDC adjusted the orientation of its organizing, making issues of both
outstripped turnout in South Boston for council elections, helping spur the election of a more radical
councilmember at large, Felix Arroyo.
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contention and race more central to its claims and strategies. However, its underlying
emphasis on consensus and collaboration continued to be at odds with beliefs and tactics
held by other local groups. Over time, staff and residents in both cases realized that the
conflict sparked by this dissonance not only made organizing more difficult, but also held
out the promise to adjust patterns of interaction among Chinatown's community
organizations. Because this dissonance was not strongly maintained by groups over time
(both CDCs were flexible in the way they framed the campaign), while success in both
cases would suggest to local groups a different way of interacting with each other, the
fluidity of the CDCs' orientation was less likely to yield thorough-going disruptions or
changes to local systems. Based on my analysis of these cases, I speculate that this
fluidity of framing, when associated with successful organizing, is most likely to lead to
growth - to adjustments in the way that local groups and the state interact with each other
and with their constituents.
"Change" - dissonance is maintained over time
Finally, in both Lawrence and Holyoke, persistently-held dissonance of claims
held out the opportunity to change political institutions in the most dramatic ways. It is
noteworthy that one of these approaches was conflict-oriented and one consensus-
oriented. In Lawrence, through extensive deliberation and community analysis with
leaders, LCW decided that the absence of an effective oppositional structure within city
government meant that they needed to "build an alternative base of power," whose terms
are instead identified with network-formation, effectiveness, and consensus-building. As
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Kristin Harol, its deputy director said, this 'consensus-pluralist' vision (as part of the
typology above) was:
in part based about philosophy of the work, but also based in the reality of
Lawrence... in Lawrence's case we don't have a choice about being connected,
because we don't have a chance to get projects done without some clear vision,
consensus, or planning....in a city like Boston where the CDCs are more mature,
there's a reason they could drift apart. It really doesn't work here. (interview 5.03)
This consensus-building orientation has made the organization generally de-emphasize
contentious tactics, and instead build both relationships and practices until local
institutions will emulate or adopt its more effective modes of community practice.
However, this dissonance in orientation between its efforts at consensus-building and the
partisan climate political life in Lawrence has made campaigns much more difficult to
succeed; at the same time, in moving (and prevailing) in significant conflicts, it has
sparked a magnitude of community improvements and has also started to alter major
development institutions, especially those around planning and economic development.
In the case of Nuestras Raices, the CDC's persistently-held opposition to
dominant institutions also evoked ambitious prospects for change. When the CDC
embarked on its campaign, it was aware that community control over vacant lots was
threatening to the local political regime, but it believed the campaign to be broadly
winnable. Instead, resistance to its vacant lots campaign turned out to be unexpectedly
fierce, involving constant challenges from City Hall, including charges that the CDC was
acting in a racially-divisive way. But Nuestras Raices embraced the implications of this
conflict. Its belief in the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from political and economic life, its
"roots" in culturally-oriented gardening and environmental justice, and its adoption of
conflictual stances toward power made it persist in the campaign, because it understood
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even more clearly that winning would represent both a dramatic change in policy and a
shift in the way that government interacted with Latino neighborhoods.
The figure below depicts how ambitions for campaigns emerge over time. In the
simplest schematic terms, during the early phases of campaigns, staff and residents
develop an orientation toward community and decide upon tactics to achieve community
change. As actors emerge from dinner tables, CDC offices, and community meeting
rooms in which these visions and strategies for change emerge, they discover whether or
not other political actors also hold the underlying values associated with campaign
demands. When these claims are shared, actors learn that success will strengthen local
political institutions and organizational ties (raising what I call "the hope for continuity").
When dissonance emerges with other actors, but this dissonance is not persistently
maintained, actors see that winning the campaign will be more difficult, but also holds
open the chance to prove to other groups that some adjustment in their own practices may
be desirable, or, alternatively, to force some shift among them. I call this potential
outcome "the chance for growth." In cases when dissonance between a CDC's orientation
and those held by other actors is persistently maintained, political institutions are more
deeply challenged by campaigns, whose success may start to alter the structure of ties
between community organizations and city hall. I call this "the ambition for change."
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Discussion
Although the data primarily illuminate dynamics within CDC organizing, the
issues I describe as important in the emergence of campaign ambitions very closely
parallel broader debates within political sociology. In this section, I locate this chapter's
findings within 1) discussions about social movement framing processes, and 2) about the
role of race in community action. Because of the orientation of the thesis is toward public
policy and community practice, I save consideration of those topics (for example, debate
on whether or not CDCs can organize, and whether conflict or consensus organizing is
more effective) for my concluding chapter.
Framing processes
Above, I refer to a CDC's orientation toward community as embodying "claims,"
because they emerged as active demands by residents and CDCs upon neighborhood
organizations and state actors. But within social movement studies, these orientations
toward mobilization are sometimes referred to as "frames," drawing from Goffman's
work on frame analysis (1994). Much the literature on framing, as it relates to movement
outcomes, stresses the importance of frame resonance between movement organizers and
potential constituents of the campaign (Benford and Snow 2000). Within these studies,
the assumption is that successful mobilization finds good "fits" between organizers'
world views and those of potential constituents. When organizers articulate the world on
the same terms as supporters, mobilization is seen to be more successful.
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My work contrasts with this assumption about frame resonance in two important
ways. First, I find that the mere articulation of a stance toward race and conflict by a
CDC is not enough to attract these leaders and let them enact local changes. Each chapter
showed how frames could resonate with potential supporters, and yet fail in their ability
to win campaigns. In the next analysis chapter I highlight issues of organizational process
as being more important to general success, even if its terms are shaped by frame
resonance or dissonance. Second, in contrast to those who emphasize frame resonance in
movement success, I note the importance of frame dissonance. especially between
challengers and political institutions. The potential to change political institutions
occurred only when collective put forward a different frame from that of local
organizations and state actors. (Although, as I note in the next chapter and also in the
cases of the Somerville Community Corporation and Nuestras Raices, frame dissonance
is merely a necessary - but not sufficient - condition to change local institutions.)
Race, conflict, and community action
The model above articulates ways that frames about race and about conflict are
crucial components to community action. Although its closest theoretical framework may
be found in the literature on difference within democratic deliberation (Mouffe 2000,
Benhabib 2001), this analysis is supported by several aspects of the literature on race and
political action. First, the fact that different frames for morality and justice exist among
different groups is supported by writings on cultural differences between whites and non-
whites. For example, Michelle Lamont (1997) found that white and non-white workers
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held different beliefs about morality, and about the role of race in determining social and
political outcomes. Second, I find that challenges to authority are bound up in collective
articulations about race. While it may not be surprising that a variety of frames may be
held about the importance of race within communities, my analysis illustrates the ways
that framing processes around race become an essential component to inter-group
challenge. This analysis finds support in the literature on Community Action's impact on
urban politics. In their extensive account of the program, Greenstone and Peterson (1972)
write that community groups' mobilization of African-Americans around issues of
discrimination was an important part of the challenge they posed to urban political
systems*
My research complements these findings and provides additional evidence that
claims about race not only structure relationships between the state and local community
organizations, but also that these claims provide the basis for interaction between
community organizations and residents. I speculate that the ways that community
organizations formed in relationship to urban political challenge during the 1960s and
1970s makes their roots deeply touched by issues of race, as they were formed during a
period of dramatic challenge and contention. These data suggest that in the forty years
after Community Action, questions of race remain an extremely important component to
local political challenges. For this reason, I hypothesize that the history of urban
challenge and disruption during the 1960s, much of it predicated on protests based on
race, makes community organizations and political institutions intensely aware of issues
* For other accounts of the ways that issues of race structure relationshiops between community
organizations and urban politics, see Mollenkopf's (1994) account of patronage through CBOs in the
Bronx, Stone's (1989) account of race and economics in Atlanta, and Gregory (1998) about community
organizations and race in Queens.
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of conflict, and whether or not racial claims were activated in self-consciously
challenging ways or in ways that did not espouse challenge and disruption.
The absence of a universal frame for effective collective action
In their book, The Miner's Canary, Guinier and Torres (2002) advocate an
understanding of race that is "diagnostic" because it allows one to understand social,
political, and economic outcomes, and which also mobilizes groups toward political
action: they call this construct "political race." This thesis supports their broad argument,
in finding that questions of race are in fact intrinsic to public policy discourse in the
United States, and that choices to exclude or include race are very significant for the
paths that organizing may take. In contrast with Guinier and Torres, however, and also in
contrast to other writers who advocate universally-effective frames for political action4 1 , I
do not find that a single frame for action as it relates to race was, in itself, associated with
institutional change, policy victories, or the scale of local mobilization. For example, the
most powerful and mobilized CDCs I studied- the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood
Development Corporation, and Lawrence CommunityWorks - worked through
diametrically opposed frames for action. JPNDC emphasized conflict and culture, and
LCW de-emphasized it.
Both JPNDC and LCW predicated their framing and organizing on an
understanding of local political institutions. In the case of Jamaica Plain, activists in the
highly-mobilized community have little incentive to adopt a different frame about race
4 See Osterman (2002) for the argument that community power-building should espouse more traditional,
conservative moralities and also avoid claims that lead to racial division; also writers on conflict and
consensus organizing, as I elaborate in the final chapter.
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and conflict, as this frame has been the one associated with community victories and
improvements. In LCW, a lack of effective redistributive measures was associated with a
partisan and political culture where questions of race were diagnostically accurate but not
effective in creating redistributive change; that is, it was (in LCW's view) correct to say
that racism had shaped the city, but they believed that highlighting issues of racism was
counterproductive.
In other words, political institutions and community organizational systems may
encourage participation and economic justice, or they may discourage it. In the cases I
studied, staff at community organizations interact with residents in ways that are
predicated by these orientations toward conflict and toward difference - by engaging
them in collaborative work or in contentious action; by heightening an awareness of
cultural difference or by helping them affiliate more broadly with a neighborhood area.
Similarly, political institutions - from the neighborhood development councils in Boston
to the City Council in Lawrence and Holyoke - also involve residents and shape policies
that are influenced by an understanding of race and conflict. Whatever the terms of local
participation, both civic engagement and its absence occurs on terms that are associated
with specific articulations about difference and about conflict.
For these reasons, changes in the way that local organizations and state actors
frame community action are also associated with changes in the level of local resident
participation. For example, at the Asian CDC, greater community-wide mobilization
occurred as the CDC itself adopted a more conflict-oriented stance toward work, and as
other organizations also shifted their stance toward conflict to practice more coalition
activity. Because community organizations help incorporate local residents into larger
David Greenberg - Ways of Contending page 143
urban political systems on terms suggested by these frames about race and conflict, local
actors are very sensitive to them, as success achieved under a different mantle than the
prevailing one may signal substantive political changes. In Lawrence, a persistently-held,
consensus-oriented stance had broad implications for political institutional change and for
broader participation in civic life. In these ways, challenging other community
organizations and city agencies about the ways they act on issues of race and contention
holds out the possibility of making anti-participatory political and organizational systems
more participatory. This point supports Guinier and Torres's contention that effectively
changing the terms of policy discourse in the country as a whole - which now resists
frames of race in considering injustice - would likely result in more redistributive policy
changes than those changes which occur only within frameworks for discourse.
In sum, my research finds that dynamics of collective action are highly
contextual. Neighborhoods are different from each other, and so community organizing
takes different courses in different settings. I did not find that certain types of claims were
more effective than others, but rather that they evoked specific dynamics based on the
political institutions in which they were located. This finding challenges proponents of
both conflict and consensus organizing, as it understands the use of conflict or its absence
(as well as the evocation of race or its suppression from discourse) to evoke responses
that were dependent on the local political institutions where CDCs were located.
More broadly, this finding is in consonance with streams of planning and policy
discourse since the 1970s that emphasize local, institutional analysis. It is in dissonance
with those who study interventions from greater distance, or who hold essential
characteristics of either action or social structure to determine the outcomes of
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intervention (Alinsky 1973, Harvey 1973, Logan and Molotch 1987) - that organizing
has universally applicable "rules" for shifting power, or that political forces generalizable
to all cities hold absolute sway. Instead, I argue that one must understand different "ways
of contending" for the impact they may have in different contexts.
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Chapter 6: Analysis - How Ambitions are Achieved
In the previous chapter, I argued that CDC organizing makes claims about
community, and that these claims spark response from local political institutions. With
this response, an ambition for influencing these institutions emerges. I find that actors
learn what impacts successful organizing may have on political institutions over time, as
they find whether their vision of community and change has resonance or dissonance
with those held by other community and state actors. Throughout the three comparative
studies, I also argued that successful organizing not only achieved its policy objectives or
won community improvements, but also impacted local political institutions, according to
the resonance or dissonance of CDC's claims with those articulated by local institutions.
In contrast, failed organizing neither achieved community improvements, nor influenced
local institutions. But what lets CDCs win campaigns and achieve these ambitions,
helping reinforce or restructure political institutions?
Although each CDC campaign had its unique turning-points, two broad strategies
were common to successful campaigns. First, CDCs won campaigns by coordinating
community mobilization throughout the CDs' development and service activities.
Second, they won by developing resident leadership and membership through inclusive
governance. Campaigns were winnable when CDCs built sufficient organizational power
through everyday practice and through governance. While these practices and
organizational characteristics were often very difficult to enact, and sometimes involved
fundamental changes for CDCs, they helped CDCs attract leaders and build strength so
they could win their campaigns - even as the impact of winning on political institutions
was informed by the paths on which the campaigns had embarked.
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Below, I illustrate the importance of these two strategies through analysis of the
comparative case studies, suggesting how in each the ability to adopt these two practices
made the difference between success and failure. In doing so, I also consider alternative
explanations for the difference between success and failure, and describe (in the cases of
Somerville and Codman Square) how greater coordination among departments, and more
effective mobilization through CDC governance, led to improved outcomes later in the
course of the campaigns.
Achieving Continuity: Internal ties yield external ones
As both JPNDC and CSNDC's campaigns developed, actors saw an opportunity
to win community improvements, while also strengthening local political institutions.
JPNDC was able to accomplish this goal, while CSNDC was not. Those familiar with
Boston may observe that the level of civic engagement in Jamaica Plain is higher than in
the western parts of Codman Square, making it easier for organizers to find residents with
deep experiences in neighborhood organizing. Similarly, histories of political
participation in Jamaica Plain also allow the NDC to work with other powerfully
participatory organizations. Both these claims are true; even to the extent that organizing
in Dorchester held the opportunity to strengthen local neighborhood institutions, actors
realized that these institutions were not very participatory.
But these differences in neighborhood context do not alone account for the
different outcomes of CDC organizing. While political participation is higher in Jamaica
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Plain, in a neighborhood where resident direction of organizational affairs is viewed as a
prerequisite to legitimacy, and where statements of good (or similar) intentions are not
sufficient to spur collaboration among groups, JPNDC is held to very high standards
about development and campaign process by its coalition partners. Jamaica Plain is a
neighborhood in which skepticism around CDCs is very high, witnessed by me both in
exchanges with resident activists about my research project (activists were generally
critical of CDCs), and in public friction between Jackson Square activists and a large
community development corporation charged with planning and development on the
border of Jamaica Plain and Roxbury. For JPNDC, collaboration between organizing and
development departments to promote resident control and direction of development
opportunities not only helps it create co-operative housing, control vacant lots for new
development, and preserve affordability in expiring use buildings; it is also a significant
factor in allowing coalition work to occur in the first place. Toward the end of my
observations of the group, Harry Smith, JPNDC's organizing director, reflected on the
relationship between neighborhood context and internal organizational factors in the
following way:
First, you have to have a City Life on your flank pushing you and making you
accountable, But they also see us as a group working for the community; if they
see it differently, that has the power to effect us differently. Most CDCs don't
have that dynamic organizing group to partner with. But in our own right, we've
always had a commitment to organizing beyond our constituency beyond the
things we've build. (We) don't just look at the neighborhoods, we look at our
constituency as the larger neighborhood. We're a neighborhood based
organization, and we have committees.. .that's a starting point. You have to have
that, that's what led us to this process, to be able to do this (organizing) - and to
do it in a way that said it's not just to get the CDC support to build more housing.
There are certain (organizational) prerequisites that have to be in place. (1.06.04)
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As a result of JPNDC's credibility with activists and other organizations, which stems
from its board and from its development practices, the NDC may work together with
them on projects like the Coalition to Educate, Mobilize, and Vote to present a
formidable voice with elected officials. This collective voice has not yet successfully
been contested by other emergent, more conservative organizations.
In contrast, organizing through the Codman Square Neighborhood Development
Corporation did not initially strengthen local resident associations in the Norfolk
Triangle, or the institutions in which they took part in Codman Square. To be sure, some
problems associated with early organizing problems were "technical," including a lack of
basic outreach and follow-up with leaders, and relationship-building outside of pre-
existing leadership. But these problems were significantly rooted in unresolved internal
tensions between CSNDC's organizing and development departments. Although the
organizing department entered the Norfolk Triangle in part because development
opportunities existed there, Rosales felt wary of engaging residents in development
processes that they might not in fact control, and felt somewhat demoralized by what he
believed to be internal power imbalances between CSNDC's organizing and
development. As a result of this sense of division within the agency, he adopted a
strategy of using potential development plans as "targets" for community protest and
engagement, which was somewhat confusing to residents and also did not foster internal
organizational change.
Over time, CSNDC achieved greater coordination between departments. This was
associated with more successful organizing, supporting the analysis that
interdepartmental coordination is critical to organizing success. Over the first six months
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of his tenure as organizing director, Marcos Beleche attempted successfully to bring
organizing and development processes closer together. He found support in this project
from the development director, Lisa Davis, and from a newly-hired developer, Chagatai
Ozgul. Part of Beleche's strategy was to encourage a sense of professional confidence
and practices within the organizing department, to parallel professional institutions within
development departments, and to de-mystify and reinterpret technical processes and
vocabularies of the development department. Believing that "until we learn to think like
each other, we're always going to be watchdogs" of the other department's behavior
(Beleche 12.02), Beleche and Davis worked to open a community meeting around an
NDC development proposal at the Latin Academy Apartments, a significant 'bridging'
event. Said Davis:
With Marcos on board we've developed a more fluid sense of how [organizing
and development can work together.] With Latin Academy, we learned that
there's a give and take, an exchange in how that happened. We make decisions
about how to work together. (site visit 2003)
Similarly, in the summer of 2003, students and staff created a charrette process
addressing a corner of the Norfolk Triangle for a design competition. Although attended
in limited ways by community residents, the charette started to develop a way that the
42two departments could work together. Said Beleche:
We seized the opportunity as a way again to get people come out and participate,
as a way of saying what do you want to see in your neighborhood. We had been
thinking for awhile that we had been doing a charette, had some decent response
to it, folks participated, we as a team was able to get graduate students to do as
much of their work here.. .residents that participated enjoyed it, and what ended
up as the final product was this plan we had for one of the corners in the Norfolk
Triangle. So we had this product, ideas, residents who had participated, did a
check-in and the ideas were good. (interview 1.04)
42 The plan won CHAPA's annual competition around affordable housing development and planning.
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Even though organizing projects emerging in the Norfolk Triangle area were not focused
on affordable housing development, these seeds of coordination between organizing and
development were energizing for both departments. They also helping in some
instrumental ways as Norfolk residents explored options to contest unwanted
development at the Brush Hill garage. Said Beleche:
Since during the time of the site visit, we were, we were feeling very excited
about what was happening in the triangle; both departments were excited - the
neighborhood was taking a more active role in determining the potential uses for
vacant lots and underutilized buildings, taking on the owner of the Brushhill
garage - and that motivated both departments. I think we are seen as a resource by
the Norfolk Triangle residents group. (1.03)
In sum, as CSNDC achieved greater coordination between organizing and development,
its campaign became more successful and it became better able to enact its ambition of
supporting local political institutions.
Achieving Growth: starting from scratch vs. building on structure
After organizing in Union Square shifted to East Somerville, Somerville
Community Corporation staff analyzed the failure to attract immigrants as a problem in
part caused by a disconnect between the issues of a neighborhood association and the
pressing concerns of Latinos. This analysis is echoed by other accounts of organizing
with immigrants around place-based issues. However, drawing both on other accounts
of organizing with Latinos (Castells 1983, Warren 2001) and on other cases within
RHICO, community organizing with immigrants to address neighborhood issues is not
necessarily an impossible proposition.
4 See Jones Correa (2001) on political participation of Latinos within New York City politics.
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Instead, as I highlighted in comparison to Asian CDC, a more pressing problem
for SCC and its ability to attract people of color was the absence of an existing
organizational structure with which residents could find a means to participate in
community life. Starting a community organization from scratch - as SCC attempted in
building a completely independent organization in Union Square - is exceptionally
difficult. While creating a new community organization outside of the CDC may achieve
long-term change, these results were difficult to enact within the short timeframe of
campaigns I studied. Instead, CDCs in RHICO that succeeded in the early months of
campaigning often did so by bringing on new members to the CDC's own organizational
structure: to its board or board subcommittees, or as members empowered to shape or
control CDC activities. Because SCC believed that organizing and development activities
needed to be separated so as to gain credibility among community stakeholders, it could
not use its housing development or its regular governance activities as a way to build
leadership and foster engagement. Although, over the early months of the campaign, SCC
sponsored workshops on immigration as a way of building trust with immigrant groups, it
did not find a way at these sessions for attendees to become involved with the CDC.
In fact, SCC's very successes in the fall of 2003 in East Somerville speak to the
importance of hanging community engagement around an existing "scaffolding" of
governance structure or existing program, while also transforming the structure or
activity so as to facilitate participation and mobilization. Although SCC's organizing in
East Somerville still valued diversity and promoted deliberation over immediate
contentious action, SCC drew on an existing service and mediation program - the
Somerville "conversations project," which had previously engaged community leaders in
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dialogues about race and neighborhood. Speaking prospectively about this strategy in
September 2003, LeBlanc observed that "Conversations has that history - they give us
permission to be there doing that type of building and community building." (site visit
2003).
During that period, the CDC's new organizing team expanded on the
"conversations" program, by changing the model to be more intensive in its engagement
of potential leaders who had not previously been engaged in community action. Led by
new organizers Meridith Levy and Tito Meza, this expansion of "conversations" involved
more extensive doorknocking, multiple follow-ups and one-on-ones with new identified
leaders, and over twenty three house meetings with neighbors before joining groups
together. After a large and successful meeting in December, 2003, LeBlanc assessed the
victory in these terms:
The conversations model has been around Somerville since the mid 1990s, but I
would say easily that half or more of the people who actually participated [on
December 4 h] never would have on their own, without the work that these guys
did. And that's critical because the type of people who would come to a general
meeting - it's very much a self-selecting group... and you don't get the regular
average residents to come out of the woodwork without the work that these guys
did. (interview 12.03)
In contrast to SCC's early work (and parallel to SCC's later work), ACDC's
ability to enact the ambitions that emerged over the course of the campaign was largely
due to internal organizational change,[ and especially its re-orientation of governance and
development processes to encourage mobilization and community control. By changing
the focus and tenor of their annual meeting to emphasize the campaign and the need for
organizing, by working with a board subcommittee to change its mandate to include
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organizing and leadership development, and through the efforts of the board to state its
support for community control of Parcel 24 even were they not the developer, ACDC
created opportunities for deliberation and community control that helped them maintain
coalition power and win concessions from the city and the turnpike authority. As a result
of these efforts, Boston's Mayor Thomas Menino announced support for the $1 land
give-away to the neighborhood. With this victory ACDC produced a tentative template
by which local groups could interact with each other on less divisive terms.
Achieving change: employing networks formed in service provision
While staff at Nuestras Raices understood how changing Holyoke's vacant lot
policies would greatly increase Puerto Rican political power, and shift advantages away
from economic actors to its own constituents, it was unable to find ways to address
opposition from Holyoke's political establishment to this vision of local control. In
particular, staff and leaders were unable to overcome an initial deficit of resident
participation in the staff-driven development of the pilot plan for land disposition.
Particularly significant was the CDC's reluctance to alter its own extensive relationships
with community gardeners and youth leaders, to encourage campaign participation and
strategization, even though control of vacant lots was a potentially important issue for
gardeners and youth interested in recreational space.
CDC staff and board members spoke of broad failures to participate in terms of
the 'hyphenated' identity of Holyoke's Puerto Ricans (some of whom were interested in
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returning to the island), and a deep-seated mistrust of political processes. From my field
notes:
[RHICO program director] asks what's up in the the next 3-6 months? Any
challenges you see? Hilda says that it is "to educate people" The Puerto Rican
community lives here but doesn't feel part of it - we need to approach them, teach
them about benefits and responsibilities to living here. Even if you move on, we
need to be asking, "in the 10 years you live here, you can make a difference in
your community." "They have an identity problem." But says that "you could
benefit your kids - you are their voice"...she does environmental education,
currently, and to help people see the connections between local work and what
happens. Julia said that language is also an issue in participation: some people
say, "I don't speak English, I don't want to be here." (site visit 2002)
While political disenfranchisement and apathy may be a pervasive force in Holyoke, the
CDC's ability to draw on relationships quickly to mobilize for a land use hearing
suggests that its constituents were in fact willing to do local political work when asked to
do so. But during the months between June 2002 and November 2003, residents were not
asked to become part of the public policy process. Staff was reluctant to meet gardeners
outside of the terms of engagement they had helped establish, and which had provided
the CDC with legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents. This meant that the campaign had
a large potential base, but few actual supporters. Because they could not move the
campaign forward, the CDC was put into a reactive role, forced to defend the
encroachments upon the community plan as they occurred. Even as Colon took over the
position, staff continued to interact with gardeners in the fields or in the CDC's
greenhouse almost exclusively around gardening or economic development activities, and
did not reach people in their homes around topics of community control of development
through public policy change. In other words, while Nuestras Raices had developed
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extensive relationships with community residents, organizational processes were not set
into motion so that these relationships could become fruitful for community mobilization.
In contrast, while relationship-building at Lawrence CommunityWorks also was
facilitated by the CDC's activities outside of formal organizing, the CDC adopted a much
more strategic approach to translating programmatic participation into community
mobilization. For LCW, both formal and informal coordination around its "network"
helped members flow from one part of the organization into the CDC' many campaigns.
These networks, while facilitated by staff activity to re-orient service projects, were also
assisted by the fact that residents controlled the content of the programs through active
committee work; LCW's Family Asset Building and housing development activities not
only mobilized many people but also were controlled by active committees. This
committee control further helped residents become part of the organization, and to learn
that membership in LCW also meant participation in various different campaigns and
committees. LCW has active and competitive elections for board positions, and vigorous
committees who engage leaders outside of the board's formal structure. All in all, as
members moved in and out of opportunities for collective action in the Reviviendo
Gateway Initiative, in the zoning change campaign, and around the Our House project,
the CDC's campaign was able to weather conflict and skepticism provoked by the CDC's
orientation toward work, and in winning these campaigns, to lay out the template for a
"new way of doing business" in Lawrence.
Further supporting evidence: Quantitative associations between governance,
interdepartmental coordination, and policy victories
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In addition to qualitative evidence from the case studies, strong associations
emerged in the annual survey to support the importance of interdepartmental coordination
and inclusive governance. While the small number of cases raises questions about
traditional quantitative analysis, measures of CDC governance and of interdepartmental
coordination were so strongly correlated with leadership development and policy
victories that they are worth reporting.
Capturing organizing success in quantitative terms
In the survey, quantitative indicators that help describe the success of a CDC's
organizing as related to effective mobilization, and also to the change of political
institutions, were of two types. First, I asked CDCs the number of resident leaders
engaged with its organizing campaign. Leadership development is a central part of
organizing work (Delgado 1986; Osterman 2002). The survey defines leaders as
"Residents who play key role in your campaign or project (for example, chairing
subcommittees, inspiring participation, or take on speaking, training, strategizing)."
Second, I also look at the number of "wins" in an organizing campaign. Survey questions
address "external institutional changes" gained from organizing. These ask about
meetings and actions by the CDC that resulted in policy or practice changes by decision-
makers, and shifts in power toward community residents. They also ask, for each of these
major events, the number of residents and leaders involved with planning, facilitating, or
carrying them out. Since these data were reported by the CDCs, the definition of a "key
victory" ranged in impact. Still, organizers make defining and celebrating "wins" as an
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important process for community power-building at all levels, and as such the counting of
wins remains a valid construct for deciding upon organizing success.
For each CDC, I count the number of changes brought about by actions or
meetings where community residents played a role in planning or facilitating the
encounter. This means that entirely staff-driven advocacy, while potentially representing
important policy gains for a CDC's neighborhood or constituents, did not count as an
organizing "win." This measure is consistent with the definition of organizing as
resident-driven change, and also corrects somewhat for victories that might be related to
staff efforts at politically-connected organizations. Across the ten CDCs, some of these
countable "wins" from actions or meetings included:
- Mass resident participation in community rezoning meetings, that helped push
through campaign proposals aimed at neighborhood revitalization;
- A large community meeting where the Mayor and the Chief of Police were
pressured to add a patrol to an underserved neighborhood;
- An action against a bank that resulted not only in the delay of eviction for tenants
in a bank-owned property, but also directed payments toward the tenants;
- The disruption of public meetings on a mayoral-appointed taskforce around
neighborhood redevelopment, that put pressure on it to include more local
residents;
- A research action that called in Inspectional Services to properties that housed
gang and drug activity;
- An action targeting the city, that resulted in a policy shift away from
homeownership and toward rental units in local redevelopment work, reflecting
the strong priority of the community.
Governance, board structures, and organizing success
The case studies strongly suggest that CDC boards of directors and committees
play important roles in mobilization and campaign work, and that a CDC's legitimacy
and power stems from its ability to represent broadly its neighborhood and its
constituencies. Professionalization and institutionalization of all sorts, particularly around
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development processes, make it difficult to maintain this resident involvement, and many
boards may make decisions that exclude organized residents or make it more difficult for
them to become part of the CDC. In contrast, boards that are more inclusive of
community activists have greater legitimacy and can develop more leaders.
To explore this inclusivity in quantitative terms, I created a measure describing
the "openness" of boards of directors. This measure was derived from three questions -
the frequency (defined on a 5-point scale, from "never" to "always") that boards
consulted leaders before making major decisions, that major issues were brought to the
board by campaign leaders, and that boards actively encouraged residents to attend
meetings. I defined a CDC's "openness" index as the average of these three frequencies.
I assessed the relationship between this independent measures and the dependent
measures of CDC success 4 through bivariate correlation. Given the small sample size
(ten CDCs), I used non-parametric statistics (Spearman rank correlations) in the event of
correlations with marginal significance. Strikingly, even with ten organizations, strong
relationships emerged. There were strong and significant associations between
independent variables (board activism and board openness) with both leadership
development and policy victories affected by organizing.
First, board openness was strongly and significantly associated with a CDC's
ability to generate more leaders in their campaign (r-.8, p=.01). This high correlation
does not appear to be definitional; although campaign leaders may also be board leaders,
not all board leaders are campaign leaders, and organizations reporting many campaign
leaders draw them from circles outside of the board. In other words, more open boards
appeared able sustain and encourage mobilization by community members, and to attract,
44 Leaders in a campaign, membership, and resident-defined policy victories.
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and train, resident leaders to do campaign work. Greater board openness was also
associated with greater numbers of organizing wins (r-.7 1, p= .046).
Second, I also created a measure to define activism of governance - describing the
ways that boards help develop new leadership. In the case studies, the ways that board
members and board structures were able to engage with emerging leaders was very
important. This measure was defined as the sum of three questions: whether boards of
directors went door-knocking on campaigns (1 =yes and 2=no); whether boards of
directors held competitive elections (1 =yes and 2=no); and the percentage of boards who
could be identified as active leaders of a campaign or project. Board activism was also
strongly associated with the number of leaders in a campaign (r--.91, p=.002). There were
also very strong associations between board activism and the number of significant
changes brought about by CDC organizing (p=.71, p=.05).
These data strongly support qualitative assessment of the ways that the board
contributes (or may hinder) leadership development, as they may act as either training
grounds for new members and leaders, or gatekeepers that may in some instances make it
more difficult for the CDC to attract them.
Interdepartmental coordination
My qualitative analysis describes the importance of interdepartmental
coordination as a major issue of daily practice within CDCs. As organizations that focus
primarily on physical or economic development, and not on leadership development,
4 Although not the primary focus of this analysis, board openness was also associated with the number of
residents involved in the campaign, at just above the .05 significance level (p= .066).
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providing opportunities within those and other core CDC functions for leaders to make
decisions and shape internal policies is an important task for CDCs who attempt to
organize. I created a measure to assess the degree of coordination between organizing and
development departments. Proceeding from the assumption (supported in the case
studies) that CDCs whose overall housing development occurs in consultation and
coordination with organizers and residents, are also those who make these activities
attractive to residents, I define coordination as the proportion of new construction,
rehabilitation projects, and preserved expiring use units influenced by CDC organizing
departments.
Even among ten CDCs, this measure was strongly associated with different
indicators of successful organizing. When organizing departments, development
departments, and resident leaders worked together to create and preserve affordable
housing, the CDC attracted more active members (r-.69, p<.05), developed more leaders
(r-79; p<.05,) and won more policy victories for neighborhoods (r-.68, p<.05). The
strength of these associations provides additional evidence of the association between
coordination and mobilization through CDC development activities, and general
measures of organizing success.
Review and discussion
My argument about the importance of organizational process and characteristics
in determining whether a campaign succeeds or fails parallels other efforts to understand
the nonprofit sector through the lens of organizational studies (cf Powell and 1986), and
also to understand social movement outcomes in terms of organizational characteristics
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(cf Zald and McCarthy 1987; Ganz 2000). The two strategies associated with "winning"
described above - the coordination of mobilization throughout a CDC's practices, and the
adoption of inclusive governance - are drawn from data about the experience of CDC
organizing and so primarily relate to that organizational field. At the same time, because I
found such substantial variation in a CDC's ability to mobilize and involve constituents, I
find it more helpful to locate these strategies within the broader discourse about
community groups and formal organizations. As has been consistent with my efforts to
avoid unhelpful generalizations about the CDC form, this brief discussion locates
effectiveness, not within the CDC field itself, but within characteristics of organizations.
Although my findings relate primarily to CDCs, theoretical and empirical work within
organizational studies supports the contention that interdepartmental coordination and
democratic inclusiveness are aspects of effective work.
First, the finding that coordination between departments leads to effective work is
supported by accounts of network forms of organization and the development of
"heterarchy." These theoretical literatures on organizational change explore how certain
organizational practices may allow fluidity, by exploring and exploiting functional
differences within aspects of the organization and avoiding the phenomenon of activity
"silos" (Brown 2001, Grabher 2001). "Integrating organizing and development," as
RHICO practitioners sometimes call it, means that CDCs must confront divisions within
their organizations about the role that residents play in the work of economic and real
estate development. When these divisions have been addressed, regular development
activities have the opportunity to mobilize residents around campaign events, and give
them control and ownership over the direction of development projects.
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Second, the importance of inclusive governance echoes Milofsky's fundamental
insight about the "organizing problem" of community groups, which he defined as:
difficulties attracting a public following which identifies with the organization and
from whose numbers people can be recruited to carry out necessary work or to
make donations of resources. These are the ingredients essential for building and
keeping up the momentum necessary for a social movement or an organization to
persist through time. (1988: 185)
Similarly, I found that CDCs need skilled and dedicated activists to be associated with
the organization and with the campaign. Community leaders and grass-roots supporters
not only do the work of the campaigns (speaking to other residents, conducting meetings,
writing letters, building relationships with stakeholders, challenging public officials,
coordinating with media, and creating public events) but lend them legitimacy and
credibility. Without the involvement of these activists, campaign work falls solely on
staff, who do not have the resources of time or credibility to wrest meaningful changes on
their own. Although this chapter emphasizes two strategies that CDCs use to make
campaigns "work," the overall finding is that resident involvement and control over
46
organizational practices gives CDCs the legitimacy and the power to win campaigns
46 Clearly, there is a strategic component to inclusive decision-making and mobilization. As organizing
practitioners well understand, the idea of one 'community" is a construct which serves strategic ends, but
which masks differences within neighborhoods among individuals and classes of people. If identifying
leadership is to resulting further networking and mobilization, it is important to target people for inclusion
who have - in the words of Alinsky, who have "followers." Although my data do not illuminate choices
that CDCs made in identifying who to include in community processes, I note that the residents I saw were
visible to and respected by their neighbors.
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Chapter 7: CDC organizing and development in neighborhood context
This chapter assesses implications for theory and practice by returning to the two
policy questions I describe in the introductory chapter: 1) whether or not CDCs can
organize effectively, and 2) whether conflict or consensus organizing is more effective.
By examining the paths that CDC organizing may takes, and the range of impacts that it
may have on political institutions, I have attempted in this thesis to bring a richer and
more complex understanding of what may happen when CDCs attempt to organize, and
also how different "ways of contending" provoke different types of responses in different
contexts. Nonetheless, these two questions retain great currency for practitioners in the
fields of community organizing and community development. In this chapter I attempt to
reframe these questions with reference to their underlying beliefs about community
structure and the ability of community actors to affect change. Broadly, I argue that the
first question privileges issues of community structure over human agency, and that the
second question privileges human agency over issues of community structure.
In contrast, the model of understanding local action I developed in this thesis
parallels other attempts to create holistic accounts of social change, 47 from the viewpoint
of the actor involved in these activities. One project of contemporary theory has been to
link "micro" and "macro" dynamics; "structure" and "agency;" "action" and
"environment" (Archer 1988, Alexander 1988, Emirbayer 1999). The model I develop
parallels insights from these theoretical writers by characterizing how different CDC
organizing outcomes are achieved in different contexts, thereby attempting to articulate
generalizable dynamics about the interplay between community structure and community
47 See, for example, Doug McAdam's (1980) articulation of the Political Process Model.
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action. In contrast to the claim that "place matters" - one often advanced defensively by
planners and other advocates of place-based intervention - I show how different groups
may develop different readings and orientations toward place, and that these forms of
contextual analysis themselves matter, as the action attempted through these orientations
provokes response from elements of community structure. At the same time that I argue
this interaction matters for the paths that organizing takes, I also show that another aspect
of agency - creating effective mechanisms for community mobilization and
representation - allows CDCs to enact community improvements and to influence local
political structure.
The structuralist question, "Can CDC's organize?"
The broadly-posed, dichotomous question of whether or not CDCs can organize
evokes two central themes in the study of communities and community action, and the
analysis of political organizations and movements over time. First, it reflects views about
the importance of resource exchanges that occur through institutionalization. Second, it
reflects views about the role of networks in community action and community life. Both
these views represent structuralist interpretations of community and community action. I
argue that advocates on either side of the question of whether or not CDCs can organize
privilege these structuralist concerns over agentic ones, even as they appear to espouse
the belief that collective action may shape or reshape community structure. In contrast,
my data suggest a different perspective. Both resources and relationships are very
important for CDC organizing, but these structural factors are in dynamic interplay with
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framing choices and organizational power-building. In this section, I reframe the debate
on CDCs and organizing with reference to structuralist theories, and to my thesis data:
elaborating the issue of resource exchanges posed through institutionalization ("selling
out,") and the effect of network embeddedness (or "buying in"). I show that these
structuralist accounts of community action only partially explain outcomes within CDC
organizing.
Resource dependencies and the institutionalization ofprotest
CDCs derive much of their funding from public sources. Many believe that this
fact makes protest by them impossible4 8. This charge of "selling out" evokes an important
theme in the study of political movements. Namely, Weber's analysis of modem states
and economies stresses the need for bureaucratization, and traces the implications of this
dynamic within organizational systems (1968). Michels elaborated this argument by
observing that goal-oriented political movements, once they achieve formal status, tend
to become more conservative over time. For Michels, the "Iron Law of Oligarchy"
described the process by which groups supplant purposive goals with procedural ones,
and concentrate more on organizational maintenance than goal attainment (Michels
1962) . In both 'street-level' interpretations of 'selling out' and in the scholarly literature
around movements over time, institutionalization is seen as a disabling, and yet
unavoidable fate. According to these Weberian insights, movements lose momentum
when their agendas become adopted into political institutions, bringing once-innovative
organizations closer to regular political processes. As organizations benefit from,
48 For proponents of CDCs, in contrast, garnering resources for distressed communities from multiple
sources is a principle advantage of the organizational form (Keyes 1997).
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monitor, or maintain movement gains, their ability to sustain high levels of grass-roots
mobilization becomes circumscribed. Piven and Cloward's argument that movements and
organizations cannot coexist is one extension of this logic (1977), as they shun any type
of formal establishment as inimical to the mass disruptions they believe necessary to
evoke real change.
For many reasons, CDCs do not fit this larger story of protest and cooptation, in
part because the development of the industry has more complex roots. Many CDCs
formed first as community organizations who opposed urban renewal, only to seek out
other tactics for local change and betterment (Keyes 1997). Others, in contrast, formed
primarily as economic development organizations, supported by early resources from the
Office of Economic Opportunity or the Ford Foundation - resources that in part were
constructed to develop an alternative to the model of violent protest. In the 1980s and
1990s, the number of CDCs doubled nationwide (Stoutland 1998), encouraged by new
funding streams for affordable housing development through nonprofits, and by the
drying up of federal resources (Goetz 1990). In this climate, local government tended to
rely more on nonprofit housing developers, and many community service or civic
organizations took advantage of the opportunity to take on these additional
responsibilities by becoming CDCs.
At the same time, as Goetz argues (1990), the proliferation of advanced
community development systems formed most often in places where movement and
protest demanded them. These places - San Francisco, Cleveland, Chicago, New York,
and Boston - are also cities where housing activism flourished, and where activists
around housing and homelessness successfully wrested resources from local government
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(Hartmann 1984, Keyes et al 1996, Herz 2001, Dreier 1996). While some CDCs also took
part in these mobilizations, the "sell-out" charge about the CDC field speaks to many
writers and practitioners of the failure of CDCs to continue these broad legacies of urban
protest and power-building.
A central component of the 'institutionalization of protest' thesis is the
establishment of regularized dynamics between movement organization and state through
the exchange of resources. In the view of many of these writers, these encounters are
necessarily co-opting, as they create internal contradictions about the larger purpose of
the organization that are impossible to overcome. Although seen on a small scale, this
thesis finds that resources and relationships formed through the institutionalization of the
CDC industry, while posing contradictions in abundance, are not always disabling
contradictions. Some CDCs found creative strategies to respond to explicit or implicit
threats around resource dependencies, and achieved - in the short timeframe I studied -
significant organizing results: in policy changes enacted, in furthering substantive
representation of underrepresented groups, or in fostering resource shifts to low-income
people of color. Some will dismiss these results of CDC organizing as insignificant
compared to the changes envisioned through or promised by other vehicles for
organizing. But in the absence of evidence that these transformative goals have been
widely attained throughout the US, organizing impacts should be appreciated for the real
and significant changes they accomplish, even as they stem from small community
organizations fighting broader social forces: housing disinvestment, wage and wealth-
driven stratification, gentrification, and institutional racism.
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Over two years in Jamaica Plain, CDC activists nearly doubled local participation
in local elections, created or preserved hundreds of units of affordable housing, and in
related activity, changed dramatically the constitution of an important elected
development-decision body. In Lawrence, organizing changed local land use policy, and
worked to implement and re-orient a federal highway infrastructure project to emphasize
community development. In Chinatown, mobilization took valuable, downtown land
away from normal bidding processes and gave it to the community for $1, even in face of
initial opposition by the State's Turnpike Authority and the Mayor's office. My central
finding- that variation exists within CDC organizing outcomes - provides additional
counter-evidence to theses that resource exchanges between nonprofits and government
necessarily disable movement activity (for other accounts of movement revitalization and
success by professionalized actors within the social movement literature, see Minkoff
1990, Staggenborg 1991, and Burstein 1998).
This central finding - that institutionalization and resource exchanges do not
necessarily disempower CDC organizing - does not discount the importance of resource
dependencies as a consideration within CDC organizing. Dependencies were identified as
a major issue in the work of several CDCs - an issue that practitioners often referred to as
'biting the hand that feeds you.' For example, the Allston Brighton CDC's attempts to
influence a planning process co-sponsored by the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA) around Harvard's expansion into the neighborhood was complicated by this issue.
As the CDC was attempting to insert community demands for more affordable housing
into the planning process, it was also in the midst of developing a major housing project
that required both resources from Harvard and favorable permitting decisions from the
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BRA. Similarly, although this encounter did not occur during the time frame I studied
the campaigns, staff at the Fenway CDC told the story of being threatened with Mayoral
withdrawal of support for an assisted living project for low-income seniors, were the
CDC to challenge a zoning process designed to give carte blanche to the Red Sox's
proposal to rebuild their stadium deeper into the Fenway neighborhood. Within the
comparative cases described in chapters two through four, resource dependencies were
significant issues for each of the failed campaigns. These were most explicitly evident in
SCC's initial acquiescing to city demands to shift organizing venues, but also occurred in
more subtle ways. Namely, within CSNDC, power disparities between organizing and
development within the agency may have been associated with the greater resources
brought to the agency by affordable housing development. Nuestras Raices's pre-
occupation with service activities over mobilization and leadership development was
associated with a desire to support the fledgling organization and keep it afloat.
While the issue of 'biting the hand' is critical for both CDCs and for other
nonprofits who attempt to organize constituents, the way that resource issues play into
organizing is considerably more complex. One way of illustrating this point empirically
is to assess the relationship of policy victories through organizing, and the amount of
money a CDC spends on organizing. If financial resources determined a CDC's ability to
challenge, and with it the outcomes of its organizing, more resources devoted to
organizing should result in greater organizing successes. In contrast, evidence from
RHICO depicts virtually no correlation between resources spent on organizing, and
organizing success. Complementing my qualitative data, the on-line questionnaire
administered to RHICO CDCs asked how much money a CDC devoted to organizing,
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above that which the program was providing. It also asked the number of "major
meetings" and "major actions" accomplished by CDCs over the course of the year, where
community leaders or board members played a significant part in planning, strategizing,
or executing the sessions that lead the concessions these events stirred49.
Resources devoted to organizing were not correlated with the number of CDC
policy victories. While claims about conformity and resource dependencies posed broad
issues for CDCs I studied, the relationship of these resource to the outcomes they were
able to achieve through organizing was far from deterministic. If any curve were to be
drawn, it would be "u-shaped," with the u lying on its side in a way that confounds
correlation, as depicted graphically below:
Figure 6:
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49 See chapter six for justification of this measure.
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For many reasons, any easy association between resources and "co-optation" is difficult
to assess. In part, financial resources are sometimes the result of successful organizing, as
city or state government accede to demands to build housing, community centers, or
provide certain types of services or investments. I illustrate this throughout my thesis in
JPNDC's successful housing development work, which continues to mobilize activists
even as it redirects funds to the NDC; through the ways that ACDC's attempt to build on
Parcel 24 (a public resource) not only succeeded but also adjusted local political
dynamics in doing so; and in the way that LCW's work both built power and shifted
resources to poor Lawrencians. In other words, even in attaining resource-related goals,
many CDCs continue to be powerful because they continue to mobilize communities so
that further concerns may be addressed. Simply put, while the flow of resource structures
is important, agency - seen in a CDC's ability to mobilize community through
governance, organizing, and development - helps determine the ways that resources
matter.
CDCs, Networks, and Community Structure
Paralleling the "sell-out" criticism of CDCs, is that they have "bought in" to
existing systems of development. Because of their ongoing, consensual relationships with
banks or intermediary foundations, with city agencies, and with elected offices, this
critique claims that CDCs are unable to change relational structures (Stoeker 1997). As
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an attack on CDCs, this view also implies a view of community structure and community
action that privileges the impact of formal networks50 . Since "community power" studies
of the 1950s and 60s, local networks have been seen to predict both attributions of power
by community actors, and actual influence in policy decisions. From the 1960s and
1970s, this form of community analysis has especially focused on inter-organizational
linkages as structuring neighborhood relations (Laumann et al 1977, 1978). Studies of
inter-organizational networks hold that both network position, and distinct structures of
relationships among groups, have powerful implications for the mobilization of resources
and the outcomes of policy disputes (Marsden 1986, Knoke 1990a, Knoke 1990b,
Laumann and Knoke 1987). This structuralist interpretation of decision-making outcomes
and the resolution of political controversy has found proponents not only in community
studies, but also in accounts of national policy domains (Knoke and Pappi 1991) and
social movement dynamics (Gould 1999).
There are acknowledged limitations of inter-organizational network analysis: that
many studies do not occur in racially-diverse settings, and that others, based on studies of
elite reputational or decision-making networks, do not capture the process of insurgent
organizing (Knoke 1990). Furthermore, most accounts of inter-organizational
community networks do not show processes or causes by which relationship structures
change over time (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). As structural change is a central goal
of organizing, its absence is a theoretical and empirical gap for network analysis.
Nonetheless, "networking" as a coalition-building strategy in organizing has many
proponents. While relationship-building among individuals - bringing individual leaders
into organizing campaigns - was highly associated with organizing success, on the inter-
so Similarly, proponents of CDCs often make the
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organizational level, networking as an explicit strategy was not associated with success or
failure.
How, then, did networks play into the organizing outcomes I described above?
Proponents of the 'sell-out' thesis might argue that deeper embeddedness with other
community organizations can impede effective community action; conversely, advocates
of social capital-building or 'networking' might argue that more ties should lead to more
victories. As I have written throughout this thesis, inter-organizational networks were
crucial for organizing, but the presence or absence of network ties alone did not predict
organizing success. No one pattern of inter-organizational relations - extensive coalition
work, sporadic engagement, or near-isolation - was identifiable with success or failure
within organizing campaigns, or with the types of outcomes they produced. Major theses
about the import of networks and networking in policy mobilization did not explain
variance within RICO organizing outcomes. For example, neither a CDC's centrality
(as defined by the number of inter-organizational coalition partners possessed by
recipients), nor its mobilization of diverse cliques (as defined by the different types of
organizations with which CDCs interacted) was associated with leadership development
by CDCs, the number of campaign wins, the degree of physical or economic changes, or
the scope of relational changes in power toward communities. To illustrate this flat
correlation between ties and success, the RHICO organization working with the most
leaders (Lawrence CommunityWorks) consciously avoided inter- organizational work
completely; the second most successful in leadership development (JPNDC) worked with
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several community partners in a deeply collaborative fashion5 1 . Again, note the sideways-
u of the curve:
Figure 7
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The failure of these structuralist perspectives on network dynamics to predict
outcomes speaks to the presence of ten different environments for community action,
where a CDC's orientation toward local networks, and the different changes they demand
of them, play a large role in influencing organizing outcomes. Inter-organizational
5 My cases do not represent a rebuttal to structuralist network accounts of community life, both because
my methodology did not parallel theirs, and because the number of sites do not yield sufficient statistical
power to generalize findings to an organizational field.
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dynamics were in fact crucial for community action, as network resistance or acceptance
of a CDC's organizing agenda shaped the ambitions of the campaign. (This is an
important point for many writers about organizing, who often describe organizing
campaigns as if they occurred in a vacuum of social or community space 2.) Because
organizing confronted the ties that connect residents and these groups, as well as the ties
of these groups to each other, the ways that CDCs addressed and interacted with other
community organizations was a critical component to campaign planning and outcomes.
In other words, while structural problems posed by resource dependencies were powerful,
but could be overcome by mobilization through governance and coordination, the impact
of networks was influenced by the orientation of local groups toward them.
The agentic question, "Is conflict or consensus organizing more effective?"
Those who claim that an orientation toward conflict or toward consensus is itself
more likely to enact change do not find support within my data. Throughout the cases I
studied, no one model of organizing was more effective - in fact, the groups with the
most divergent organizing styles, JPNDC's and Lawrence's, also had the most leaders
working with them and in many ways were the most powerful organizations. Chapters
five and six of the thesis addressed more explicitly how different "ways of contending"
could all help create institutional change, depending on the setting of the organizing.
Contrary to debate about conflict vs. consensus organizing, and to the more theoretical
literature about framing in social movements (which tends to overstate the power of
52 See Delgado (1984) on the ACORN model, which as classically formulated avoids inter-organizational
work.
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frame resonance), the orientation of a group toward conflict or toward racial difference
alone does not provoke institutional change.
This observation is true for three reasons. First, what might be a radical
orientation toward difference and conflict in one setting, proves to be accepted and
easily-incorporated by another community. This was the case for Jamaica Plain NDC.
Although its claims about race and its ability to embrace conflict holds out some hope for
enacting change within Boston as a whole, its orientation toward race and toward conflict
strove over time not to change neighborhood institutions but to maintain them. Second,
even tentative evocations of the role of difference and conflict in certain neighborhoods
(or, in contrast, the role of collaboration) are met with fierce resistance, enact dynamics
of contention and challenge, and carry the potential to introduce new policies and
discourses as a result. One can be consensus-oriented, as Lawrence, and yet still pose a
radical threat to thinly-representative and "dysfunctional" community dynamics.
Third, and perhaps more importantly, although developing a specific orientation
toward community - a frame for local action - is one way to attempt to capture 'hearts
and minds' of residents over the course of organizing (as the literature on social
movement framing suggests), the power to enact community changes does not come
through rhetorical appeal alone or through more passive appeal to identity. Instead, a
second aspect of agency, organizational power-building, helps allows the articulation and
realization of these frames about community. One can also be conflict-oriented (as was
Nuestras Raices) or consensus-oriented (as was the Somerville Community Corporation)
and with a clear vision of what institutional change might constitute, and yet be unable to
carry it out this vision effectively. My findings suggest that framing processes cannot be
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understood in a vacuum - they react to specific neighborhood conditions, and, at the
same time, they do not alone change neighborhoods. In these ways, I find that the conflict
vs. consensus organizing debate privileges agency but ignores the structure from which
these views of community emerges, and assumes that cognition alone can enact change,
absent organization-building and effective mobilization. In more reductionist lay terms,
how angry a handful of residents are, how sensitive they are to race, how inclusive and
cooperative they are, or how color-blind they imagine themselves to be, does not alone
effect change. Instead, residents must learn to build effective organizations.
Bringing Together Structure and Agency, Community and Community Action
In these ways, my thesis finds that resources and relationships, while important,
do not in themselves determine organizing outcomes. Public or private funds sometimes
(but do not always) re-direct challenge; networks sometimes help, and sometimes work
against change attempts. Instead, as I argued above, two important aspects in control of
community actors helps predict the ways that these structures will play into organizing:
1) framing - the orientation of a CDC toward community and community change - and
2) community mobilization and power-building (in the case of CDCs, facilitated through
governance and ordinary development practices). This model attempts to provide a more
holistic picture about community organizing and its impacts by telling a story about both
structure and agency - about both context and choice.
Choices are important from the beginning of this account, because campaigns
emerge from a conscious identification of community problems, and a sense of how to
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change neighborhoods for the better. But context also matters, as choices about framing -
the ways that a campaign attempts to win the hearts and minds of local residents - do not
work alone to produce change. Instead, they develop in a specific neighborhood settings,
where campaign frames - their appeal to values of contention and racial and ethnic
difference - find resonance or dissonance among other local groups, activating potential
outcomes for the organizing. Visions about race and about conflict, and the tactics that
follow them, matter for the local dynamics they set into motion, contributing to the paths
I call continuity, growth, and change.
This point is another way of saying that agency - choices about framing and
organizational identity - "matter" broadly for organizing, but that these choices do not
alone determine the success or failure of CDC campaigns. In each of the dynamics that
organizing sets into motion, winning basic and essential community improvements is
possible when facilitated by activist governance and effective mobilizing practices. This
point is particularly important, because many CDCs - as place-based organizations - may
be bound to contexts that make it very difficult for them to change patterns of local or
citywide political participation. For example, as discussed at length in footnote in
chapter five, JPNDC is not in a position (of physical or political space) to influence
institutional change within the city of Boston as a whole; nor is it interested in
challenging already-participatory and progressive structures within that neighborhood. In
other words, while the scope of winning or losing may be determined by neighborhood
and political dynamics both within and outside the realm of individual or group choice,
whether or not a CDC wins its campaign is highly associated with its ability to coordinate
among development and organizing departments, and its ability to include a broader
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circle of community residents in decision-making. Although organizational change to
facilitate community mobilization is difficult, as many theoretical and empirical
perspectives on organizational change emphasize,5 3 many of the CDCs I studied were in
fact able to change so as to better represent and mobilize local residents through
organizing.
For organizers, community developers, and social service practitioners engaged in
attempts to change neighborhoods for the better - while also questioning and expanding
what they can accomplish through traditional means - the model developed in this thesis
creates a way of thinking about community action and local change. Although the
strength of this model is in its ability to describe campaigns and campaign outcomes
within my cases, for other studies of community intervention and planning practice, it
suggests a way to conceptualize the potential impact of different approaches to local
action, given the contexts in which they are actually practiced. Its framework emphasizes
not just the fact that neighborhoods are different from each other, but also how different
visions about neighborhood play important roles in community action. In this way, the
process of identifying local problems and conditions, and strategizing about them -
'planning' with a small p - becomes important not only in itself, but for the community
dynamics evoked by this visioning. At the same that the thesis places emphasis on these
important community dynamics, it recognizes that winning and losing is based not on
visioning alone but on the ability of residents and staff to enact this vision. As an effort of
analysis, this thesis has hoped to parallel the necessary work of reflection and self-
assessment practiced by participants in movements -- allowing greater understanding of
5 See for example Stinchcombe's "liability of newness" hypothesis. (1965). For counterevidence on the
possibility of organizational change in nonprofits and movement organizations, see Argyris and Schon
(1987), Jenkins (1977), Greenwood and Hinings (1986) and Sewell (1998).
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the terms of contingency and choice, freedom and consequence, while advancing the
territory where agency may take hold.
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